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VOLUME 45 SUMMER 1968 NUMBER 3
BEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY: SPRINGBOARD
FOR IMAGINATIVE LEGAL EDUCATORS
By CHARLES D. KELSO*
Dean Kelso's theme is that (1) the civilizing of law and of
society, as well as the improvement of education, are marked by in-
creased reliance on the reinforcement of desirable behavior, and by a
decline in reliance on punishment as a means of influencing be-
havior; and that (2) one of the most important challenges facing
society and the educational world is to generate the perspectives,
environments, communications systems, research, and organizations
needed fully to explore and facilitate the above developments. In
many ways, present day legal education operates as if teachers were
already consciously applying the principles of behavioral psychology.
Nevertheless, a deliberate attempt to incorporate behavioral prin-
ciples should result not only in more effective classroom meth-
odology, but more significantly in the curricular reform necessary
for legal education to be relevant to its societal setting.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF BEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS
EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY
A. Prologue on the Past
A LAW professor, searching philosophy and psychology for in-
sights into the learning process, can find many budless branches
on those disciplines' family trees.' For example, Aristotle defined
"knowing" as a capacity to actualize pure forms.2 Unfortunately, this
*Associate Dean, University of Miami School of Law. This article was submitted in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of the Science of
Law in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University.
There is little evidence that law professors have yet done much searching for inspira-
tion in the psychological forest. Professor Cowen looked at the trees, but found no
buds at all, except in psychoanalysis. "Academic psychology is almost totally irrele-
vant for law. This is also a sad state of affairs and a cruel disappointment to many
a student of jurisprudence who had hoped that the new science of psychology would
revolutionize law. It has not happened." Cowen, Notes on the Teaching of Juris-
prudence, 15 J. LEGAL ED. 1, 21 (1962). As this article shows, the author feels that
Professor Cowen overlooked some buds, blooms, and branches. A synthesis of what
contemporary learning theorists have told us-along with the ways in which our
present educational methods appear to be inconsistent with the synthesis - appears in
Kelso, Science and our Teaching Methods: Harmony or Discord?, 13 J. LEGAL ED.
183 (1960). The present article sets forth what the author considers to be the most
promising theory of behavior, that of Professor B. F. Skinner, and applies that theory
and its associated technology to a wide range of law school and legal problems. See
B. F. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1953) and VERBAL BEHAVIOR
(1957). A very readable overview of psychology's history may be found in R. WAT-
SON, THE GREAT PSYCHOLOGISTS FROM ARISTOTLE TO FREUD (1963).
2R. WATSON, supra note 1, at 65.
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does not even squint toward the classroom. Descartes' "I think, there-
fore I am," rings true.3 However, educators prefer to ask, "You are,
therefore why don't you think?" Freud discovered sex's ubiquity.4
Unfortunately, he focused on couches, not curricula. Pavlov switched
from sex to reflex.' However, most law students are easily distin-
guished from Pavlov's salivating dogs.
In the Twenties, psychologists probed the unconscious mind's
seething labryinths. 6 Law professors, happily ignoring the id, juggled
cases and blue books. Meanwhile, psychologist Sidney Pressey, at
Ohio State, played with a little multiple choice machine.7 It recorded
responses to questions and immediately informed users whether they
were right or wrong. The device did not look like the beginning
of a billon dollar industry. Pressey went other ways. The world of
legal education took little note.
Mutual disinterest might have continued indefinitely. How-
ever, the wackiest missile of World War II fused an educational
explosion.
B. Breakthrough
It started when Professor B. F. Skinner was challenged to trans-
form several squadrons of peace loving pigeons into expert Kamikazi
fliers.8 Three pigeons, taught to look at warships, were to be
harnessed in the windowed nose cone of a -missile. Their head move-
ments would control tail fin adjustment. A majority "vote" of the
winged warriors would keep the missile on target.
Skinner trained his birds by rewarding them immediately with
a bit of food whenever they emitted responses approximating the
behavior of looking at models or pictures of warships. "Looking"
behavior grew stronger and stronger. As it did, Skinner gradually
narrowed the tolerance between a rewarded good look (head aimed
right at the target) and an unrewarded off-target glance. Also, the
pigeons gradually had to do much more shipwatching to earn
their seed.
3 DESCARTES' DISCOURSE ON METHOD, at IV (A. Wollaston ed. 1960), reprinted in
R. WATSON, supra note 1, at 144.
4 See S. FREUD, THREE ESSAYS ON SEXUALITY (1953).
5 A thorough analysis is presented in B.F. SKINNER, Two Types of Conditioned Reflex
and a Psuedo-Type, in CUMULATIVE RECORD 367 (1959). See also I. PAVLOV, CON-
DITIONED REFLEXES (1927).
6 R. WATSON, supra note 1, at 423-95.
7 Pressey's work is described in Skinner, Teaching Machines, 128 SCIENCE 969 (1958),
reprinted in A. LUMBSDAINE & R. GLASER, TEACHING MACHINES AND PROGRAMMED
LEARNING 137 (1960). Study of this article is a must for anyone who would venture
into programming.




Ultimately, shipwatching was about all that hungry birds did.
In conventional terms, the birds had learned to "like" shipwatching,
or were "motivated" to watch ships. Speaking strictly in terms of
observable variables, the birds increasingly engaged in watching
behavior after such behavior had been reinforced.
Speaking even more precisely of the birds' history of reinforce-
ment during their training program:
(1) The birds initially were reinforced for "looking" be-
havior on a continuous schedule of reinforcement (i.e., every
approximately correct response was followed by food).
(2) Gradually they were shifted to an intermittent sched-
ule (i.e., only some of their correct responses were reinforced).
(3) The standards for acceptable behavior (i.e., behavior
that would be followed by reinforcement) gradually were
raised.
(4) The pigeons were never punished for behavior in-
compatible with looking behavior.
It is apparent that Skinner's birds were not actualizing pure
forms. Nor were they reasoning from an "I think" proposition, or
coveting warships as sex symbols. Pavlovians might be tempted to
regard the strong looking behavior as a conditioned reflex. However,
conditioning a reflex requires the repetitive presentation of a neutral
stimulus together with one which naturally elicits the reflex
response.' For example, Pavlov paired the ringing of a bell with
the presentation of food. After many repetitions, his dogs salivated
when the bell rang even though food was not present.
In contrast, Skinner's trainees were presented with a neutral
stimulus (a view of a ship), were given the opportunity to respond,
and were reinforced with food whenever their behavior approxi-
mated looking at the ship. Nowhere in the Skinner pattern was a
stimulus used which elicited a reflex response.
The war ended before Skinner's squadron saw action. How-
ever, he used excess pigeon time and energy teaching some of his
charges to walk figure eights, play ping-pong, distinguish colors,
and so on. Later, Skinner turned to quite carefully controlled and
quantified experiments to determine the relationships between
various schedules of reinforcement and resulting patterns of be-
havior.' 0
Skinner's experiments produced opportunities for observing
9 See B.F. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 45-58 (1953). For a more tech-
nical discussion see B.F. SKINNER, supra note 5, at 367.
10 These experiments are most thoroughly documented in B.F. SKINNER & C. FERSTER,
SCHEDULES OF REINFORCEMENT (1957).
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many systematic relationships." For example, the more promptly
reinforcement follows a response, the more quickly will behavior
change. Reinforcement on a continuous schedule (every response
reinforced) produces rapid initial learning. If behavior is never
reinforced, gradually it will be extinguished- it will cease to be
emitted. If reinforcement occurs only after a certain number of
responses have been emitted, there is a rising curve of activity as the
reinforcing event is neared, followed by a lull. The greatest resistance
to extinction, that is, the highest number of unreinforced responses,
occurs if reinforcement has gradually been moved from a continuous
schedule to an intermittent schedule which does not follow a definite
pattern. (For a human analogy, consider the behavior of a person
who wins his first few bets at the races or at a one-arm bandit, and
thereafter, over the years, wins from time to time.)
As previously mentioned, Skinner discovered that responses not
followed by reinforcement (either on a continuous or intermittent
schedule) gradually are extinguished. However, following a response
with the presentation of an aversive stimulus - punishing the
response - does not extinguish behavior any more rapidly than
simply not following the behavior with reinforcement. Again, to
present a simple example, it may be more effective to ignore a
nagging child than attempting to suppress the behavior. Indeed, the
child probably nags only because such behavior has been reinforced
in the past. Far better it would be to reinforce those occasions when
a child uses acceptable behavior to communicate a desire.
Though punishment was not observed to be effective in ex-
tinguishing behavior, Skinner found that it did have definite ef-
fects. 2 Initially it resulted in emotional responses that could inter-
fere with future learning, because the entire situation became some-
what aversive, and it produced unpredictable patterns of avoidance
behavior. Later, when the aversive emotions gradually subsided, the
punished behavior re-emerged unless in the meantime stronger be-
havior, incompatible with the punished behavior, had been created
by the discriminative use of reinforcement. For an example, consider
the alcoholic who has learned to call Alcoholics Anonymous rather
than search for a bottle.
Why is Skinner's work such a tremendous breakthrough? The
answer is that, unlike previous psychological paradigms, each critical
variable in the systematic relationships discovered by Skinner was
and can be observed directly. Thus, Skinner had no need to invent
" These relationships are technically described in B.F. SKINNER & C. FERSTER, Supra
note 10, but they are explained in a much more readable fashion in B.F. SKINNER,
supra note 9, at 99-106.
12 B.F. SKINNER & C. FERSTER, supra note 10, at 182-93.
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hypothetical entities such as pure forms, traits, mental faculties, egos
or ids. Further, not only can the pertinent responses be observed,
but also, and perhaps more important, the two most important con-
trolling variables (stimulus presentation and reinforcement) can be
manipulated by the experimenter.
Since Skinner's work with animals has been replicated on humans
with similar results,13 and since a teacher occupies in the school a
role somewhat analogous to the experimenter in the laboratory, we
now have the basis for a technology of education. Further, since we
now have an analysis of behavior relevant to all actions of all men,
we have the premises for synthesizing our notions about the economic
man, the political man, and the law abiding or the law breaking
man. Finally, and possibly most important to jurisprudes and to
lawyers concerned about community problems and social reform,
we have a solid basis for analyzing the human aspects of legal prob-
lems. Thus, we are in a better position for proposing solutions than
were the Benthamites, who accomplished so much in the 19th century
through applying a less scientific psychology (men seek pleasure
and avoid pain).'4
However, before taking off into the blue yonder of solving
world problems, let us begin with the groundwork - the technology
of education. The stage may be set for its investigation by providing
a somewhat oversimplified list of the technology's specifications:
(1) Provide students with many opportunities to respond
actively.
(2) Reward correct responses (or responses which ap-
proximate correctness) first on a continuous basis, and then
intermittently, as standards for performance gradually are
raised.
(3) Do not punish erroneous responses; plan instead so
to structure educational situations that correct behavior is
observed and promptly reinforced.
(4) Work toward the creation of an educational environ-
ment which provides automatic or self-reinforcement. Reinforce
students for manipulating variables in problem-solving behavior
so that mastery over manipulable variables becomes itself one
of the rewards for problem-solving behavior. 5
13 Much of the work is reported in W. SCHRAMM, THE RESEARCH ON PROGRAMMED
INSTRUCTION, AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and
Welfare Bull. No. 35, 1964).
14 For a quick summary of the major definitions and tenets in the theory of utilitarianism
see J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 1-43 (1950).
15 If one reinforcer, such as praise for manipulating variables, is frequently paired with
another, such as an awareness of gaining mastery over the variables, the second
becomes a conditioned reinforcer by much the same process that transformed Pavlov's
bell into a stimulus for salivation. See B.F. SKINNER, rupra note 9, at 76-81.
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C. First Steps in the New World
If a teacher decides to apply Dr. Skinner's prescription, how
does he do it?
First, students must be provided with many opportunities for
responding in some observable manner to problems and questions.
Much more difficult (indeed, probably the most difficult problem
in conforming educational experience to Skinnerian specifications),
is to supply reinforcement on schedule. Fortunately, a very slight
reinforcement at the proper time may have a great effect in changing
behavior. For example, Skinner hypothesized that immediately
learning whether one's response is correct can be a sufficient rein-
forcement to carry a person through a long series of educational
challenges, at least if the learning situation is reasonably free of
aversive properties. 6 (Recall the temptation to keep going on a
crossword puzzle when a "down" word provides assurance than an
"across" word is appropriate.)
Perhaps the best way of eliminating punishment from an educa-
tional situation is to sequence the presentation of information and
questions so that most responses are correct. This provides maximum
opportunity for reinforcement on a planned schedule.
To test the basic characteristics of the technology suggested by
his experiments and observations (sequence stimuli, observe active
responses, apply discriminative reinforcement), Skinner invented
programmed instruction. His first program presented vocabulary,
principles, and applications of introductory psychology in a sequence
of small statements, called frames. 7 Each frame contained a prob-
lematic stimulus, to which the student composed a response. The
second part of each frame contained a suggested response, concealed
from the student until he had first recorded his response. Usually a
student was asked to respond to new material for the first time while
it was still in the frame before him. Later he was asked to apply
that material when it was not in view.
Skinner's program contained frequent review. However, his
review frames were not merely repetition. To strengthen new be-
havior, Skinner called for applications in many different contexts,
much as a law professor does when he has a student compare one
16 B.F. SKINNER, supra note 9, at 59-106. W. SCHRAMM, Supra note 13, at 10-11, reports
that -[t]he majority of the studies suggest the idea that immediate knowledge of
results contributed to learning.... Knowledge of results is doubtless more important
when the probability of error is high. When the probability of error is kept low, as in
a typical linear program, it becomes less important to have immediate knowledge of
results." See also B.F. SKINNER, supra note 5, at 153, where he states, "[O]ne of the
most striking principles to emerge from recent research is that the net amount of
reinforcement is of little significance. A very slight reinforcement may be tremen-
dously effective in controlling behavior if it is wisely used."
17 J. HOLLAND & B.F. SKINNER, THE ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR (1961).
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case with others, or discuss its relation to hypothetical cases, asking
the student to act as advocate, counselor, or judge.
Hundreds of Skinnerian-type programs, from beginning read-
ing or writing to advanced algebra, have now been written and
tested. They are in use from first grade through university-level
courses, and in industry.'"
Some programs are presented through specially designed books.
Others are computerized, and are presented through a console that
may include a television screen, a sound system, and a typewriter
keyboard.
The typical Skinnerian program is highly structured. It does not
have branches contingent upon the student's performance. Accept-
able response patterns are rather narrow. Perhaps because of this,
law teachers have tended to assume that programmed instruction, if
applicable at all in legal education, holds most promise for highly
structured areas, such as legal problems covered literally by de-
tailed codes, or the purely terminological relationships of a well
developed field. 19
Of course, if programmed instruction could be shown more ef-
fective than conventional instruction in the above two categories, it
should be welcomed as a useful addition to our repertoire of methods.
However, there is no reason to assume that its potential is narrowly
confined. Stimuli can gradually be made more complex until students
are responding to highly abstract relationships among various por-
tions of a total situation. So too, the range of acceptable responses
can be made greater as the program moves from areas in which only
one response is correct to areas where a range of appropriate re-
sponses can be suggested. At such levels, a program might merely
ask a student to study his response in order to determine whether
or not he had considered certain issues. Some responses could be
18 A most useful compilation is C. HENDERSHOT, PROGRAMMED LEARNING: A BIBLIOG-
RAPHY OF PROGRAMS AND PRESENTATION DEVICES (1964 and supplements). The
most complete collection of articles on programmed instruction is A. LUMSDAINE &
R. GLASER, supra note 7. Other useful books include W. DETERLINE, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO PROGRAMED INSTRUCTION (1962); E. FRY, TEACHING MACHINES AND
PROGRAMMED INSTRUCTION (1963); E. GALANTER, AUTOMATIC TEACHING: THE
STATE OF THE ART (1959) ; E. GREEN, THE LEARNING PROCESS AND PROGRAMMED
INSTRUCTION (1963) ; R. MAGER, PREPARING OBJECTIVE FOR PROGRAMMED INSTRUC-
TION (1962); 0. MILTON & L. WEST, P.I.: PROGRAMMED INSTRUCTION, WHAT IT
IS AND How IT WORKS (1961); W. SMITH & J. MOORE, PROGRAMMED LEARNING:
THEORY AND RESEARCH (1962).
19 That this assumption is not necessarily true is demonstrated in C. KELSO, A PRO-
GRAMMED INTRODUCTION INTO THE STUDY OF LAW, PART I: CASE SKILLS (1965).
This was written primarily to teach an area considerably removed from that of the
highly structured code: the skill of reading legal materials, particularly related judicial
opinions, for and with understanding. It was hoped thereby to suggest the versatility
ot programmed instruction. Undoubtedly, programmed instruction could be used to
teach other basic skills now taught only by costly individualized effort (if they are




submitted to an instructor, if detailed and expert evaluation were
needed for appropriate reinforcement.2"
Successful application of the now conventional format of pro-
grammed instruction to many different subject areas and to lawyer
skills would certainly be an important first step in applying be-
havioral psychology to legal education. However, a far more im-
portant point is to realize that the principles underlying Skinner's
technology of education are not limited in their application to con-
ventional programmed instruction. Application of these principles
can improve conventional classroom instruction, as well as con-
ventional course materials. They lead on to highly sophisticated
multi-media catalysts for learning, and suggest the value of inter-
institutional linkages for learning and research. They suggest juris-
prudential perspectives for analyzing and improving the law. They
are relevant to a miscellany of problems including law school
administration, the design of law school buildings, and planning
the law curriculum.
The following sections of this article will explore some of the
ways in which behavioral psychology can in these areas be a spring-
board for imaginative legal educators.
II. EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY IN LEGAL EDUCATION
A. Applications in Conventional Courses
As an introductory aside, it should be noted that "technology"
has two meanings: (1) sets of equipment or machinery which facili-
tate an operation and (2) systematic application in a practical
setting of basic principles validated by scientific methodology. The
word is used primarily in its second sense in this section.
It is not the purpose of this article to suggest that classrooms
be filled with audio-visual aids, or that computers be substituted for
teachers. Of course, to the extent that systematic application of basic
principles calls for interaction between men and machines, this article
will not hesitate to suggest exploration. However, for the moment,
put aside the spectre of computers. Assume only a teacher and his
students, with perhaps the usual surroundings of books, pens, chalk-
board, and chalk. Let us have a behavorial look at the case method,
the problem method, the lecture, and, then, clinical courses and
other recent developments.
o Substantive areas have already been programmed. Professor Wills, at Miami, teaches
Criminal Law by use of programmed instruction. See Diertke & Wills, Investigation
of the Use of Programmed Material in Legal Education, 15 J. LEGAL ED. 444 (1963).
The author has taught portions of Conflict of Laws and Trusts by programmed instruc-
tion. See Kelso, Programming Shows Promise for Training Lawyers: A Report on an
Experiment, 14 J. LEGAL ED. 243 (1961).
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It should come as no surprise to many authors of casebooks or
to classroom experts that they have been behaving for a long time
as if they had consciously been applying behavioral psychology in
planning and presenting their class materials." For example, with
respect to the sequencing of stimuli, many teachers plan questions
for class. They avoid "spoonfeeding" the answers, which would be
indiscriminate use of potential reinforcement. Instead, a classroom
master develops subsidiary questions which hint or suggest directions
of thought that aid a student more precisely to state a point, or more
effectively to reach for an idea almost grasped.
Some teachers, though they do not plan an ordered sequence of
questions, come to class with a written or mental list of the most
important issues or problems illustrated by the materials. The issues
or problems are discussed when the teacher senses that the students
are ready to deal effectively with them. Hence, the teacher provides
opportunities to reinforce his students for lawyerlike behavior.
In a real sense, a class so run is a branching oral program-
provided that students promptly are reinforced for acceptable
responses and that the nature and sequence of questions and other
dialogue has a cumulative or "spiral" effect, i.e., later work builds
on earlier responses and is not merely a repetition of earlier behavior
with new terminology.
2 2
A typical pattern in a case method class is this: the teacher
begins by asking a student to make a careful statement of who is
suing whom, and for what relief. After procedural matters are
cleared away, students are called upon to explore the theories on
which recovery was or was not, could or could not have been,
granted. When the underlying basis for the decision is reached,
the questions usually become more sophisticated. The students must
react not only to literal words, but must also be sensitive to the
method by which the judge handled prior case materials or other
legally pertinent variables. A student will be reinforced by the
21 "How does a program teach? It teaches by age-old methods of telling the student what
he should know or carefully leading him through the steps of discovery." However,
it also "teaches by asking the student to put his new knowledge to work immediately,
to finish the sentence, do a problem, answer a question- not at the end of the
chapter or the end of the unit or the end of the semester, but at the moment of acqui-
sition. A textbook cannot do this, and a teacher can do this for only one of the stu-
dents at a time, the student who is called on. It teaches by compelling each student to
take each step on his own. He cannot depend on his brighter classmates, nor raise his
hand when he happens to know the answer." Markle, Inside the Teaching Machine, in
AMERICAN EDUCATION TODAY 231-32 (P. Woodring & J. Scanlon eds. 1963).
2 During 1964 and 1965 the author visited 120 law schools as study director for the
Association of American Law Schools' Study of Part-Time Legal Education and, as
a part of that study, attended classes. During this time nearly 1000 law teachers were
observed at work. With respect to the sequencing of problematic stimuli, it has
seemed that when a teacher was most closely in rapport with his class, the discussion,
like a good play or novel, approached a peak of dramatic or intellectual complexity,
changed direction, then spiraled toward another central question.
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teacher only if he accurately states such matters as relationships
between cases, how the judge resolved the pros and cons involved
in deciding a case, or how slightly different fact situations might
be treated by the court. An ability to restate in one's "own words"
is often used to test whether a student has really understood the
matters about which he speaks, or whether he has merely hit
upon a phrase in an opinion, footnote, or canned brief.
If students are well prepared, the above pattern provides many
opportunities for active response, vocal or sub-vocal, and for rein-
forcement. However, particularly as the teacher reaches more sophisti-
cated regions, many different sub-vocal responses may be generated,
only a few of which can be vocalized and explicitly reinforced.
A slightly different classroom pattern develops when the prob-
lem method is used. The reason is that problems, when properly
constructed, give the professor more control over the nature and
sequencing of student behavior than do a series of cases to be read.
Only a certain number of paths lead in the direction of solving a
problem, whereas cases can be read in a multitude of ways. Class-
room discussion of a problem assigned in advance tends to center
on pros and cons relating to specific issues or strategies. Building
these pros and cons calls for active responses, and may produce a
greater volume of active, vocal responses than merely reading cases
- even if the students have acquired habits of attempting to
synthesize law from groups of cases read. Furthermore, the range
of responses generated by problems may be narrower than that
produced by case reading. Hence, if students prepare with any
degree of diligence on problem method assignments, very likely
there will be many more opportunities for reinforcing the kind of
behavior that the professor hopes will be strengthened by taking
his course. In building his problems, the professor can implement
with some precision a prior determination of the kind of knowledge
and skill he intends to develop. 3
With respect to the reinforcement phase of educational tech-
nology, regardless of whether the case method or the problem
method was being used, it has been observed that teachers who keep
students most actively engaged in a dialogue usually make clear in
some manner the degree to which each student's contribution approxi-
mates an ideal response that commands respect. 24 The ideal usually
is not a specific statement or result the teacher hopes to hear (al-
though many teachers do "restate" answers for purposes of recorda-
23 An excellent report on the status of the problem method today, prepared by Prof.
David F. Cavers, is THE PROBLEM METHOD, 1966: SURVEY AND APPRAISAL, 1966
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, PART I, at 198
(report of the Teaching Methods Committee).
24 See note 22 supra.
VOL. 45
BEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY
tion in student notebooks), but rather an answer which embodies a
satisfactory reasoning process.
In addition to presenting sequenced stimuli of spiraling com-
plexity, and reinforcing responses with sophisticated discriminations,
a third classroom characteristic that accords with principles of
effective learning frequently can be observed: American law teach-
ers today are usually quite sparing in denunciation, deliberate em-
barrassment, or other forms of deliberate punishment. They prefer
instead either to move on to another student, or to work with a series
of "prompting" questions until the erring student regains the path.
25
Although the preceding analysis has been limited to class
dialogue, some teachers bring life to a subject by lecture. Such teachers
induce their audiences to respond, subvocally, to the kind of variables
which move the teacher, such as retracing the steps of highly original
thinking; or moving frequently from one level of thought to another
- evidence to conclusions, conclusions to support, experience to
reflection, what is to what should be; or comparing, evaluating, or
in some other way bringing considered philosophic premises to bear
on some problem. Ineffective lectures, which fail to hold the listener's
attention, tend to remain at one level of abstraction, such as recount-
ing rules of law which apply to certain logically determinable varia-
tions on a basic situation. Such a lecture does not challenge the mind
with new patterns, create the tension of anticipating the solution of
a problem, or build connections between the world of words and the
world of perception or of ideals.
The above analysis serves as a useful reminder that law teachers
and law students deal almost exclusively with verbal behavior -
25 Lack of intentional classroom punishment may not be sufficient to avoid the emotional
effects on beginning law students of a lack of immediate feedback on overall perform-
ance or the apparently never-ending question-upon-question (which creates a very
intermittent schedule of reinforcement). Professor Watson has suggested that this may
interfere with the development of professional predispositions, or may even erode
them, and he has called for greater teacher sensitivity to student emotions.
If a student senses cynicism or criticalness in the teacher regarding the
emotions he expresses, he will swiftly learn to obscure them from visibility
as well as awareness. This reinforces the very defenses we wish to obviate.
It is just at the point when students freely express themselves that they hang
in precarious balance. If feelings and emotions are treated as acceptable
whatever they are, then and only then may they be kept in awareness long
enough to test their rationality and validity. A person's current attitudes
were generated from what was once a real situation. It is only when they
are reapplied to a new and different set of facts that they become unreal
and irrational. This is the reason why one of the goals in professional educa-
tion should be to help students re-examine their feelings and attitudes in
light of the impending role of lawyer. So far as education for professional-
ism is concerned, this is the moment of truth.
Watson, Some Psychological Aspects of Teaching Professional Responsibility, 16 J.
LEGAL ED. 1, 17 (1963). He has delved even more deeply into the problem in The
Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of a Legal Education, 37
CIN. L. REV. 93 (1968). The University of Miami Learning and Instructional Resources
Center has a video tape and a 16 mm. kinescope of Professor Watson illustrating
some of the problems aand demonstrating some solutions.
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whether the format be reading, listening, lecturing, or discussing.
The problem of teaching verbal behavior relating to law is some-
what different than that of teaching verbal behavior relating to
science. There, uttering a word such as "tree" or "miscroscope" can
be reinforced in the presence of a particular kind of object. In law,
words such as "negligence" or "domicil" have no unique perceptual
counterparts. They gain meaning only gradually. The words must be
heard, read, used, and reinforced in the presence of many other words
and many different fact situations.26 This must be so, since to the
extent that any written or printed word is understood by the listener
or reader, he must be responding, subvocally at least, to variables
similar to those which influenced the speaker or writer. To read an
opinion with understanding is to behave in some way as did the
judge. To understand a professorial comment is to behave anal-
ogously to the professor. Hence, a lecture or discussion which deals
with examples is easier to follow and ordinarily will teach more than
one which is entirely intraverbal and patterned largely on the oral
presentation of an encyclopedia. So, too, a lecture or discussion is
more effective if it moves from one level to another (e.g., by induc-
tion or deduction from facts to principles or principles to results -
patterns of thought for which most law students have been rein-
forced during their previous formal or informal education).
Langdell's invention of the case book was successful primarily
because many more active responses were strengthened when stu-
dents read opinions than when they merely read summaries or heard
about cases. Selective reinforcement of active responses in the
classroom and in discussions with fellow students made students
26 A thorough treatment of these matters appears in B.F. SKINNER, VERBAL BEHAVIOR
(1957). The crucial distinctions in verbal behavior are not between nouns, verbs,
conjunctions, and the like. The critical distinctions depend upon the reinforcing con-
tingencies which strengthened the behavior. For example, a deprivation may have been
reduced ("please pass the bread"). Or, a person may have been reinforced for making
connections between words ("red, white and blue") ; between words and some environ-
mental properties ("the flower is red") ; or between words emitted and the variables
which strengthened their use ("all A is B, no B is C, therefore no A is C"; or I see
a storm coming" in place of "I read that a storm is coming").
The same analysis can be applied to "seeing" things in one's imagination and to
thinking. Thinking can be analyzed as simply a sub-vocal form of thinking out loud.
If a person has a problem, in the sense that some behavior has been strengthened by
a deprivation or a potential reinforcer, but that behavior cannot be emitted, the person
may manipulate variables by using his hands, his speaking voice, whispers, or sub-
vocal behavior. If he is able to emit the blocked behavior and is reinforced, e.g., he is
able to pick up car keys that had become buried under a pile of papers, then he
has solved a problem and his problem solving behavior is strengthened.
"Seeing" things in one's imagination is a matter of behavior having been rein-
forced. In many situations persons are reinforced for retention of visual or auditory
sensations. At first this behavior cannot be maintained in strength for very long. How-
ever, when a substantial history of reinforcement has occurred, quite vivid and detailed
impressions can be called to mind.
Even general techniques for problem solving can be selectively reinforced in dif-
ferent contexts. Thus, it is logical to assume that persons someday will efficiently be
taught not only how to learn, but also to engage in that behavior quite extensively.
And, again, following Skinnerian observations, persons can be taught to teach.
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more lawyerlike. It is highly probable that study of transcriptions,
recordings, or video-tapes of law teachers in action would confirm
the above observations as well as provide valuable aids for training
future law teachers. Some work in this direction is already under-
way.
27
Though communication between law teachers based upon com-
mon observations of law classes is still in its infancy, law teachers
have increasingly been willing to explain what they hoped would
be taught by using certain course materials, and how it might best
be taught. Thus, coursebook authors are now preparing manuals
that explain 'how-to-teach-it" and "why." At first such publications
were only for teachers. Lately, students are also being let in on the
secrets. At first this was by way of an extended introduction cover-
ing what the book was about. Today, however, coursebooks are
tending to include more text. The author states his views and opin-
ions, thus placing before each student much of the synthesis that
Langdell would have wanted the student himself to construct.
Furthermore, the author may place in footnotes some of his favorite
class questions, thus suggesting directions for preparation to the law
teacher in the casebook itself. And today's footnote questions often
go beyond the "suppose X fact changed to Y, what result," with a
citation to a decided case. More complex problems are appearing,
which clearly call for students to apply a synthesis, whether their own
or one supplied by the teacher, a hornbook, or otherwise.
Thus, consciously or not, to generate more responses and to
sequence stimuli so that discriminative reinforcement can be used
more effectively, today's teachers are blurring the distinction between
case method and problem method. However, teachers who wish to
generate a larger number of student responses for selective rein-
forcing usually have turned in another direction: the clinical course,
such as appellate moot court, trial practice, interviewing, or legal
aid clinic.
B. Applications in Clinical Courses
Many active responses can be predicted when the contingencies
of reinforcement are such that a specific problem is presented, and
27 Professor John Murray has prepared tape recordings of teachers in action, and an
observational evaluative questionnaire. He has proposed the creation of a clearing
house to facilitate anonymous critiques of tape recorded classes for professors who
desire the benefit of such evaluation. See 1966 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, PART I, at 261-64 (report of the Subcomm. on Evaluating
Case-Method Instruction). The University of Miami has produced, under the auspices
of the 1967 Teaching Methods Committee, a series of nine video tapes (which have
been kinescoped) featuring eight great teachers in action. The starring teachers are
Fleming James (Yale), Harry W. Jones (Columbia), Robert Keeton (Harvard),
Allen McCoid (Minnesota), Soia Metschikoff (Chicago), Harry Reese (North-
western), Myres McDougal (Yale), and Andrew S. Watson (Michigan).
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reinforcement for its solution can only be obtained by action. This
is what occurs when students are placed in a clinical situation.
The main teaching problem in clinical courses is to create op-
portunities for observing responses and for promptly reinforcing
them. It is difficult to say, "Good question, Jim," while a student is
still interviewing a legal aid client. However, some very imaginative
experiments are going on. One of the most successful appears to be
that of Professor Robert Keeton, at Harvard Law School, who has
been engaged in it so long that perhaps "experiment" is no longer
the proper term. A description of a part of his course in Trial Tactics
should suffice to make the point.2"
Professor Keeton provides students with a set of materials in-
cluding witness statements, and asks two-man teams to represent the
parties at a hearing. The problematic materials are so structured that
there are valid conflicting arguments about whether a particular
witness should be used at all; about the issues with respect to which
his observations are relevant; and usually about whether, though
he can provide favorable testimony with respect to one issue, un-
favorable matters could be brought out on cross-examination.
The student teams interrogate the witness, with the instructor
making rulings as would a judge. Then the entire class joins in a
critique on the performance just observed. If other members of the
class believe that pertinent facts could better have been produced
by other questions, they are invited to try out those questions on the
witness. The answers then received are placed before the house for
critique.
Professor Keeton permits the discussion to range widely, but
does insure that certain critical questions are asked: What did you
hope to get from this witness with respect to what legal issue? Are
you satisfied with what you did? How might you have done a better
job? What were the most important problems involved in deciding
whether to use the witness and what to ask him?
Keeton's approach to Trial Tactics generates a great deal of
very pertinent student behavior, subject to immediate selective rein-
forcement. Little time is spent on subsidiary matters. The focus is on
the crucial questions of how facts are proved, and the judgmental
problems of deciding what to do when both reinforcing and aversive
consequences can be foreseen in the attempt to prove (or disprove)
a fact.
Sometimes clinical and non-clinical courses are distinguished
in terms of skill versus knowledge, or practical versus theoretical.
2 The following description is based in part on conversations with Professor Keeton and
on use of his Trial Tactics materials, but in greater part on the video-tape of his class
at the University of Miami under the program described in note 27, supra.
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However, usually this is done very superficially on grounds such as
easily observed responses (skill) versus covert verbal behavior
(knowledge), or the frequency with which practicing lawyers are
observed to engage in the behavior (practical) versus frequency of
the response in the repertoire of scholars (theoretical). Such dis-
tinctions interfere with the development of an effective educational
technology, and the following analysis is proposed as a more work-
able alternative.
Education is the process of changing behavior by arranging
contingencies of reinforcement for that purpose. Knowledge, whether
acquired by education or by responses to the natural environment, is
potential behavior. Skill is highly refined knowledge.
Knowledge is transformed into skill when contingencies of rein-
forcement are such that a man becomes responsive to ever more
subtle or complex properties of stimuli or to more of them; when his
responses become discriminative, complex, precise, or original; and
when he is able to emit more efficient discriminative and manipu-
lative responses between finding a problem and solving it.
Practical skills, when exercised successfully, have an immediate
effect on the environment or on others, and are reinforced by feed-
back from that effect. Theoretical skills, when exercised successfully,
create understanding. They are potential verbal behavior which
place a man more closely into contact with subtle or complex
aspects of his environment, or provide methods by which that may
be done. A man need not bring about a change in the environment
or in others in order to be reinforced for exercise of theoretic skill.
Improvement of practical skills to a high level of sophistication
depends upon developed theoretical skills. Since law is a form of
applied social science, its theoretical skills ultimately become prac-
tical, and exercise of its practical skills is likely to be more effective
if the actor also has theoretical skills.
It is useful to distinguish extremes along several dimensions
with respect to both practical and theoretical skills. At one extreme
are skills developed by reinforcements contingent upon prompt
response to a total situation in order to facilitate pre-set goals. A
stereotype is the cross-examiner at work (though, of course, he must
have a guiding theory of his case). At the other extreme, reinforce-
ment may be contingent on reflective reaction to situation-types,
where an attempt has been made to determine sense for the situation
and the means for bringing that sense into being. A stereotype is the
brooding jurisprude.
Either a clinical or a classroom setting (lecture, case, or problem
method) may be designed to call for prompt or reflective responses,
abstractions or concreteness, implementation or goal-defining be-
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havior, or various other combinations and degrees of these kinds
of responses. Certainly in the Keeton course2 9 students reflect during
preparation, must develop theories of their case, and decide what
their goal will be with respect to the witness. When the witness is
on the stand, preparatory behavior must combine with prompt, im-
plementing, and total-situation responses. Indeed, developments may
well call for some on-the-spot revision of the basic plan. In the
critique portion of the class session, the contingencies of reinforce-
ment resemble those of the case class, insofar as quick thinking is
rewarded, and the problem method class, insofar as perspective on
the assigned materials has been sharply limited by the specific prob-
lems facing the advocates.
Recalling the principles of educational technology,3" the above
analysis suggests that in deciding whether a course should be given
clinical or non-clinical configuration, a case or problem method
treatment, or some other setting, and in planning activities and
materials within any of these formats, the following questions should
be asked and answered:
(1) Precisely what is the behavior to be strengthened;
must responses be prompt to be effective; can they be reflective;
are they to a total situation, or to highly abstract properties of
it; and to what extent are goals to be formulated?
(2) What is the most promising sequence of pertinent
stimuli, considering the structure of the field, what the students
already know, and the complexity of problems to be considered?
(3) What mode of presentation will generate active
responses capable of observation and discriminative reinforce-
ment?
(4) Do the problems provide an appropriate challenge -
one within the ability of the students, but not so easy that rein-
forcement for their solution has but little effect on behavior?
Of course, there are limits to the power of purely methodo-
logical engineering. It is increasingly suspected that law students
will not find it reinforcing to learn behavior which does not relate
to pressing community problems of our times, and which is not in
some way based upon the best available data and scientific theories
with respect to that data.
Keeping the curriculum relevant as well as logical is a con-
tinuing problem. Also, so long as we rely for reinforcement on a
live teacher saying "right," or simply moving on to the next question
or topic as a sign that all is well, there are limits to the degree of
29 See text at note 28 supra.
30 See note 15 supra.
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individualized contingencies of reinforcement we can construct
(since we are not likely to reach a one to one faculty-student ratio
for all courses). Programmed books, previously discussed, individual-
ize with respect to speed of progression and are so designed that
individual reinforcement is frequent because most responses are
correct. However, for many sophisticated kinds of skills, and for
skills involving interaction to printed and oral forms of communi-
cation, instrumentation is needed, both within law schools and
between law schools in order to take maximum advantage of the
unique strengths of each. These matters are explored in the next
sections.
C. Educational Configurations That Include Equipment
Some law professors have used audio-visual materials. A few
have produced them. However, almost all of the available materials
merely present words and pictures. They do not create a new kind
of educational configuration, one calling for active responses to
sequenced stimuli, followed by reinforcement for the correct re-
sponses that sequencing tends to insure.
Much attention is being paid today in educational circles to
computer assisted instruction that integrates written and oral stimuli
and responses."' The potential of such sophisticated and expensive
devices will be touched upon later. However, much can be done
with simpler and less expensive equipment. A multitude of poten-
tially fruitful experiments cry out to be performed.
For example, lawyers and law students must depend upon
skilled listening. Much of the data manipulated in their professional
problem solving comes from lectures, questions, answers, et cetera.
Listening is not a passive, inherited faculty nor a capacity to
actualize pure forms. It is a set of active responses for which law
students have had a long history of reinforcement, but not a history
that necessarily has developed all of the sub-skills needed to listen
effectively in a professional situation. The listening lawyer or law
student must sort relevant from irrelevant information, connect facts
with legal theories, make interconnections between legal concepts,
test "is" statements against values.
It is quite likely that many law students and lawyers under-
perform because they do not know how to listen effectively (just as
many perform at less than full capability because of specific diffi-
culties in reading, manipulating concepts for problem solving, com-
posing, editing, and speaking). There is no doubt that a test could be
31 See PROGRAMMED LEARNING AND COMPUTER-BASED INSTRUCTION (J. Coulson ed.
1962) and Swets & Feurzerg, Computer-Aided Instruction, 150 SCIENCE 572 (1965).
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devised to determine how well a student listens, and that a program
could be placed on tape to develop the ability to listen effectively.
While it is not the purpose here to sketch out an entire course
along this vein, one of the most important skills which should be
developed is to listen for the main theme of an oral presentation
and, having separated it from the rest, classify other portions of the
statement as supporting evidence, elaboration, and proof. Just as
a legal reading course can improve understanding of written mate-
rials, so a tape recorded program, probably combining tape with a
syllabus, work materials, and tests, could improve listening with
understanding to legal presentations. It is assumed that such a pro-
gram would not merely be aimed at understanding lectures, though
it might start there, but would also include understanding a discus-
sion and understanding an interview.
A listening program might well be taught using several differ-
ent fields of law or several different kinds of legal problems. How-
ever, it might perhaps be better taught in the context of a particular
first year course. There is no reason, for example, why some branch
of torts could not be taught via a listening program, in order not
only that the students would learn that part of the course, but also
that they would respond more effectively to oral teaching in all
other parts of the subject and their other courses. The program
might also teach something about note-taking.
A history of positive reinforcement generated by such a pro-
gram might make possible a form of learning not now in use - sup-
plemental tape recordings available in the law library for fine points
that cannot ordinarily be reached in class. Further, the library might
find it advisable to stock up on tapes relating to recent develop-
ments in the law. Such tapes are now being made available com-
mercially to practicing lawyers.
In addition to teaching listening skills, the tape recorder could
well be used to teach discussion skills, as an incident to or part of
learning law. Programmed problematic situations, probably related
to a course then being taken, could be presented in writing (or
orally from a tape) to a small group of students. They would be
expected to discuss the problem until they felt the need for an opera-
tion to be performed of a kind that a discussion leader or a teacher
would perform in class. Class operations include giving gentle hints,
giving strong hints, suggesting a list of issues that should be con-
sidered, providing additional information on some phase of the
problem, indicating whether some specific sub-answer is right or
wrong, or giving an opinion on the main problem. With respect to
each of the programmed problems, these discussion-leader functions
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could be placed on the tape, and the recorder so structured that
students could easily reach the spot on the tape which provided the
desired operation with respect to each problem.
A discussion program, such as outlined above, might have the
incidental effect of reviving or extending interest in the old-fashioned
bull session about legal problems. Moreover, student assistance in
constructing discussion tapes would provide a creative outlet for
student energies that might ultimately prove almost as beneficial as
writing the standard law note or comment.
Tape recorded programmed instruction, described above, has
some branching built into it, since the students need not ask for each
of the possible aids to discussion for each problem. However, if we
are fully to individualize programmed instruction, it becomes neces-
sary to employ complex equipment such as computers. Again, it is
important to note just what the computer is adding, so that unlike
the movies previously created for legal education, we are not merely
spending money to present something to students in a fancier pack-
age that could just as well be done via a book.
For example, an adequate program on legal writing probably
could be prepared in book form. Writing may be divided into
composing and editing behavior. An experienced writer edits as he
composes, trying out in his mind several versions of a sentence, and
then writing the best one - keeping in mind the overall organization
and theme he is trying to present. The less experienced writer has to
get something out on paper and then go over it. Indeed, even the
best of writers, particularly when working in a new area, occasionally
needs to use a blue pencil on his first efforts.
A program to improve a law student's ability to write should
begin, like the teaching of chess, with the ending game - editing.
Indeed, a program has already been written on editing non-legal
writing. 2 It is a fascinating experience to take the program. Such a
program could rather easily be written for law students. It would
include matters of editing for citation form, common misspellings
found in legal writing, grammar, and diction. Also, it would call
upon students to detect errors in logic, and the misuse of autoclitics
(words or phrases which describe relationships between other words,
or between words and external experiences of the author).
The program should probably begin with sentence problems,
move to paragraphs, and then to relationships between sentences and
paragraphs, particularly the use of topical sentences. This would
provide a lead into composition, which might well start with a form
of writing which embodies a great deal of editing behavior -the
32 R. SHURTER & J. REID, A PROGRAM FOR EFFECTIVE WRITING (1966).
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composition of headings. Headings are heavily edited writing since
what has been composed must be checked, rechecked, and, typically,
many times revised in order to make sure that the essence of the
following text has been captured. Students could be given the sub-
stance of legal arguments from well written briefs, and then chal-
lenged to draft headings which fit the substance. Then they could
compare their work with a check list of questions, re-edit their work,
and, finally, compare it with examples provided by the author.
Going a step beyond, students could then be given the raw materials
from which an argument, case note, or memo could be composed.
Further, the law schools certainly need a program which teaches
law students something about how to write a law examination.a
Such a program could provide information and casebook refer-
ences, and then begin by asking very simple questions. Sample
answers would be provided. The questions would then become more
complex. The order of questions need not and probably should not
correspond with the order of things in the casebook. However, it
might well be confined, in its early stages, to the earlier portions of
a particular course, so that freshmen could work with it during the
semester before final review time rolled around.
The important thing is not that all such programs be taken by
all law students. The critical point is that specialized supplementary
materials should be available in the law school for students who have
special needs.
Although a program on writing could be presented in book
form, to embody it in a computer would have several advantages.
First, student responses could easily be recorded for future study.
Second, the program could be amended easily. Third, as patterns of
student response were learned, branches of the program could be
constructed to deal with special kinds of responses and problems
observed at each step of the way. Fourth, and most important, the
composition and editing of legal writing could lead to the next step:
challenging a student to prepare a legal writing that solves a problem
for which not all of the relevant material was provided in advance.
The other relevant material could be stored in the computer and
made available if the student took the proper search steps.
How to do research by using a computer could be taught by a
program built into the computer. This makes a great deal of sense,
looking to the future, because legal research materials are increas-
33 Just about all that most students ever see on the subject is found in the booklet by
Professor S. KINYON, HOW TO STUDY LAW AND WRITE LAW EXAMINATIONS (2d ed.
1951). It is one thing to be told how to write exams and to read examples. It is quite
another to edit exam answers, from simple to subtle, being reinforced along the way,
and to compose answers, in a sequence from simple to complex, having had opportu-
nities all along the way to evaluate each step of your work.
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ingly becoming available in computer systems.34 By teaching editing,
composing, and research on a computer console, and then adding
research technique, we would be using the machine as a combined
teaching and research instrument. Probably the machine would have
the capacity to permit editing of a draft by some kind of interlineation,
and then it would print out, at high speed, a revised copy of what
had been prepared. Thus, it is highly probable that the total time
involved in researching for and preparing a written argument could
be substantially decreased, and in all likelihood the thoroughness of
the research would be enhanced.
Of course, substantive courses can be programmed for computer-
assisted instruction. Demonstrations of programmed instruction in
criminal law were included in the 1965 and 1966 audio-visual exhibits
at the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools.
Questions and information were presented on a console. Answers
could be typed on a keyboard. The computer then evaluated the
answer and presented the next problematic sequence.
Thus far this article has suggested that not only substantive
courses, but also skills such as listening, problem-solving, and com-
munication could be taught more effectively by conscious application
of educational technology. It has been indicated that this could also
occur by more conscious application of Skinnerian principles in the
classroom and in the preparation of conventional materials. How-
ever, there is yet another dimension to consider in the teaching
environment - learning by responding to print or voice combined
with pictures presented by television and/or movies.3
It is clear that lawyers and law students constantly must respond
in situations where what is heard or read must be placed in context.
Although it is uncertain how much time should be allotted for
experiences such as those described below, it seems that they would
provide kinds of valuable learning experiences not now available,
and that experimentation in these areas would be worthwhile.
First, lawyers are sometimes called upon to reduce to writing a
general agreement reached between negotiating businessmen. A film
might be produced showing two businessmen in negotiation. Students
representing each side could be asked to negotiate the details and
reduce them to a written contract for signature. The raw data could,
of course, be presented via a summary, a transcript, or a tape record-
ing. However, the total scene, as depicted by a movie or video-tape,
34 C. RHYNE, THE COMPUTER AS AN AID IN LEGAL RESEARCH (National Institute of
Municipal Law Officers Report No. 150, 1950) (containing an extensive biblio-
graphy).
35 "One of the significant findings seems to be that it is possible to teach efficiently with
programmed materials on television films." W. SCHRAMM, supra note 13, at 12.
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would be a far better stimulus, and certainly a more realistic one.
Listening, note-taking, and situation-reaction skills would be put to a
rigorous test.
Second, students could be exposed to several versions of an inter-
view with a client, and asked to compare them. This could be done
via scripting, with the student asked to improve the script. Or it
could be done live, by instructors or students. However, a more
economic use could be made of teacher time by having the stimulus
recorded and, as distinguished from a transcript, the film or video-
tape would provide the opportunity to respond not only to what
was being said in the interview, but to the total picture as well.
Third, a backstage look could usefully be taken of great judges
deciding a case which had been argued before them. This might
provide new insights into a phase of the judicial process not hereto-
fore brought to light.
Fourth, students could be asked to prepare on a series of cases,
as for a regular class, and then attend a video or movie presentation
of a class taught by a great teacher covering those materials. The
presentation could direct questions to the student audience from time
to time. The audience might be provided with some kind of sheet on
which answers could quickly be recorded. Perhaps some answers
would then be revealed on the work materials. Perhaps the answers
would thereafter develop on the screen. The best configurations
would have to be determined by empirical experiment. Once the
proper formula was found, the expertise of great teachers could be
extended far beyond the boundaries of their own schools, and in ways
more educationally compelling than in their casebooks, treatises, or
articles.
The law schools simply must begin experimenting with the use
of television as a catalytic agent for discussion. In the past, and
perhaps up to the present time, law students were for the most part
print-oriented. Increasingly, however, the law schools will have a
generation of students who have worked with programmed instruc-
tion and who will have learned from educational television, as well
as having spent countless hours in front of television sets.
Law schools have to take their students as they come and cannot
totally remold their methods of learning. And, according to Pro-
fessor McLuhan, television is a medium which induces a high degree
of total involvement, much as if the viewer were experiencing an
extension of his tactile sense and not merely his eyes and ears. 6
36 M. McLuHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN (1964), and
M. MCLUHAN & Q. FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS THE MASSAGE (1967).
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Students who have grown up on such fare will expect higher educa-
tion much more to resemble a "happening" than a lecture.
Surely, in years to come, television will be permitted in high
courts so that law students and others can experience arguments live,
and thus can participate in decision day. If immediately thereafter,
what they experienced could be discussed with a professorial expert,
the impact of such a jurisprudential "happening" would probably be
much greater than reading the case after it had been neatly packaged
in a casebook. Through such a medium a sense of immediacy and
urgency, as is found partly in U. S. Law Week, could be added to legal
education. It is difficult to think of a better way than this to intensify
law students' involvement in important community problems of our
time- an involvement which is almost as real as the clinic, and
perhaps much more beneficial because of the possibility of having a
professorial expert selectively reinforce reactions to what was going
on. Because television can take students into the street and into
business, it should be used, or tried, as a device to promote more
systematic study of the major community problems of our time.
Of course, trials, appellate arguments, and opinion day should
be tape recorded as well as viewed on a monitor. Selected portions
could be edited and preserved. But even for discussion purposes,
there is a great value, after just having experienced the whole, in
going over it, stopping the tape from time to time, and discussing a
particular point or series of events.
Television and computers are expensive equipment. However,
if a television program is being presented, it is cheaper to present it
over a network than repeat it many times locally. The same is true
of computer assisted instruction: it may be more economical to have
many terminals at various schools connected to a time-sharing instru-
ment, than to have many computers at each school. Indeed, one of
the great potential benefits of instrumentation is that it can be used
not only to increase the teaching effectiveness of a faculty within a
single school, but also to create productive interchanges between
schools.
Telelecture or radio can transmit voice communication between
classes at widely separated points; telewriting and slow scan tele-
vision can add a visual dimension to the experience. Consoles for
computer assisted instruction can be connected by long distance tele-
phone wire to the computer. Soon to come on the campuses of many
universities are inter-university communications centers which will
facilitate and coordinate activities such as those mentioned above.
Cooperation between law professors at different schools can be
expected to evolve into creation of courses capable of being taught
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and taken at several universities simultaneously, or being used as
supplementary work by students at several law schools. 7
III. BEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY, LAW, AND THE CURRICULUM
A. The Rise of Reinforcement and the Decline of Punishment
Law is intended to influence behavior. Thus, it embodies
assumptions on how behavior is controlled, as well as judgments on
what kinds of behavior should be encouraged, discouraged, or left in
freedom. Law is effective because of (or perhaps should even be
defined as) the contingencies of reinforcement maintained by govern-
ment officials.
38
Historically, our legal system has assumed that men seek to
gain rewards and avoid punishment, and that fear of punishment is
the most practicable contingency of reinforcement for the govern-
ment to maintain. However, the limitations of punishment and the
power of reinforcement were being discovered by lawmakers even
before Professor Skinner conducted his experiments. In fact, it can
be argued strongly that the civilizing of law has been marked by a
shift from punishing undesirable behavior to reinforcing desired
behavior.89
For example, creation of the Federal Trade Commission 40 was
a step away from the jurisprudence of punishment. Punitive court
litigation was not deemed an adequate procedure for gray areas in
antitrust problems, where decisions must be based on economic or
social effects rather than evil or predatory motives. The Commission
was to determine cause-effect patterns. Its programs of voluntary
compliance reflect its raison d'etre much more than does a cease and
desist order.41
Reinforcement principles are more clearly evidenced by pro-
grams such as social security and medicare. Though there is a very
slightly felt punishment in payroll deductions, an enormous amount
37 Systems for accomplishing these linkages are described in a pamphlet that emerged
from the Audio-Visual Exhibit at the 1966 annual meeting of the Association of
American Law Schools. The help of Mr. Michael H. Beilis, of American Telephone
and Telegraph, in preparing the exhibit is gratefully acknowledged. See AMERICAN
TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, COMMUNICATIONS TECHNIQUES FOR LEGAL
EDUCATION AND RESEARCH (1967) (distributed by A.T. & T., 195 Broadway, N.Y.,
N.Y.).
38 See B.F. SKINNER, supra note 9, at 339.
s Skinner has noted the same trend in all of society. "Not only education but Western
culture as a whole is moving away from aversive practices. We cannot prepare young
people for one kind of life in institutions organized on quite different principles.
The discipline of the birch rod may facilitate learning, but we must remember that it
also breeds followers of dictators and revolutionists." B.F. SKINNER, TEACHING
MACHINES, reprinted in A. LUMSDAINE & R. GLASER, supra note 7, at 158, and B.F.
SKINNER, supra note 5, at 177.
40 Elman, Antitrust Enforcement: Retrospect and Prospect, 53 A.B.A.J. 609 (1967).




of fairly predictable personal planning is based upon reinforcements
anticipated or being provided for by these programs. Again, the
behavior of businessmen is significantly influenced, more predictably
than if criminal laws were used, by tax deductions, exemptions,
or allowances.
Today, reinforcement is being proposed as a supplement or
substitute for punishment even in some areas where the conduct
sought to be changed is clearly undesirable. For example, anti-pollu-
tion laws are being urged which would provide tax benefits in return
for money spent by polluters to install control equipment.
Such programs may make one apprehensive about the possibly
undesirable side effects of "reinforcement" as distinguished from
"punishment" jurisprudence. Of course, all ramifications of any law
should be traced. This is particuarly so when a reinforcement pro-
vision depends not upon behavior, but upon a status - as in most
welfare programs. If reinforcement is contingent upon a status
which can voluntarily be created or continued, then unless the pro-
gram is carefully structured, it can tend to bring about or continue
the status for many individuals, even though the most desirable goal
is behavior that avoids the status. Thus, for example, all is not well
with a welfare program which encourages fathers to remain "incog-
nito" for fear that aid to dependent children may be cut off.42 For
similar reasons, subsidy programs must continually be monitored.
However, the problems of developing a reinforcement program
so that it efficiently and effectively produces desirable behavior, and
does not result in undesirable by-products, are ordinarily much less
troublesome than those associated with trying to administer punish-
ment successfully. It is no exaggeration to say that where punishment
still remains in the law, there you will usually find unsatisfactory
administration, failure to achieve stated goals, and even a deteriora-
tion of the process by which goals are formulated. Just a few quick
examples: think of how we jail intoxicated persons as if they were
criminals; think of the environmental situation into which v.-e throw
persons accused for the first time of a misdemeanor; and consider the
social erosion caused by too quickly branding youths as delinquents.
When punishment theory gets too far away from what the public
will accept, as where the law purports to grant a divorce cnly as a
punishment to a wrongdoer, the whole system breaks down into
42 Some recognition of this problem was contained in the Social Security bill passed by
the House of Representatives on Au ust 17, 1967. However, the tenor of the changes
was punitive - stop certain past abuses - rather than to reinforce new forms of
behavior. Reported in the Miami Herald, Aug. 18, 1967, at Al, "The House approved
a major increase in Social Security benefits and tough new welfare restrictions to
discourage illegitimate births . . . . The child welfare provisions are intended to get
jobs for unwed mothers and to stop a frequent practice of fathers leaving home so the
mothers can qualify for welfare payments."
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myths and devious procedures- devices which, unfortunately, are
all too often available to the prosperous, but not to the poor. Indeed,
almost across the board, the punishing aspects of our legal system
apply much more to the poor than to prosperous persons. Persons of
means are much more likely to be affected primarily by programs
based on the more civilized and advanced jurisprudence of rein-
forcement.
43
Rather than attempt to catalogue further instances from the past
or present, let us examine several examples of how a behavioral
perspective - one which emphasizes reinforcement rather than pun-
ishment - may help suggest approaches for solving pressing com-
munity problems at the local, national, and transnational levels.
Locally, the most important function of government is to insure
that the physical environment adequately supports recognized values.
Property tax relief for sums spent by landlords to improve sub-
standard housing would probably produce more tangible results than
an equivalent amount of money spent on housing code enforcement.
Indeed, going a step further, it might be possible to create a system
whereby money spent or labor invested by tenants to improve their
housing conditions could be treated as a credit against rent. The
possibility of ultimately securing ownership of a condominium via
an option procedure, perhaps coupled with government rent sudsidies
on certain conditions, should also be considered as a tool for encour-
aging behavior that would result in more suitable housing conditions
in our cities.
The problem of pollution could be attacked not only be requir-
ing new automobiles to have filter equipment (or electric motors),
but also by selling cheaper license plates to automobiles equipped
with operational filters (or electric motors). Thus, older cars as
well as new could rather quickly be swept into a system for abating
exhaust fumes, without resorting to the paraphernalia of punish-
ment - tickets, summonses, court appearances, fines, and the like.
With regard to the above matters, and indeed with respect to
all or almost all phases of planning for improvement of the local
environment, procedures which encourage and reward greater public
involvement in the early stages of developing an overall plan would
pay off many dividends in greater public support for implementation
of the plan. Furthermore, the plan probably would be better if such
procedures were followed.
Moving now to broader geographic areas, regional problems
center primarily around developing and conserving resources, and
providing for their fair distribution. Action on the regional level




would be substantially accelerated if federal support were readily
available to subsidize planning conferences and the research and
drafting necessary to produce interstate compacts. Permanent staffs
created by groups of states in a regional area to deal with these
matters would broaden thinking from "What's best for my state?"
to "What's the best means for dealing with the resources of this
region?" Such staffs would turn inevitably from considering such
questions as how to obtain the maximum gallonage of water in an
interstate river for local allocation, to questions such as whether the
maximum economic benefit from the water in an interstate river can
be derived from irrigation or industrial use.
Turning to the national scene, there is today much concern
about demonstrations, which, depending upon their intensity, may
shade into riots. The problem is both local (because people and
property must be protected from physical violence) and national
(because the variables that generate most demonstrations or riots
appear to be nation wide in scope).
The stimulus-response-reinforcement paradigm makes it clear
that if people are reinforced for demonstrative behavior, the behavior
of demonstrating will be strengthened. If the existence, amount, and
promptness of the reinforcement is proportionate to the intensity of
the demonstrative behavior and/or the number of persons involved
in the demonstration, then it becomes probable that even more
intense demonstrations will occur in the future.
The next step in reasoning is not to opt for more repressive
measures against demonstrations. Far from it. The burnings, violence,
and disruption of a riot impose tremendous punishment on the very
people the rioters apparently hope to benefit. Further, official pun-
ishment, particularly the imposition of punishment at an early stage
in a situation containing a few troublemakers and many spectators,
can turn the spectators into a mob because punishment, experienced
or observed, creates emotional and unpredictable behavior.
The basic, long-run solution is to reinforce behavior incom-
patible with the onset or continuance of demonstrations or riots.
Programs for reinforcing behavior that predictably lead to good
jobs, sound education, and decent housing have of course been
recognized as necessary ingredients in any total plan. Another
promising step is to encourage the articulation of grievances at the
earliest possible moment, particularly grievances against officialdom,
and to provide prompt reinforcement for doing so. Hence it is that
Professor Gellhorn's monumental studies on the ombudsman are so
timely and have touched such a responsive chord. 44
Second, there is a clear and present need to show certain dis-
44 W. GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS (1966).
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advantaged people that society does care, and intends to remove
obstacles in their path, such as restrictive laws or practices which deny
opportunities for constructive behavior. For example, whether by
statute or otherwise, the avenues for entry into many of the trade
unions should be broadened. Until it becomes possible to practice a
trade, no reinforcer is available to encourage educational effort to
improve one's skill.
Third, local officials should not become so preoccupied with
improved training for riot control that they fail to search for schemes
that would reinforce the behavior they would like to see occur. For
example, if the city fathers of Fort Lauderdale, Florida, would prefer
that its annual influx of students dance rather than riot, then the
city should provide plenty of music and dancing space, rather than a
dark beach and an array of police alerted for riot control.
Fourth, promises should not be made in order to reinforce the
behavior of ceasing to demonstrate.45 However, promises made
should be honored. Failure to carry through with a promise is a
form of punishment and will produce all of the usual undesirable
results.
Fifth, if a riot does break out, punishment should be held to a
minimum. The "white hat" concept, used in Tampa, Florida, appears
to have been quite effective. A "clear the area" curfew appears to be
more effective than attempting many arrests in the midst of spectators
who see in the arrests many examples of punishment.
It is recognized that the above is only a superficial start toward
suggesting some means for dealing with a current national problem.
The problem is too complex for solution by any such five points.
However, the hope is to suggest the kind of perspective and approach
that follows from applying behavioral psychology. Further examples
relating to cooperation in the administration of justice, juvenile courts,
and the good samaritan appear in the footnotes. 6
Moving to the transnational arena, it seems clear that if a gov-
45 Of course, efforts not to reward rioters should not lead to a punitive attitude. Whit-
ney M. Young, Jr., executive director of the National Urban League, is rightly con-
cerned that "Congress, 'in its obvious efforts to avoid rewarding the rioters,' will
embark on 'a course of retaliation, revenge and vindictive activity' that will ultimately
punish innocent Negroes as well and thereby play right into the hands of the extrem-
ists." TIME, Aug. 11, 1967, at 12.
46 If a citizen cooperates with law enforcers as, for example, by taking a day off from
work, presenting himself at the courthouse, perhaps waiting on uncomfortable benches
for a time, but then learns that the trial has been postponed, the lack of reinforcement
will tend to extinguish the behavior of willing cooperation. Some devices to insure
against this situation should be tested. For example, postponement might be permitted
only on motions timely made, with proof that witnesses have been notified or assur-
ances that they will be notified. The situation might also improve by more efficient pro-
cedures for scheduling hearings (a few courts are using computers), and compensation
for witnesses who have to appear more than once because of postponements. The con-
tingencies of reinforcement that now face would-be rescuers are no better than those
awaiting persons who are willing to cooperate in law administration. The potential
good samaritan can do nothing and suffer no legal risk. He may help, without hope
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ernment is reinforced for the behavior of asking for an economic or
military grant, and such grants are forthcoming for the asking, then
the behavior of asking will be strengthened. What initially is viewed
as a "privilege" will tend to become viewed as a "right." When such
a history of reinforcement is built up, denial of further aid becomes a
form of punishment and, hence, likely to be followed by emotional
behavior. For an example, consider the temporal relationship of the
United States' withdrawal from the Aswan Dam project and the
seizure of the Suez Canal.
This is not to suggest that foreign aid programs be discontinued.
They have done much good. However, they should be planned
within a behavioral perspective. For example, usually it is hoped or
expected that the granting of aid will be followed by certain changes
in the behavior of the grantee government, as in the Alliance for
Progress program. Typically, it is expected that the foreign govern-
ment will take some direct action. However, if ultimately the
behavior which must change is that of individuals or organizations
within the aided country, it may be much more efficient to encourage
that behavior 1,7 having it reinforced directly by the local government
through such devices as tax reductions, subsidies, and the like. Local
government could then be reimbursed for its costs or loss of revenues.
Also, aid programs might more often be designed as joint projects
with religious and business leaders, and other leaders of public
opinion, as well as with government officials. Understanding of the
problems would be deeper, and responsibility for implementing the
programs would be more broadly shared.4" For example, it seems
likely that some such approach will have to be used in order to obtain
of reward, but with the risk of being sued if his rescue efforts are not entirely satis-
factory. If he is injured in the attempt, he has but slight chance of recovering his
damages. Obviously, if the law wants to encourage people to help others in danger,
or at least not to discourage such behavior, then the contingencies of reinforcement in
the law should provide some immunity for negligence, and there should be funds to
provide compensation for injuries caused by heroism. I do not favor punishment of
individuals for failing to provide aid. However, some institutions could be subjected
to aid-providing duties, which could be passed on by reinforcing personnel policies.
Juvenile courts are mentioned since, until recently, they were thought to be great
advances in law administration. However, it is now appreciated that, informal or not,
a determination of delinquency is a severe punishment. And, of course, legal counsel
must now be provided for such proceedings. For the future, attention must focus on
pre-hearing procedures, where constructive relationships might be generated without
filed charges, detention, and the like. See remarks by Professor Monrad Paulsen in
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LAW AND POVERTY, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 77
(June 23-25, 1965).
47 The Japanese have been using this approach in foreign aid programs, apparently with
great success. For example, it has been recounted that a Japanese firm, backed by
government funds, lent a Korean company considerable funds to build a chemical
fertilizer plant and helped supply construction workers and supervisors. Japanese
schools taught several hundred Koreans chemical engineering, and Japanese chemical
companies gave them three to six months on-the-job training. The net result was in-
creased agricultural production in Korea, whose food could be sold in Japan in return
for -ie sale to Koreans of manufactured goods. Velie, Japan's Quiet War Against Mao,
READER'S DIGEST, Aug. 1967, at 116.
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the maximum advantage from the enormous potential supply of food
and minerals that is in the oceans.
A useful analogy from this country is the procedure used in
drafting the Uniform Commercial Code. Its phenomenal legislative
success is undoubtedly related to the methods used in its planning
and drafting. Business practices were carefully studied. Businessmen
were consulted so that the Code would help commerce flow smoothly
under the umbrella of fair dealing. Hundreds of lawyers participated
in workshops designed to test the emerging draft from every point
of view. By the time the Code was published in final draft, many
people had a history of positive reinforcement for working on it.
Many people wanted to see it enacted. And many people could testify
to the changes it would make and why it would work.
Since the curricula of law schools tend to mirror law, it seems
clear that as behavioral principles increasingly influence the law, so
will we see more concern with their application in designing courses.
B. Curricular Effects
Of course, a law school's curriculum continually changes without
external or committee-inspired planning because of what its profes-
sors do (regardless of course labels). Further, faculty calibre is more
important that bulletin logic.48 Also, to agree with Professor Gell-
horn, the most important single factor for the success of any curricu-
lum probably is the faculty's enthusiasm for what is taught 49 (a factor
which makes reinforcement from such men more significant).
However, the above observations do not transform all "outside"
curricular suggestions into officious intermeddling. Enthusiastic
professors may at least occasionally respond to suggestions. Hence,
the text for this day and this decade. Law teachers should examine
the conceptual structures and administrative practices relative to their
fields of law or to social problems which will form emerging fields
of law, and ask whether existing contingencies of reinforcement are
the most likely ones to shape the behavior called for by prevailing or
preferred values. If this were done, the result would be many
promising new concepts, new organization of ideas, and new legal
processes.
Examples already have been provided of how a jurisprudence
incorporating behavioral principles has made inroads in our law and,
thus, without much professorial initiative, must ultimately be worked
48 For an elaboration of this theme, as well as some of its limitations, see Kelso, Curric-
ular Reform for Law School Needs of the Future, 21 U. MIAMI L. REv. 526 (1967).
49Gellhorn, Commentary, 21 U. MIAMI L. REv. 536 (1967). "If the curriculum as
such is not the most important concern of legal educators, what really should be
important to us? I think it important that law professors be excited. They ought to be
terribly concerned about what they are doing .... Then each teacher should communi-




into the curriculum. However, it should be illustrated how a law
professor, viewing a field of law from a behavioral perspective,
might come up with a new emphasis and new approaches, even
before that area of law had fully embodied reinforcement principles.
Take a course in torts as an example.
If asked to prepare a set of materials on torts, one might well
begin by deciding that it apparently is true that neither the threat of
a punishing judgment nor the possible reinforcement of a tort recov-
ery influences drivers (other than causing potential defendants to
buy insurance). One might well conclude that at least the automobile
branch of tort law is a compensation system. Thus viewed, it is pait
of the nation's overall health and welfare system - a system designed
to protect people from punishments or from the lack of reinforcers
that ordinarily are enjoyed by others. Perhaps the field, as so viewed,
deserves a new name, such as Injury Prevention and Loss Allocation.
Regardless of whether a new name be chosen, the perspective
limits concern with states of mind, and shifts attention to the structur-
ing of risk distribution processes and to proposals for reducing acci-
dents and the severity of injuries they produce. With respect to risk
distribution processes, it seems clear that they should provide prompt
compensation for actual injuries, without generating excessive litiga-
tion, and should include some assurance that recoveries will be
similar when accidents, injuries, and losses are similar - an assurance
not present in the system now operating. The requirements all point
to the emergence of some kind of compulsory insurance plan.
50
The problem of getting safer roads, cars, and drivers elicits
several possible answers. Drivers who have not had accidents or
traffic violations for a certain number of miles could be permitted
to purchase licenses for less than is charged to others. They could
be given a safe driver sticker of some sort. Their insurance rates
could be substantially lowered.
To promote safer roads, the federal government should con-
tribute bonus support to states which can demonstrate successful
efforts to build safer roads, or to operate roads with better safety
records. 1 Governmental agencies should be encouraged to experi-
50 The Keeton plan for self insurance would reinforce injured persons by prompt pay-
ment of damages and eliminate the punishing aspects of litigation. Keeton & O'Con-
nell, Basic Protection: A Rebuttal to Its Critics, 53 A.B.A.J. 633 (1967).
51 Only belatedly has the federal government recognized the consequences of not offering
reinforcement for safe design in road building. Representative John A. Blatnick (D.
Minn.), chairman of a House subcommittee investigating highway design defects, has
reported that thousands of miles of interstate highways are lined with faulty guard-
rails, poorly constructed median barriers, badly placed signs, light poles, and other
obstacles. Indications are that as many as 20,000 deaths may have been caused by such
hazards. Miami Herald, Aug. 17, 1967, at 26A. The federal government has indicated
its willingness to pay for 90% of the cost of corrective programs, as it did for con-
struction. The initial use of a reinforcing bonus for safe design would have been a
lot cheaper in money and lives.
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ment in the design of safety devices. Perhaps intersection signals
could be constructed which warn whether or not a car is in the cross-
ing path within, say, 300 feet. These could warn the drivers on the
"stop" street by turning on a red light, and warn the preferential
street driver by turning on a caution light. With respect to the build-
ing of safer cars, the federal government is in the process of taking
some worthwhile steps. The government might also consider the
preparation of a "safe car" list, noting with statistics what kinds of
injuries were suffered in comparable accidents in various kinds of cars.
Many other experiments could be considered or tried in each of
the areas noted above. This writer does not propose to create a
comprehensive list because the only purpose here is to point out that
once the new perspective is used, the interests and responsibilities of
law professors and their students broaden out to include something
other than rules for litigation. 2
To conclude the sojourn into torts by moving beyond automobile
accidents to other injuries, the application of behavioral psychology
would result in the asking of new kinds of questions about various
causes of action. For example, rather than wonder what conduct
should be actionable if it caused certain kinds of injuries, the question
should be, "What behavior and institutions do we want to encourage
by reinforcement so that injuries will be avoided, and, if they occur,
will promptly and fairly be compensated?" Thinking of this type has
already led to the extension of absolute liability into many areas
where the social cost of injuries can be spread through insurance.
Leaving torts, and returning to the curriculum as a whole, it has
already been observed that law is shifting from punishment to rein-
forcement as its most relied upon instrument of social control. 3 If
that long range trend continues, it becomes ever more imperative for
legal educators to consider whether the education they provide is
preparing men only for legal processes in which the issue is whether
punishment shall be imposed, or whether law graduates will also be
able to play a significant role in developing and administering rein-
forcement programs designed to harmonize social and legal processes.
If lawyers are to be more than the mechanics for a system gradually
being replaced, if they are to be the architects for systems gradually
52 For example, in my opinion if a behavioral approach were taken in the development
of professional responsibility programs, we could engineer changes in values and
attitudes as well as in knowledge, a result apparently not now being accomplished.
COUNCIL ON EDUCATION IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, THE ASHEVILLE CON-
FERENCE OF LAW SCHOOL DEANS ON EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY, PROCEEDINGS 131 (1965).
53 See note 39 supra.
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coming into being, the law school curriculum must be revisited. 4
Professor Gellhorn has suggested that we as teachers may have
less influence over our students than we might hope or think we
have. ' But it is the suggestion of the author that research and
course design as described above would help create the enthusiasm
which Professor Gellhorn believes to be the most essential ingredient
in good teaching.
CONCLUSION
This article can be summarized rather concisely. The main tenet
of the educational technology supported by behavioral psychology
is as follows:
To maximize behavioral change, present stimuli in an en-
vironment such that many active responses are made which can be
observed; reinforce those which approximate desirable behavior,
gradually decreasing the tolerance (or, to put it another way, gradu-
ally increasing the standards for performance), as reinforcement is
shifted from a continuous to an intermittent schedule; but do not
punish erroneous responses, because this makes the whole situation
aversive, thus producing undesirable emotions and unpredictable
avoidance behavior.
This formula suggests many reforms and experiments in legal
education's methods, curricula, programs, administrative structures,
and procedures. Likewise, it suggests avenues for research in improv-
ing the law and its administration. It could well support an as yet
unformulated new jurisprudence, one which combines practical and
theoretical in ways more immediately apparent to beginning law
students, and more useful to society.56 For when law is viewed
essentially as a contingency of reinforcement for behavior, we are led
beyond legal words to the actual behavior of people in framing,
administering, and reacting to law and law men.
Thirty-five years ago, Karl Llewellyn urged that we should
study the contact point between law people and law-affected people.
57
54 In addition to more specialized courses, this may well include provisions for courses
or even non-degree programs (or, at least, non-LL.B. or J.D. programs) designed to
help insure that satisfactory legal services are readily available at a reasonable price
to all persons who can benefit from them. See Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, JR.,
LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK (1967).
55 GELLHORN, supra note 49, at 538.
56 A jurisprudence concerned with implementing the reinforcement principle rather than
devising punishments must be empirically oriented toward behavior - the kind of
behavior that many lawyers encounter day-to-day. This has been described elsewhere
as a "lawyer-oriented" jurisprudence, and it has been noted how it calls for the crea-
tion of permanent empirically oriented research centers at our law schools. Kelso,
Steps Toward a Lawyer Oriented Jurisprudence: Problems, Promises, Procedures, and
Pitfalls, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 552 (1967).
57Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence- The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431
(1930), reprinted in JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1962).
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I quite agree. Now, however, there is a scientific framework within
which better to understand what it is we are observing; there is a
guide for the kinds of things to observe and a map to help us
understand what it is we have seen.
LEGAL CLASSIFICATION OF SPECIAL DISTRICT
CORPORATE FORMs IN COLORADO
By BENJAMIN NOVAK*
As various problems and concerns of municipalities and coun-
ties have crossed legal boundary lines, formation of 'especial dis-
trists" by legislative enactment has become common. In a metro-
politan area composed of several counties, sewage disposal, water
drainage, fire protection, recreation and others are common concerns
to which a special district governing body can better coordinate the
common efforts. In this article, Mr. Novak considers the defini-
tional problems of special districts as related to their powers and
legal characteristics. The author limits himself to consideration of
Colorado special districts and classifies them into various categories.
INTRODUCTION
F IFTY years ago, all special districts were thought to be essentially
alike in legal nature, and differences among them relating to
their functions or powers were considered only incidental.' This has
been the generally prevalent view of special districts since that time.2
Recently, however, writers on the subject have adverted to the need
for a deeper analysis of the legal nature of special districts. Max
Pock, in an excellent study, noted that special districts operate in a
"definitional no man's land. ' 3 Referring to the practical problems
of special district litigation, one lawyer complained that "[tQhe
problem of classifying districts by powers or legal characteristics has
never been comprehensively attacked ..."' It is precisely this prob-
lem of classification which this article attempts to clarify.
Study of the special district enabling legislation and cases on
special districts in Colorado reveals significant differences among
several classes of special districts. For example, one class is deemed
*Economist, Resource Institutions Branch, Natural Resource Economics Division, Eco-
nomic Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture.
'"[O]ne fact now stands forth clearly: namely, that all these districts for special pur-
poses are one in essential (legal] nature, regardless of the divergence of many of the
individual districts from the standard type." Guild, Special Municipal Corporations,
12 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 678, 679 (1918).
2 See, e.g., ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE PROB-
LEM OF SPECIAL DISTRICTS IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1964); J. BANKS, COLO-
RADO LAW OF CITIES AND COUNTIES § 1.6 (1959); GOVERNOR'S LOCAL AFFAIRS
STUDY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT: LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN COLORADO 45 (1966) ;
Guild, supra note 1, and 18 NAT'L MUN. REV. 319 (1929); Tobin, The Legal and
Governmental Status of the Metropolitan Special District, 13 U. MIAMI L. REV. 129
(1958).
3 M. POCK, INDEPENDENT SPECIAL DISTRICTS: A SOLUTION TO THE METROPOLITAN
AREA PROBLEMS 22 (1962).
4 Perry, The Lawyer and Special Districts, 35 J. ST. B. CALIF. 21, 23 (1960).
347
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
to be so essentially private and nongovernmental in purpose and
benefit that, without special statutory exemption, it is subjected to
normal taxation by the state, counties, and other units of local gov-
ernment. This class includes, among others, irrigation' and drainage
districts.' One group of districts has the power to levy general ad
valorem taxes, while another group can levy only special benefit
assessment taxes. Some of these differences, such as tax liability,
have been judicially decided. 7 Others, such as taxing powers, are
legislatively granted or withheld in the enabling statutes under which
these districts are formed.
The thesis of this article is that these differences, and others like
them, are neither random nor ad hoc. Rather, differences in purposes,
organization, powers, and limitations indicate differences in corporate
and governmental structure which can be classified so as to bring
order to this confusing area of statutory law. Essentially, three major
classes of districts can be distinguished, into which fall most of
Colorado's special districts. A few kinds of districts are hard to
definitively classify in one group or the other, and these will be
noted. Two of the major classes will be discussed in this article and
the reasons for their classification discussed in detail.
The discussion which follows will be limited to special districts
in Colorado. Furthermore, it will not discuss school districts which,
because of differences in character, function and purposes, lie beyond
the scope of this article and warrant full and separate treatment else-
where. Finally, this classification of special districts according to
their legal and corporate characteristics is limited to those districts
which possess an independent corporate existence, and separate or-
ganization, range of action and responsibility.8 For this reason,
districts such as disposal districts are not considered here as special
5 Organized under COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 150-1-1 to -60, 150-2-1 to -40, and
150-3-1 to -88 '(1963). (A number of the Colorado Statutes cited in this article have
been amended, as indicated in the 1965 and 1967 Supplements to Colorado Revised
Statutes Annotated, 1963. However, the amendments do not alter or affect the
author's discussion and have not been indicated.)
6 Organized under COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-1-1 to -10-2 (1963). Drainage dis-
tricts are, however, exempt from taxation by statutory provision. Coio. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 47-2-7 (1963).
7See, e.g., Logan Irrigation Dist. v. Holt, 110 Colo. 253, 133 P.2d 530 (1943).
8 The criterion developed for inclusion in the 1962 Census of Governments was
whether the district under consideration "is an organized entity which, in addition to
having governmental character, has sufficient discretion in the management of its
own affairs to distinguish it as separate from the administrative structure of any
other administrative unit." U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF GOVERN-
MENTS: 1962, VOL. I, GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 15. The definition used in
this article is meant to be more exclusive than the Census Bureau criteria, requiring
not only administrative freedom in the management of its own affairs, but a thor-
oughly separate corporate existence from any other state or local governmental body.
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districts because they constitute little more than a department of
county government. For the same reason, districts formed under the
chapter on Public Recreation and Playgrounds are excluded as being
no more than administrative divisions of the town, city, county, or
school district by which they may be formed."° Other districts which
will not be discussed in detail are mentioned and distinguished below
as special taxing districts.
The plan of this article is to present, in section I, a brief descrip-
tion of each class or type of special districts and its distinguishing
characteristics, and to list those specific districts, such as sanitation
and drainage, which fall into each class or type. This will be followed
in sections II and III by a detailed legal analysis of the two major
classes of districts under the headings of "Public Corporations," and
"Quasi-Municipal Corporations." Each of these will be discussed
separately and in depth according to its corporate nature and status
as it has been recognized by the courts; and distinguished from pri-
vate, municipal, and other types of corporations, and from each other,
according to their characteristic legal powers and limitations.
I. CLASSIFICATION OF DISTRICTS
There are several different criteria by which special districts
can be classified. Usually this is done on a functional, operat-ional,
or even geographical basis, such as, for example, distinguishing
between urban and predominantly rural districts. Each set of criteria
has its own particular merits and purposes, and it is not the function
of this article to analyze, criticize, or displace any other classification
system. This article is concerned with only one set of criteria: the
classification of districts by legal power characteristics. The classifi-
catory terms used in this article, and the meanings accorded them, are
those employed by the courts in decided cases.
Colorado has 29 enabling statutes under which districts can be
formed. These can be divided into three main groups based upon
their purposes, types of taxing and other public powers, tax liability,
the degree of public or private interest involved in their functions,
and their independent corporate existence and status.
In classifying special districts, two sets of terms have been used
by the courts. The first is based upon the characteristic function of
the districts. Under this classification special districts can be classified
as local improvement districts, special service districts, and special
9 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 89-11-1 to -5 (1963).
'0 Id. §§ 114-1-1 to -2-5.
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taxing districts." The second classification is based upon the status
of the corporate entity involved in each type of district, and includes,
respectively, public corporations, quasi-municipal corporations, and
quasi-corporations whose corporate identity is indissolubly linked to
that of the city, county, or agency of the state by which it was cre-
ated." The following is a brief outline of the distinguishing char-
acteristics of each class of districts, and a listing of those districts
which would appear to belong to each class, determined by their
treatment in the courts, or by their essential statutory similarities.
11 The Governor's Local Affairs Commission, in its report on special district govern-
ment in Colorado, distinguished only two types of districts - special service districts
and local improvement districts. See GOVERNOR'S LOCAL AFFAIRS STUDY COMMLS-
SION, supra note 2. The difference between their classification and this one is the
breakdown on their special service districts classification into two distinct types which
shall be dealt with here as special service districts and local improvement districts.
What the Commission discussed as local improvement districts will be discussed here
as special taxing districts.
The recently created State Division of Local Government has developed a more
complex and operationally oriented classification system in which four types of dis-
tricts are distinguished. These are (1) single purpose districts; (2) multipurpose
districts; (3) local improvement districts; and (4) special taxing districts. Letter
from J.D. Arehart, Director, Division of Local Government, State of Colorado, to
Benjamin Novak, June 22, 1967. It is difficult, if not impossible, to correlate an
operational, functional, or other classification scheme with a legal one. First, from a
legal point of view, whether a district is authorized to provide for two functions,
such as, for example, sanitation and fire protection, or only one of these, is normally
immaterial. In a legal context, it is the powers given to the district to perform its
activities, and not the number of activities, that determine a district's classification.
The problem of reconciling this terminology to the courtroom is relatively easy,
for single and multipurpose mean the same things in the courtroom and out. How-
ever, a real problem arises where different groups develop classifications using the
same terms, but with different meanings. The Division of Local Government's last
two categories present a problem on this score. For example, the terms local improve-
ment districts and special taxing districts do not mean the same things in the court-
room as they do in the public administrator's office, The Division of Local Govern-
ment distinguishes between a local improvement district and a special taxing district
on the basis of whether, respectively, a single improvement is to be built by a munici-
pality and paid for by special assessment of the benefited landowners, with operation
and maintenance costs appropriated from the city's general fund, or whether a service
is to be provided by a city or county to the residents of a defined area within the
city's or county's jurisdiction to be paid for on a continuous basis by ad valorem
taxes. Id. The first of these, local improvement disticts, are legally special taxing
districts, i.e., quasi-corporate entities through which funds are raised to finance con-
struction of the improvement. The second, which the Division calls a special taxing
district, is not an independent district entity, but merely an authorization to the city
or county to provide a service to those parts of its jurisdiction in which the land-
owners are willing and able to pay for it. On the other hand, the courts have gen-
erally used the term local improvement district to denote an independent corporate
entity formed by landowners to construct, maintain, and operate an improvement, not
as a part or function of any other local or state governmental unit, but merely as a
group of landowners incorporated for their own, predominantly private, benefit.
These differences in terminology can create confusion. This is unfortunate, but
should not be new to the lawyer. In this article, the terms local improvement district
and special taxing district will be used in the manner in which they have been used
by the courts. It is suggested that this terminology be retained and used more con-
sistently by lawyers and the courts, regardless of the value of other classification
schemes in other contexts.
12 All special districts in this class were said by the Governor's Local Affairs Study
Commission to be quasi-municipal corporations. GOVERNOR'S LOCAL AFFAIRS STUDY
COMMISSiON, supra note 2.
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A. Local Improvement Districts: Public Corporations
Local improvement districts are formed by landowners to con-
struct, maintain, and operate improvements which affect the value of
the lands included within the district. They are full corporations,
independent from outside control except where they are regulated by
the legislature.
Local improvement districts are formed under general enabling
laws, usually by a petition to the district court or to the board of
county commissioners by the owners of the lands to be included in
the district. After hearings on the question, normally an election is
ordered on the question of whether the district is to be organized.
The districts are governed by a board of directors who are normally
elected by the taxpaying landowners.
Local improvement districts are granted such common and
municipal powers as eminent domain, the power to issue bonds, and
the power to levy special benefit assessment taxes.
Local improvement districts are public corporations. Their dis-
tinguishing characteristics are
(1) Independent corporate existence;
(2) Private benefit nature of the district;
(3) Liability for state, county and other public taxes;
(4) Limited public powers bestowed upon this class of districts,
particularly the power to levy special benefit assessment
taxes and eminent domain; and
(5) Territoriality.
The following districts appear to possess the characteristics of
public corporations as outlined above: conservancy districts for flood
control, 13 drainage districts, 4 voluntary drainage districts,' 5 soil con-
servation and soil erosion districts,' " internal improvement districts,' 7
and irrigation districts formed under the laws of 190518 and 1921.'9
Local improvement districts will be discussed further as public
corporations.
B. Special Service Districts: Quasi-Municipal Corporations
Special service districts are full corporations, normally referred
to as bodies-corporate and politic. They are formed under general
enabling laws for the purpose of providing such normal govern-
mental services as fire protection, sanitation, and hospitals to all of
'3 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-1-1 to-8-1 '(1963).
14 Id. §3 47-1-1 to -10-2.
15 Id. §§ 47-9-1 to -2.
'1d. §§ 128-1-1 to-21.
17 Id. §§ 150-4-1 to -48.
1Id. §§ 150-1.1 to -60.
19 Id. §3§ 150-2-1 to -40.
1968
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
the residents of the district. Special service districts are governed by
a board of directors which is usually elected by the resident electors
of the district but which is sometimes appointed by other public
bodies, such as the county commissioners, municipal governing
bodies, or the district courts.
Three general methods for forming special service districts are
found among the various enabling acts for special service districts.
First, organization of a district may be initiated by a petition of a
certain percentage of the taxpaying electors of the proposed district.
This petition is normally submitted to the district court or board of
county commissioners who hold hearings and then call for an election
to decide whether or not the district will be formed. Under some of
the statutes, however, if the petition is approved by the court or the
board of commissioners there will be no election unless a protesting
petition is presented demanding an election. A protesting petition
signed by a majority of the taxpaying electors of the district is suffi-
cient under some of the statutes to have the petition for organization
dismissed. A second method of initiating the organization of a special
service district is by ordinance of a municipal governing body. Under
this method, the governing body of one municipality will pass an
ordinance calling for the creation of a district including several other
municipalities. The district will come into being upon certification
to the Secretary of State that a majority of the governing bodies of
the other municipalities named in the initiating ordinance approve of
the creation of the district including them. A third method of form-
ing special service districts is the creation of a specific district directly
by the legislature. When the district is created by direct legislative
enactment, the taxpaying electors of the district are given the right
to protest its formation and cause its dissolution.
Special service districts are normally granted such public and
municipal powers as eminent domain, the power to issue municipal
bonds, and the power to levy ad valorem property taxes in addition
to special benefit assessment taxes.
Special service districts are quasi-municipal corporations. Their
distinguishing characteristics are
(1) Independent corporate existence;
(2) Public character as agencies of the state created for the
benefit of the inhabitants of the district and not only the
landowners; and, as a result,
(3) Power to levy general, ad valorem taxes, as well as special
assessments;
(4) Tax-exempt status as agencies of the state and quasi-munici-
pal corporations; and, finally,
VOL. 45
LEGAL CLASSIFICATION
(5) Absence of the power of local government, which distin-
guishes quasi-municipal corporations from municipal cor-
porations.
The following districts appear to possess the characteristics of
quasi-municipal corporations outlined above: domestic water works
districts,2" metropolitan districts, 21 water and sanitation districts,
fire protection districts, 23 metropolitan recreation districts,24 metro-
politan water districts, 25 hospital districts, 26 metropolitan sewage dis-
posal districts,27 the metropolitan stadium district,28 mine drainage
districts, 29 and water conservancy districts.
30
Special service districts will be discussed further as quasi-munic-
ipal corporations.
C. Special Taxing Districts
Special taxing districts are districts which are organized "within
municipal limits, [and are] usually created and operated under the
supervision of the municipal governing body. ' 13' They can also be
organized for some purposes by counties within the boundaries of
the creating county. They are used for the purpose of constructing,
providing, or maintaining an improvement or service (e.g., curbs,
gutters, cemeteries, or waterworks) for the use or benefit of the
landowners or residents of the district.
Special taxing districts are not full corporate entities. Their legal
existence is almost indistinguishable from the parent city, town, or
county which created them. Usually they are created by a petition to
the municipal or county governing body which then, by ordinance
or resolution, creates the district. Sometimes the municipal or county
governing body acts as the board of directors for the district, while
at other times the board of directors is appointed by them. Usually
a separate budget is maintained for the district, although, in some
cases, surpluses from one special tax district can be used by another
special taxing district within the same creating unit. In some cases,
there is not a separate tax levy for the district, but funds are appro-
20 Id. §§ 89-1-1 to -31.
21 Id. §§ 89-3-1 to -33.
MId. §§ 89-5-1 to -49.
23 Id. §§ 89-6-1 to -45.
2
4 Id. §§ 89-12-1 to -35.
25 Id. §§ 89-13-1 to -15.
2Id. §§ 89-14-1 to -16.
27 Id. §§ 89-15-1 to -47.
28Id. §§ 89-19-1 to -95 (Supp. 1967).
2COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 92-28-1 to -26 (1963).
3 0Id. §§ 150-5-1 to-50.
31 GOVERNOR'S LOCAL AFFAIRS STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 2.
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priated to the district budget from the general budget of the creat-
ing body.
The distinguishing characteristics of the special taxing districts
are as follows:
(1) It is not a separate legal entity;
(2) It possesses only the power to levy special benefit assess-
ment taxes through the creating body;
(3) It has a set of accounts separate from the creating body;
(4) It cannot exist outside of the boundaries of the creating
local government unit; and
(5) Control of district management lies in the creating authority.
The following districts appear to possess the characteristics of
special taxing districts: cemetery districts,"' special improvement dis-
tricts in cities and towns,33 improvement districts in cities and towns, 4
and domestic waterworks districts - cities of 10,000.3
5
Special taxing districts are normally treated as administrative
subdivisions of municipal corporations proper and are mentioned
here for the sake of completeness. The law applicable to special
taxing districts will normally be found in standard texts on municipal
corporations. For this reason they shall not otherwise be dealt with
in this article.
D. Miscellaneous Districts
It was mentioned before that there were 29 enabling laws under
which special districts could be formed. So far, we have classified
and accounted for 22 of these. No classifications in law are airtight.
The following kinds of districts do not easily fit into the previously
discussed classifications.
1. Moffat-Type Districts
The following three districts have powers and limitations quite
distinct from other types of quasi-municipal corporations, but are
treated by the courts as quasi-municipal corporations.
The Moffat Tunnel Improvement District8 " was established in
the early 1920's. It was created to build a tunnel through the con-
tinental divide. The legislature directly created the district; however,
the owners of 50 percent or more of the property in the district were
given the opportunity to protest and reject its establishment. 37 In most
32 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-16-1 to -7 (1963).
33 Id. §§ 89-2-1 to -39.
34 Id. §§ 89-4-1 to -30.
35 1d. §§ 89-7-1 to -41.




respects the Moffat Tunnel District is a public corporation. It is
based on the idea of special benefit to the property of the district,
and its sole taxing power is that of special benefit assessment taxes.
However, the district, in the first case testing its constitutionality and
validity, 8 was declared to be quasi-municipal in character, and thus
despite the public corporation character of its powers, benefits, and
purposes, it is judicially determined to be a quasi, or almost, municipal
corporation in its incidents. For this reason it is not taxed by the
state or other subdivisions of the state.8 9
Housing authorities4" and urban renewal authorities 4' appear
to be in the same position. In the case of People ex rel. Stokes v.
Newton4 2 the court held a housing authority to be a state agency
and quasi-municipal corporation, stating that it was in all material
respects similar to the Moffat Tunnel District.43 This holding was,
in spite of the facts, that unlike the Moffat Tunnel District and quasi-
municipal corporations in general, a housing authority has no power
to levy any kind of taxes, either special assessment or ad valorem;
that the district is created by ordinance of city council; that the board
of directors is appointed and can be removed by the mayor of the city
with the approval of the city council; and that a housing authority
cannot exist outside of municipal limits. Urban renewal authorities
are similar in all material respects to housing authorities; even the
wording of the two acts is frequently identical. While no case was
found directly discussing the status of urban renewal authorities, it is
presumed that they would also be classed as quasi-municipal corpora-
tions by the courts.44
2. Special Drainage and Irrigation Districts
The Grand Junction Drainage District,4" and irrigation districts
organized under the Irrigation District Law of 1935,46 appear in most
respects to be quasi-municipal corporations. This is especially true
with regard to the power of each to levy ad valorem taxes. 47 How-
38Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 72 Colo. 268, 211 P. 649 (1922).
39 Letter from Howard A. Latting, Chairman, Colorado Tax Commission, to Benjamin
Novak, December 2, 1966.
40 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 69-3-1 to -32 (1963).
41 Id. §§ 139-62-1 to -14.
4 106 Colo. 61, 101 P.2d 21 (1940).
43Id. at 67-68, 101 P.2d at 24.
"Because they do not possess the power to levy taxes, authorities are often classified
separately from special districts. R. SMITH, PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, SPECIAL DISTIcTS
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 21 (1964). Since the Colorado Supreme Court did not
consider this a material distinction, these authorities are included with the Moffat
Tunnel District in this discussion of miscellaneous districts.
15 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-12-1 to -59 (1963).
46 id. §§ 150-3-1 to -88.
4 Grand Junction Drainage District, id. § 47-12-35; Irrigation District Law of 1935,
id. § 150-3-35.
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ever, it is not clear from the cases whether these districts in the final
analysis shall be treated as public corporations or as quasi-municipal
corporations. Irrigation districts are not exempt from state and
county taxes .
4
3. Regional Conservation Districts
The two remaining districts to be accounted for are the Colorado
River Conservation District,49 and the Southwestern Water Conser-
vation District."° Each of these is directly created by the legislature
and given broad powers in the field of conservation. 1 It would be
difficult to draw a line determining whether these districts were
essentially administrative agencies of the state government, or
whether they were quasi-municipal in character. Subdistricts can be
formed under the two acts which resemble, in most material respects,
the special taxing districts discussed before.
II. PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
In Colorado, irrigation,52 drainage,5" soil erosion," and prob-
ably conservancy districts for flood control55 have been judicially
held to be "public corporations."
In its usual sense, the term "public corporations" refers to all
civil corporations which are not private,5" and includes municipal
corporations, quasi-municipal corporations, quasi-corporations, and
quasi-public corporations. 7 However, in applying the term "public
corporations" to the types of districts mentioned above, the Colorado
Supreme Court has not used it in its generic sense alone, but has
developed a narrower classificatory meaning indicating a particular
species of public corporations as well. A more orderly classification
scheme would have reserved the term "public corporations" to indi-
48 Letter from Howard Latting, supra note 39.
49 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 150-7-1 to -32 (1963).
5 Id. §§ 150-8-1 to -32.
51 Another district which would have been included in this classification had it not
been recently dissolved is the Caddoa Reservoir and Arkansas River Basin Conserv-
ancy District. Ch. 84, §§ 1-22, [1935] Colo. Laws 267 (repealed 1967) [was COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 150-6-1 to -19 (1963)].
52 See, e.g., Logan Irrigation Dist. v. Holt, 110 Colo. 253, 133 P.2d 530 (1943);
Holbrook Irrigation Dist. v. First State Bank, 84 Colo. 157, 268 P. 523 (1928).
53 Colorado Investment & Realty Co. v. Riverview Drainage Dist., 83 Colo. 468, 266
P. 501 (1928).
54People ex rel. Cheyenne Soil Erosion Dist. v. Parker, 118 Colo. 13, 192 P.2d 417
(1948).
55 The case of People ex rel. Setters v. Lee, 72 Colo. 598, 213 P. 583 (1923), does not
unambiguously classify conservancy districts for flood control formed under COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 29 (1963). The case speaks of the district as a "quasi-municipal
corporation," a "public corporation" and a "municipal corporation," and conservancy
districts are said to be "on the same footing as drainage districts." Because its
purposes and powers seem to be the same as drainage and irrigation districts in nearly
all material respects, it will be discussed here as a public or quasi-public corporation.
56 1 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 57 (perm. ed. rev. 1963).
57 18 C.j.S. Corporations § 18a (1939).
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cate the genus and would have referred to irrigation, drainage, and
soil erosion districts as quasi-public corporations, a more accurate
designation. However, the designation of both the general class and
the specific type appears to have become settled in the cases.", This
dual usage presents some confusion. From this point on, when the
term "public corporation" is used in its narrow, specific sense, it will
be followed (except in quotations) by the phrase "or quasi-public
corporation."
What then is a public or quasi-public corporation in the specific
sense? Outlined before were five characteristics which distinguished
local improvement districts as public corporations from other types
of districts and corporations. These were (1) independent corporate
existence; (2) the private benefit nature of the district; (3) liability
for state, county, and other public taxes; (4) the limited public
powers bestowed upon this class of districts; and (5) territoriality.
A. Independent Corporate Existence
Public or quasi-public corporations are unquestionably full and
independent corporate entities. They are usually denominated as a
"body corporate" 59 or a "public body corporate.'"'" Normally they
possess the power to sue and be sued in their corporate name, have
perpetual existence, adopt a seal, incur debts, liabilities, and obliga-
tions, issue negotiable bonds, exercise the right of eminent domain,
and levy special benefit assessments on real property within the dis-
trict.61 They possess a board of directors of from three to five persons
who are responsible to the landowners of the district, and who are
free from supervision of their activities by any other bodies except
the legislature or the courts as outlined in the enabling legislation.
These elements distinguish public or quasi-public corporations from
special taxing districts which usually can be sued only in the name of
the city, town, or county which created them and which usually do
not possess a separate board of directors, but rather have the city or
town council or county board of commissioners act as the special
taxing district board.
B. Private Nature
Fletcher, in his cyclopedic work on corporations, wrote:
Private corporations are those which are created for the immediate
benefit and advantage of individuals, and their franchises may be
58 Compare Logan Irrigation Dist. v. Holt, 110 Colo. 253, 258-59, 133 P.2d 530, 532
(1943), with People ex rel. Rogers v. Letford, 102 Colo. 284, 297, 79 P.2d 274, 281
(1938).
S9See, e.g., Conservancy Law of Colorado: Flood Control, CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 29-2-5(7) (1963).
6 0
See, e.g., Soil Conservation District, CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 128-1-6 (1963).




considered as privileges conferred on a number of individuals, to be
exercised and enjoyed by them in the form of a corporation ....
The property of this kind of corporation and the profits arising from
the employment of their property and the exercise of their fran-
chises, in fact, belong to individuals.
0 2
This description can be applied to public or quasi-public corporations
of the type under discussion just as accurately as to the ordinary
business corporation which Fletcher had in mind. For a public or
quasi-public corporation is one for the private benefit of landowners,
the value of whose land is increased by the improvement maintained
or operated by the district. This was clearly stated by the Colorado
court in the case of Colorado Investment and Realty Co. v. Riverview
Drainage District: 63
The primary purpose of such districts is to benefit the owners of
the lands by making their lands productive, or more productive, as
the case may be . . . . The benefit to the public . . . though sub-
stantial, is incidental to the main purpose sought to be accom-
plished.
64
In Interstate Trust Co. v. Montezuma Valley Irrigation District65
the following description of the nature of an irrigation district was
borrowed from a California case:6 6
"The district, when formed, is a local organization to secure a local
benefit from the irrigation of lands from the same source of water
supply, and by the same system of works. It is, therefore, a charge
upon the lands benefited by a single local work or improvement,
and from which the state, or the public at large, derives no direct
benefit, but only that reflex benefit which all local improvements
confer."
6 7
The purposes and activities of public or quasi-public corporations
must be distinguished from those general activities of governments
which are normally called proprietary and which assume the govern-
mental mantle by reason of the demands that governments assume
those responsibilities." An example of this is a municipal water or
sewage system. Public or quasi-public corporations, unlike quasi-
municipal corporations to be discussed below, do not have the govern-
mental or proprietary activities of a local or state government. The
Supreme Court of Nevada made this distinction very clearly in the
case of State v. Lincoln Power District No. 1 69 where the court dis-
tinguished for purposes of taxation between irrigation districts as
62 1 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 58 (perm. ed. rev. 1963).
6383 Colo. 468, 266 P. 501 (1928).
6Id. at 471, 266 P. at 502.
6566 Colo. 219, 181 P. 123 (1919).
66 City of San Diego v. Linda Vista Irrigation Dist., 108 Cal. 189, 193, 41 P. 291, 292
(1895).
67 66 Colo. at 221, 181 P. at 124.
68 See generally In re Bonds of Orosi Pub. Util. Dist., 196 Cal. 43, 235 P. 1004 (1925).
6960 Nev. 401, 111 P.2d 528 (1941).
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public or quasi-public corporations and power districts as municipal
corporations. Citing the Colorado case of Holbrook Irrigation Dis-
trict v. First State Bank,70 the court said:
Irrigation districts are organized primarily to promote the
material prosperity of the few owning lands within their boundaries,
just as manufacturing plants are established to produce profits for
their stockholders, and are not organized for the discharge of
governmental functions in addition to, or in aid of, the usual gov-
ernmental departments or agencies. Power districts ... are created for
the sole purpose of assisting the state in the performance of its
governmental function of distributing heat, light and power among
its people without profit.7 1
The consequences of this recognition of the fundamentally
private nature of public or quasi-public corporations can be seen in
the cases.
In the Riverview case, an action had been brought against a
drainage district for the return of wrongfully assessed taxes. The
lower court sustained a demurrer to the complaint based on the de-
fense that, since there was no statute authorizing such suit, the district
was like a county or school district and could not be sued without its
consent. The supreme court reversed on finding that the essential
purposes of the district were to benefit the landowners and thus that
it could be sued as a private entity without the need of a special stat-
ute authorizing suit.
In Holbrook, an action was brought by an irrigation district to
obtain a decree that the district's bank deposit in an insolvent bank
should be paid by the state bank commissioner to the district because
moneys due the district from an insolvent bank have a preference
as moneys due to the sovereign. The court denied the decree, holding:
"While an irrigation district is a public corporation, we do not think
that it is in any true sense a branch or subdivision of the sovereignty.
Its purposes are chiefly private, and for the benefit of private land-
owners." 72
People ex rel. Cheyenne Soil Erosion District v. Parker73 was
a case involving two issues of relevance here. The first concerned
an amendment to the Soil Conservation Act which required a vote of
75 percent of the qualified landowners of the district for the adoption
of land use ordinances. The contention was that submitting the ordi-
nances to a vote of all the landowners constituted a "referendum"
and thus came within the municipal referendum provisions of the
7084 Colo. 157, 268 P. 523 (1928).
71 60 Nev. at 410, 111 P.2d at 532. Power districts in Nevada would appear to be
essentially the same as quasi-municipal districts in Colorado, to be discussed in text,
section III infra.
72 84 Colo. at 165, 268 P. at 526.
73 118 Colo. 13, 192 P.2d 417 (1948).
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constitution of Colorado which required only a majority vote."4
Looking to the essential nature of the district, the court held:
It is thoroughly settled that a district such as the one here involved,
is a public corporation, but not a city, town or municipality within
the meaning of the constitutional provision. The purposes of the
district, as expressly set forth in the act, are, as the trial court
expressly found, primarily of a private nature for the mutual benefit
of the landowners of the district.75
It was also contended that the amendment was violative of the
constitution because it permitted corporations and nonresidents of
the district to vote upon the adoption of land use ordinances, instead
of limiting the election to legal voters.7 6 The Cheyenne court rejected
this contention in language which strikingly illustrated the private
nature of public or quasi-public corporations:
We have heretofore shown that the relator [the soil erosion
district] is a public corporation and not a municipal corporation.
The so-called election upon the question of adopting land use
ordinances is not an election within the constitutional provision,
but is more in the nature of an election held by the stockholders of
a private corporation in the management of its affairs.
77
C. Tax Liability
The cases reviewed above indicate that the private benefit nature
of public or quasi-public corporations is more than a theoretical dis-
tinction. It has been a material and often decisive factor in the cases.
But by far the most important consequence of this fact lies in the
area of tax liability. The landmark case in this area is Logan Irriga-
tion District v. Holt.7 8 The Logan case was an action by an irrigation
district to restrain the county assessor from assessing taxes upon the
district's property. The property of the district had not previously
been assessed for tax purposes by the county. The fundamental issue
raised was the meaning of the constitutional grants of exemption
from taxation. The constitution of Colorado provides: "The prop-
erty, real and personal, of the state, counties, cities, towns and other
74 CoLo. CONST. art. V, § 1.
75 118 Colo. at is, 192 P.2d at 420.
76 COLO. CONST. art. VII, §§ 1, 11.
77 118 Colo. at 20, 192 P.2d at 421. It is worthwhile noting here that at the time the
Cheyenne decision was handed down, the statute provided that a violation of a land
use ordinance so adopted by the landowners was a misdemeanor. This was later
declared unconstitutional as an unauthorized delegation of power by the legislature
to the district to make laws, violations of which were punishable as crimes. Olinger
v. People, 140 Colo. 397, 344 P.2d 689 (1959). The Soil Conservation Districts act
was amended by the legislature in 1961 to provide for the bringing of a civil action
by the district to enforce the land use ordinances rather than a criminal action. CoLo.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 128-1-14 (1963). This brings the actual mechanics of the statute
more into line with language in the Cheyenne case which held that the land use
ordinances were more in the nature of bylaws or regulations of a private corporation
or association.
78 110 Colo. 253, 133 P.2d 530 (1943).
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municipal corporations and public libraries, shall be exempt from
taxation."979
Counsel for the district contended that "while an irrigation dis-
trict is not strictly a municipal corporation, yet it is a quasi-municipal
corporation - that is, it partakes of the qualities of a municipal cor-
poration"80 and that it was intended to be included in the language
"other municipal corporations" as above.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that the districts were not
tax exempt. In doing so the court cited a long line of cases holding
that an irrigation district is a "public corporation," and that, as such,
its power of taxation is limited to local or special assessment taxes,
and that the purposes of irrigation districts, like drainage districts,
"are chiefly private, and for the benefit of private land owners." It
concluded by quoting Cooley on Taxation to the effect that
"[ajn express exemption of property of 'municipal corporations'
applies only to municipal corporations proper and not to a corpora-
tion composed of shareholders [i.e., landowners] which in its form
and controlling features is a business enterprise upon which munici-
pal powers have been incidentally conferred in promotion of its
primary purpose." 8 1
It is worth noting at this point the similarity of the reasoning in
this case and the Cheyenne case previously quoted. In both cases a
public corporation is compared to an ordinary business corporation
as to its essential purpose and controlling features.8 2
Counsel for the district argued alternatively that even if the
district did not qualify as a municipal or quasi-municipal corporation,
that it would still be exempt as an agency of the state. The court re-
plied, quoting from Buffalo Rapids Irrigation District v. Colleran:88
"It would seem that, in order to come within the rule which will
permit the court to consider the property of a public corporation
the property of the state for the purpose of exemption from taxation,
such corporation should be so closely engrafted upon the state
as to in fact exercise governmental functions and be supported,
directly or indirectly, by the state."
8 4
The court held that public or quasi-public corporations, such as
irrigation and drainage districts, were not agencies of the state despite
the fact that the irrigation district act "was adopted from California,
and the decisions of that state have held that irrigation districts are
agencies of the state, and their property.., exempt from taxa-
tion .... "85 The California courts have reasoned that while irrigation
78 CoLo. CONST. art. X, § 4 (emphasis added).
80 110 Colo. at 258, 133 P.2d at 532.
81 1d. at 259, 133 P.2d at 532-33.
82 See text accompanying note 77 sut'ra.
83 S85 Mont. 466, 477, 279 P. 369, 372 (1929).
84 Logan Irrigation Dist. v. Holt, 110 Colo. 253, 259, 133 P.2d 530, 533 (1943).
851d. at 260, 133 P.2d at 533.
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and drainage districts are not municipal corporations in any true
sense, they are nevertheless public agencies, and under the theory
that their property is in effect property of the state they are not
subject to taxation. 6
The Colorado Tax Commission uses the following criterion of
taxability of special districts: "Exemption applies to municipal cor-
porations usually performing a function or service, as contrasted with
districts that performed a special benefit to property and are collect-
ing benefits the properties derived." 87
Referring back to the identifying characteristics of a public cor-
poration, it may be recalled that one of them was the limitation of
their taxing powers to special benefit assessment taxes only. This
follows closely the criterion of the Tax Commission in that benefits
to properties derived from improvements could only be collected
through special benefit assessments.
It might be noted here that drainage districts and voluntary
drainage districts, to which the same provision applies, and the
Grand Junction Drainage District as well as the Moffat Tunnel
Improvement District and others, all have a special statutory exemp-
tion clause which exempts all the property, real and personal, of the
districts from taxes of the state, counties or other political subdivisions
of the state. 88 In the absence of this statutory exemption, it is
presumed that drainage districts formed under these acts would be
liable for taxes as public or quasi-public corporations. The Moffat
Tunnel Improvement District would probably remain tax exempt as
a quasi-municipal corporation.
D. Public Powers of Public Corporations
As has been shown, irrigation, drainage, soil erosion, soil con-
servation, and other local improvement districts are of an essentially
private nature. Why, then, are they treated and classified as public
corporations? The United States Supreme Court, in the landmark case
of Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley,89 which upheld the con-
stitutionality of the California irrigation district act (the Wright
Act) - from which the Colorado act was largely taken - described
the basis and necessity of granting to irrigation districts public powers
and a certain public nature. Applying the same reasoning the Court
86 Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. White, 186 Cal. 183, 198 P. 1060 (192 1).
87 Letter from Howard A. Latting, Chairman, Colorado Tax Commission, to Benjamin
Novak, Dec. 2, 1966.
88 Drainage and voluntary drainage districts, COLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47-2-7 (1963);
Grand Junction Drainage Dist., id. § 47-12-27; Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist.,
id. § 93-1-12.
89 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
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had used with reference to reclamation districts,90 and pointing to the
essential similarity between these and irrigation districts, the Court
said:
If it be essential or material for the prosperity of the community,
and if the improvement be one in which all the landowners have to
a certain extent a common interest, and the improvement cannot be
accomplished without the concurrence of all or nearly all of such
owners by reason of the peculiar natural condition of the tract
sought to be reclaimed, then such reclamation may be made and the
land rendered useful to all and at their joint expense. In such case
the absolute right of each individual owner of land must yield to a
certain extent or be modified by corresponding rights on the part of
other owners for what is declared upon the whole to be for the
public benefit.9 1
1. Power to Levy Special Benefit Assessments
The most important power granted to a public or quasi-public
corporation is the power to tax.92 But this power is limited, both in
purpose and in scope. In the following statement by the Colorado
Supreme Court the importance of the purpose of the tax, and the
private benefit nature of the public or quasi-public corporation can
be seen:
Irrigation district assessments are distinguished from taxes
levied by a municipality for water works, and taxes levied for
maintenance of schools, because of the public nature of the latter.
In the latter cases there is a direct public benefit, general in character,
for which the public at large, through general taxes levied for that
purpose, must pay. But in the construction and maintenance of an
irrigation system, there is obviously no direct general benefit. The
direct advantage is to the particular landowner whose land is
supplied with water, and he pays in proportion to the benefits
received, the land itself being held for such payment.
93
This statement discloses much about the power of public or
quasi-public corporations to tax. First, the tax is an assessment for
benefits, based on the theory of apportionment of benefits and costs
90 Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 701 (1884).
91 164 U.S. at 163.
92 Technically, public or quasi-public corporations do not possess the power to tax, but
only the power to levy assessments. The distinction was made in the case of City
and County of Denver v. Tihen, where the court said, "Taxation and assessment are
not synonymous terms. Each is a separate and distinct exercise of the sovereign power
to tax but .. .taxation . . .is that burden or charge upon all property laid for raising
revenue for general public purposes in defraying the expense of government. Assess-
ments are local and resorted to for making local improvements on the theory that
the property affected is increased in value at least to the amount of the levy."
77 Colo. 212, 215, 235 P. 777, 779 (1925). The U.S. Supreme Court commented,
"Although there is a marked distinction between an assessment for a local improve-
ment and the levy of a general tax, yet the former is still the exercise of the same
power as the latter, both having their source in the sovereign power of taxation."
Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 176 (1896). The power of public
or quasi-public corporations to levy assessments for benefits shall be discussed as an
exercise of the power to tax in this latter sense.
93 Interstate Trust Co. v. Montezuma Valley Irrigation Dist., 66 Colo. 219, 223-24,
181 P. 123, 124-25 (1919).
1968
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
as a result of the improvement constructed, operated or maintained. 4
This was explained in People ex rel. Rogers v. Letford:95
As a general proposition special assessments are permitted by
authorized governmental agencies upon the theory that the property
against which they are levied derives some peculiar benefit by
reason of the projected improvement different from that enjoyed
by other property in the community in which the improvement
is to be made.96
Second, because of its less than general purpose, and the private
nature of its benefits, a public or quasi-public corporation does not
have the power to levy ad valorem taxes upon the general inhabitants
of the district, but is instead limited to special assessment levies
against the increased value of the land as a result of the improve-
ment. 7 It might be noted, however, that while public or quasi-public
corporations, in the specific sense in which they have been discussed,
are limited to only special benefit assessment taxes because of the
private nature of the benefits, other public corporations, in the
generic sense, including municipal corporations proper and quasi-
municipal corporations, are not precluded from this type of taxation
in addition to the power to levy general ad valorem taxes. 8
Flowing from the nature of a special assessment tax are two
restrictions upon its levy. First, the taxpayer has a right to voice
objection at a public hearing as to the amount of benefits with which
his property is charged and against which taxes are assessed.9 Any
act which attempts to delegate the special assessment taxing power
to a district without providing for hearings will be declared uncon-
stitutional.' 0 Second, cumulative levies of special assessment taxes
to discharge delinquencies of local improvement taxes are unconstitu-
94Ruberoid Co. v. North Pecos Water & Sanitation Dist., 158 Colo. 498, 500, 408
P.2d 436, 437 (1965); Gordon v. Wheatridge Water Dist., 107 Colo. 128, 136,
109 P.2d 899, 903 (1941).
95 102 Colo. 284, 79 P.2d 274 (1938).
96 Id. at 304, 79 P.2d at 284.
9 Ruberoid Co. v. North Pecos Water & Sanitation Dist., 158 Colo. 498, 408 P.2d 436
(1965) ; People ex rel. Rogers v. Letford, 102 Colo. 284, 79 P.2d 274 (1938).
98 See cases cited note 97 supra. See also Montgomery v. City & County of Denver,
102 Colo. 427, 80 P.2d 434 (1938) ; City & County of Denver v. Tihen, 77 Colo. 212,
235 P. 777 (1925).
9 "In Colorado, where the cost of a local improvement is to be paid by special tax or
assessment, the taxpayer has a right to be heard, after notice, upon the question of
benefits and the proportion of the general cost which may be assessed against him
... " Gordon v. Wheatridge Water Dist., 107 Colo. 128, 136, 109 P.2d 899, 903
(1941) ; accord, Embree v. Kansas City & Liberty Boulevard Road Dist., 240 U.S.
242 (1916).
199 Gordon v. Wheatridge Water Dist., 107 Colo. 128, 109 P.2d 899 (1941). There is,
however, an exception to this rule. Where the legislature directly determines the
boundaries of the district and declares that all of the property in the district is
benefited, the declaration of the legislature, while not conclusive on the courts, is
held to be "highly persuasive, and to be rejected only in case it is palpably false."




tional.1°' This is merely logical; if assessments are for benefits to
each piece of property, property A should not be additionally assessed
to make up for a deficiency in district income caused by the failure
of B to pay its taxes.
2. Eminent Domain
All of those kinds of districts which have been here classed as
public or quasi-public corporations possess the power of eminent
domain. However, this would not in itself grant any public character
to the district. For the power of eminent domain has, on occasion,
been granted to corporations which only by a great stretch of imagi-
nation could be considered public or municipal corporations. In these
cases the question is not whether the corporation per se is to be con-
sidered a public corporation, but whether or not the public power
granted (i.e., eminent domain) will be exercised for a specific public
use. The often cited case of Tanner v. Treasury Tunnel, Mining and
Reduction Co.1"2 is a good example. In that case the issue was
whether or not a private company authorized for the purpose of
constructing a tunnel could acquire the necessary real estate under
eminent domain where the tunnel was to be used for draining mines
and for the transportation of waste and ore for such proprietors as
might wish to avail themselves of this facility. "The vital question
is, whether or not the use of the property sought to be condemned
will be public in its nature." 103 The court faced the issue in this way:
As an aid in solving this question, we may consider the character
of the business in which the petitioner proposes to engage through
and by means of its tunnel. If this business is wholly for its benefit,
then the use of the property sought to be appropriated would be
private; while, on the other hand, if the business proposed to be
carried on by the petitioner through its tunnel is essentially for public
benefit and advantage, then the use would be public....
[W]e find, in examining the authorities, that, in determining
whether or not a use is public, the physical conditions of the country,
the needs of a community, the character of the benefit which a
projected improvement may confer upon a locality, and the neces-
sities for such improvement in the development of the resources of
a state, are to be taken into consideration.104
This test and these considerations were applied to the grant of a
single public power for a single specific use. However, this power
granted to special districts is a general power at the general disposal
of the district board of directors. The courts, consequently, in viewing
the power, look not to the requirements or benefits of a single "pro-
101 Interstate Trust Co. v. Montezuma Valley Irrigation Dist., 66 Colo. 219, 225, 181
P. 123, 125 (1919).
102 35 Colo. 593, 83 P. 464 (1906).
103 Id. at 595, 83 P. at 465.
104 id. at 595-96, 83 P. at 465.
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jected improvement," but to the character and general purposes of
the district in applying the consideration set out above. The case of
Rothwell v. Coffin 10 5 indicated the scope of the grant of this power
to an irrigation district. That case was a proceeding against a district
judge to require him to appoint a board of commissioners to deter-
mine the necessity of the taking of the complainants' lands by eminent
domain. The landowners argued that the entire project for which
the land were being taken was infeasible, and even if it were feasible,
the taking of their lands was unnecessary to accomplish the projected
result. The court found that the irrigation district had the power
under statute to construct, maintain, and operate irrigation district
properties, and to acquire rights of way over the properties of others.
The court also found that the project involved here, relating to the
draining of ponds and the constructing of a drain ditch to protect
irrigation dikes, was within the purposes of the district. The court
then decided against the landowners, holding that it was solely within
the province of the district board of directors to determine the
feasibility of any project within their general purposes and powers
and, further, that the district did not have to show the necessity for
taking the particular lands in question, nor even whether the district
would ever make use of the property it sought to condemn, but
simply whether or not the property was being condemned for a
stated purpose which was authorized for the district.
The power of eminent domain, however, can only be exercised
for a public purpose. If, as has been shown, these local improvement
districts are of essentially private nature, how then can this power,
as well as that of special assessment taxes, be justified? These dis-
tricts, though primarily for private benefit, are public corporations.
That is, their existence is beneficial to the public weal, and the
public powers granted to them are necessary to their effective exist-
ence. The Supreme Court of the United States in Fallbrook summed
up the answer to this question succinctly:
The use for which private property is to be taken must be a public
one, whether the taking be by the exercise of the right of eminent
domain or by that of taxation.... A private company or corporation
without the power to acquire the land in invitum would be of no
real benefit, and at any rate the cost of the undertaking would be so
greatly enhanced by the knowledge that the land must be acquired
by purchase, that it would be practically impossible to build the
works or obtain the water. Individual enterprise would be equally
ineffectual; no one owner would find it possible to construct and
maintain waterworks and canals any better than private corporations
or companies, and unless they had the power of eminent domain
they could accomplish nothing. If that power could be conferred
105 122 Colo. 140, 220 P.2d 1063 (1950).
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upon them it could only be upon the ground that the property they
took was to be taken for a public purpose. 10
E. Territoriality
This last quotation from the Fallbrook case also suggests another
characteristic of local improvement districts as public or quasi-public
corporations which distinguishes them from private corporations.
This is the characteristic of territoriality which is common to all
special districts. Territoriality refers to the establishment of exact
geographical boundaries within which the district will perform its
functions. Territoriality is necessary to the district as an organiza-
tional device to (1) compel the inclusion for election purpose of all
the landowners whose lands will be benefited by the improvement;
(2) define those lands against which special assessments may be
levied; and (3) specify the boundaries within which, or in reference
to which, the power of eminent domain may be exercised.
The characteristic of territoriality is part of the public nature of
a public or quasi-public corporation. It is believed that this character-
istic has often led courts to refer to special districts as municipal cor-
porations.1 °7 McQuillin listed "[a]population and prescribed area
within which the ... corporate functions are exercised" as one of the
six elements necessary to constitute a municipal corporation proper.
1 0 8
Banks speaks of it this way:
A municipal corporation generally has jurisdiction only in the terri-
tory embraced within its corporate limits. It therefore follows that
every municipality must have its boundaries fixed, definite and
certain in order that they may be identified and so all will know the
exact territory within the corporate limits. Such boundaries are
originally fixed when a municipality is incorporated and they may
be changed when territory is annexed or disconnected.' 0 9
This feature distinguishes a public or quasi-public corporation
from a private corporation which does not have set boundaries within
a state. First, this characteristic enables a public or quasi-public
corporation to include an individual's lands within the district
vhether the individual wants to be included or not, as long as the
formation procedures in the enabling act are followed. A purely
private corporation, on the other hand, is a collection of individuals
who each voluntarily join together for a common purpose. It is quite
possible for many of the member landowners of a public or quasi-
public corporation to be quite bitterly opposed to the formation of
the district and the inclusion of them as members.
106 Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161 (1896).
107 See, e.g., the use of the term "municipal corporations" as applied to irrigation districts
in People ex rel. Weisbrod v. Lockhard, 26 Colo. App. 439, 143 P. 273 (1914).
108 1 E. McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORtATIONS § 2.07, at 454 (3d ed. 1949).
10 9 J. BANKS, COLORADO LAW OF CITIES AND COUNTIES § 4.1 (1966).
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Second, a private business corporation normally can operate
anywhere within the state under whose laws it is incorporated. A
public or quasi-public corporation, like quasi-municipal and municipal
corporations proper, cannot, of course, pick up and move to another
part of the state when conditions change. William Anderson made
this distinction clear when he listed the characteristics of territoriality
as one of the elements necessary to constitute "a government" for
the purposes of his 1941 enumeration of governments in the United
States." Discussing this aspect of a government further, he said:
Each unit of government ... operates over a definite land or land-
and-water area .... It may have incidental powers and possessions
beyond these territorial limits, yet it remains identified with a
particular area. In this respect it is unlike a business corporation...
which usually has a principal place or center of business such as a
central office, but ranges outward from that center without very
fixed territorial limits.",
Special service districts, which are discussed in the next section
of this article as quasi-municipal corporations, also possess this char-
acteristic of territoriality.
F. Public Corporations - Conclusion
Thus we have the essence of a public or quasi-public corporation.
The legislature acts to enable the organization of an area and all of
its residents to accomplish works which, though they may privately
benefit those involved, redound to the benefit of the entire state.
Through bringing more lands into cultivation through drainage or
irrigation districts or protecting the economic base of the state
through flood control or conservation, the state as a whole is made
richer, and all of its people are indirectly benefited. For this reason,
several of the powers of the state are conferred upon private land-
owners organized according to statute, such as the powers of taxation
and eminent domain, the power to issue municipal bonds, and the
power to organize an area and all the landowners thereof into a dis-
trict, even if a number of those to be organized might object. For
this reason, these districts, though essentially and directly for private
benefit, are classed as public corporations.
III. QUASI-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Districts formed under 11 special district enabling statutes were
classified above as quasi-municipal corporations.112 They were all
placed in the same classification because analysis of their provisions
reveals that they are similar in all material respects. Cases bearing
110 W. ANDERSON, THE UNITS OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1945).
1I Id. at 8.
112 See text, section IB supra.
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upon the quasi-municipal status of districts formed under each of
these statutes have not been before the courts. However, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court has been consistent in classifying those which
have been litigated before that court as quasi-municipal corporations.
Thus metropolitan districts,11 water and sanitation districts," 4 and
water conservancy districts'" have been held to be quasi-municipal
corporations. In addition, metropolitan recreation and park dis-
tricts," 6 and fire protection districts" 7 have been noted to belong to
the same classification, although there has been no specific holding
on these types of districts.
A. Independent Corporate Existence
Quasi-municipal corporations, like public or quasi-public corpo-
rations and unlike special taxing districts, are full and independent
corporate entities. Like all municipal corporations, they are not
managed or subject to the control of any other entity or body except
the legislature. They are usually denominated "quasi-municipal cor-
porations" although in a minority of the enabling statutes they are
referred to as "municipal corporations." They possess the powers to
sue and be sued in their corporate name, to have perpetual existence,
to adopt a seal, incur debts, enter contracts, buy, sell, and own real
and personal property, hire employees, issue negotiable and general
obligation bonds, levy and collect taxes, and to exercise the power of
eminent domain. They are governed by a board of directors who are
normally elected by the resident taxpaying electors of the district and
are responsible to the inhabitants of the district without supervision
of their activities by any other bodies except the legislature or the
courts as outlined in the enabling legislation.
B. The Nature of Quasi-Municipal Corporations
Throughout the preceding discussion of public or quasi-public
corporations, it was observed that they were basically private corpora-
tions in nature and benefits, upon which had been engrafted a few
of the attributes and powers of municipal corporations. On the other
113 Garden Home Sanitation Dist. v. City and County of Denver, 116 Colo. 1, 177 P.2d
546 (1947); City of Aurora v. Aurora Sanitation Dist., 112 Co!o. 406, 149 P.2d
662 (1944). Both of these cases were decided prior to the enactment of the Metro-
Solitan Districts Act in 1947. However, the acts under which they were formed
ecame in large measure the provisions of the 1947 Act, which replaced them.
114Schlarb v. North Suburban Sanitation Dist., 144 Colo. 590, 357 P.2d 647 (1960);
Gordon v. Wheatridge Water Dist., 107 Colo. 128, 109 P.2d 899 (1941).
115 People ex rel. Dunbar v. South Platte Water Conservancy Dist., 139 Colo. 503, 343
P.2d 812 (1959) ; Kistler v. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist., 126 Colo.
11, 246 P.2d 616 (1952) ; People ex rel. Rogers v. Letford, 102 Colo. 284, 79 P.2d
274 (1938).
116 Burns v. District Court, 144 Colo. 259, 356 P.2d 245 (1960); Schlarb v. North
Suburban Sanitation Dist., 144 Colo. 590, 357 P.2d 647 (1960).
117 Schlarb v. North Suburban Sanitation Dist., 144 Colo. 590, 357 P.2d 647 (1960).
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hand, quasi-municipal corporations, as their name implies, approach
the opposite end of the scale. They are "almost" municipal corpora-
tions lacking only those powers of a municipal corporation which are
not essential to the fulfillment of their limited objectives or functions.
In traditional language, the basic distinction between quasi-
municipal corporations and public or quasi-public corporations, re-
spectively, is the difference between an organization for "normal"
governmental purposes and one which has as its purpose the organ-
ization of landowners to construct improvements that will affect the
value of their lands. Generally, Colorado municipalities are author-
ized to perform almost all of the functions (except, perhaps, water
conservancy) which are authorized for special service districts as
quasi-municipal corporations. The primary reason for the creation
of these latter districts has been to provide municipal services in
unincorporated areas where they were not available from a city or
town and which were beyond the county's power to provide. The
functions of public or quasi-public corporations as local improvement
districts are not "normal" governmental functions at either the county
level or the municipal level. They are, in fact, "extra-governmental."
The Supreme Court of Oregon has stated this more generally as the
first test of the corporate status of a special district:
The criteria adopted by the courts in determining whether a
specified public corporation is a municipal corporation designed to
confer general benefits, as distinguished from a special assessment
or a local improvement district designed to confer special benefits,
are, first, whether the functions which the corporation is designed
to perform are in their nature so interrelated with industry and
general community development as to affect the property as well as
the persons generally within the boundaries of the public corpora-
tion .... 118
This character of a quasi-municipal corporation in Colorado was
clearly presented in People ex rel. Dunbar v. Proposed Toll Gate
Sanitation District."9 Referring to sanitation districts, 2 the Colo-
rado Supreme Court said that they are "an expression of the unques-
tioned police power of the state in serving a public use for the 'health,
safety . . of the inhabitants of said districts.' "121 This concern for
all of the inhabitants of the district is greatly different from the
conception the courts have of public or quasi-public corporations
118 Petition of Board of Directors of Tillamook People's Util. Dist., 160 Ore. 530,
86 P.2d 460, 463 (1939) (emphasis added); accord, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Sacramento Municipal Util. Dist., 92 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1937). The other two tests
are whether the district was formed as a separate organization or is to be dissolved
upon performance of the special functions for which it was organized, and whether
it is empowered to levy a general tax or only to levy special assessments.
119 128 Colo. 33, 261 P.2d 152 (1953).
120 Organized under COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 89-5-1 to -49 (1963).
121 People ex rel. Dunbar v. Proposed Toll Gate Sanitation Dist., 128 Colo. 33, 39,
261 P.2d 152, 155 (1953).
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which were "essentially private in nature," and primarily for the
benefit of those landowners of the district whose lands were increased
in value. This is the crux of the difference between public or quasi-
public corporations and quasi-municipal corporations. In Ruberoid
Co. v. North Pecos Water and Sanitation District' this difference
was decisive. Ruberoid was an action by landowners to have their
lands excluded from the district on the grounds that their property
would not be benefited by being included in the district. Were this
a typical public or quasi-public corporation, this objection would be
sufficient to have them excluded. 1 3 But the court, quoting from Toll
Gate, distinguished these two types of districts: " 'Sanitation districts
... are not created for the purpose of improvements or benefits to
land, as may be the case in the organization of other kinds of districts,
but are for the inhabitants of the district' "; 124 and concluded: "We
hold, therefore, that lack of special benefit alone cannot be a ground
for excluding property from a water and sanitation district. "125
Another distinction flows from the nature of the district. Re-
quirements for voting in the district are different. In a public or
quasi-public corporation usually nonresidents of the district and cor-
portions which own land can vote in district elections.126 In quasi-
municipal corporations normally only persons who are registered
voters in state elections, have paid real or personal property taxes in
the last year, and reside in the district can vote.127 In public or quasi-
public corporations, voting is often weighed according to the amount
of land a person owns in the district. In quasi-municipal corporations,
on the other hand, the principle of "one man, one vote" prevails.
C. Power of Taxation
Where the nature of the district most obviously makes a differ-
ence is in the more extensive power of taxation possessed by a quasi-
municipal corporation. This was brought out most forcefully in the
landmark case of People ex rel. Rogers v. Letford 12 which upheld
the Water Conservancy Law of Colorado, 129 and held water con-
servancy districts to be quasi-municipal corporations. Water con-
122 158 Colo. 498, 408 P.2d 436 (1965).
123 See, e.g., Irrigation District Law of 1905, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 150-1-3 (1963);
Internal Improvement District Law of 1923, id. §§ 150-4-12, -13.
124 158 Colo. at 501, 408 P.2d at 438.
1251d.
12 People ex rel. Cheyenne Soil Erosion Dist. v. Parker, 118 Colo. 13, 192 P.2d 417
(1948).
127 People ex rel. Dunbar v. Proposed Toll Gate Sanitation Dist., 128 Colo. 33, 261
P.2d 152 (1953).
12 102 Colo. 284, 79 P.2d 274 (1938).
12
9
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 150-5-1 to -50 (1963). For a good presentation of the
important provisions of this act, and the Letford case upholding its constitutionality,
see Kelly, Water Conservancy Districts, 22 RocKy MT. L. REV. 432 (1950).
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servancy districts were granted the power to levy ad valorem taxes
as well as special benefit assessments.13 ° Discussing the constitution-
ality of the power to levy ad valorem taxes, the court quoted the
constitutional provision which authorizes the legislature to grant to
the corporate authorities of "any county, city, town or other municipal
corporation" the power to levy and collect taxes for all purposes of
such corporation,' and continued: "In this grant of power [i.e., the
power to levy ad valorem taxes] lies the distinction between a water
conservancy district under this act and ... irrigation districts ....
The public character of the water conservancy district is the occasion
for this difference."'I32
The court held that a water conservancy district was a "quasi-
municipal corporation formed for a public state purpose," and had
the power to levy "an ad valorem tax based upon the same valuations
as all general taxes." '33  This type of district was quite carefully
distinguished from irrigation districts as examples of public or quasi-
public corporations. It was stated that "an irrigation district operates
in a proprietary rather than a public capacity,' 13 4 and thus cases
limiting the power of irrigation districts to levy ad valorem taxes had
no applicability to water conservancy districts as quasi-municipal cor-
porations. Three years later the court affirmed the reasoning in
Letford in deciding the constitutionality of the grant of the power to
levy ad valorem taxes to water districts:
Section 7 of the [Water and Sanitation District] act provides inter
alia that a district "shall be a governmental subdivision of the state
of Colorado and a body corporate, with all the powers of a public
or quasi-municipal corporation." If the district is such and no ques-
tion is here raised on this point, the power to levy general taxes on
all property, real and personal, within the district may be conferred
by the legislature.' 85
In the case of Kistler v. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy
District3 6 the court again distinguished between irrigation districts
as public or quasi-public corporations and water conservancy districts
as quasi-municipal corporations on the basis of the latter's purposes
130 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 150-5-16 (1963).
131 CoLo. CONST. art. X, § 7.
132 102 Colo. at 301, 79 P.2d at 283 (emphasis added).
133 Id. at 302, 79 P.2d at 284.
134 Id. at 302, 79 P.2d at 283.
135 Gordon v. Wheatridge Water Dist., 107 Colo. 128, 136-37, 109 P.2d 899, 903 (1941).
As though to further emphasize the fact that quasi-municipal corporations exist to
benefit the inhabitants of the district generally and not only landowners, the water
district act in this case was declared unconstitutional on the grounds that it authorized
the district to levy an ad valorem tax on real estate solely, thereby exempting
personalty and violating the uniformity and exemption clauses of the Colorado
constitution.
116 126 Colo. 11, 246 P.2d 616 (1952).
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and status as state agencies and their general taxing powers. The
court used these words:
The [water conservancy] district as here created is, according to
our adjudication in the Letford case, supra, a state agency, and as
such is a public corporation with broad powers to accomplish its
objects which are of public benefit, an advantage to the people of
the state as a whole.
187
This is in striking contrast to an irrigation or other public or
quasi-public corporation which is "a local organization to secure a
local benefit," "from which the state, or the public at large, derives
no direct benefit."' 8 8 The Kistler court added:
It is technically characterized as a "quasi-municipal corporation,"
however, designed for state purposes. It is, by the broad grant of
power to levy taxes, distinguished from the usual irrigation districts
authorized by Colorado statutes. 139
This distinction was summed up in the Ruberoid case, previously
mentioned, where the court said:
Unlike special [local] improvement districts, which do have as their
objective improvement of the respective properties and which are
financed by a special assessment on each by reason of the relationship
to the improvement bestowed, a water and sanitation district is
directly concerned with the public health and welfare. . . . Because
of that fact, the water and sanitation district does not depend on
special assessments for its revenue or taxing authority. Instead, there
is in the act . . . conferred upon the board "power and authority to
levy and collect ad valorem taxes . "..."140
Another distinction between the extent of the taxing power of
a public or quasi-public corporation and a quasi-municipal corpora-
tion was made in the Letford case: Public or quasi-public corpo-
rations, which are given only the power to levy special benefit
assessment taxes, cannot collect cumulative levies to meet defaults
and deficiencies. 141 Speaking of public or quasi-public corporations
as local special improvement districts, the court met the objection
that cumulative levies of ad valorem taxes by a water conservancy
district were unconstitutional, saying:
It has very generally been held that such [cumulative] levies could
not be made for the purpose of paying deficiencies arising from a
nonpayment of taxes in local special improvement districts such as
irrigation and drainage districts....
These decisions are based upon the theory that the assessments
levied in a local special improvement district cannot exceed the
benefits conferred upon the property involved. The distinction
1371d. at 14. 246 P.2d at 618.
138 Interstate Trust Co. v. Montezuma Valley Irrigation Dist., 66 Colo. 219, 221, 181
P. 123, 124 (1919).
139 126 Colo. at 14, 246 P.2d at 618.
140 158 Colo. 498, 500, 408 P.2d 436, 437 (1965).
141 See text accompanying note 101 supra.
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between such a district and the one under consideration has been
heretofore pointed out .... [T]he objection is not tenable. 142
The point should be clear by now that two separate classes of
districts have been distinguished. One is for public purposes, the
other is not; one is a state agency, the other is not; one is to benefit
the public generally, the other is for the benefit of private landowners
only. And it should be clear by now that the presence or absence of
the power to levy general ad valorem taxes has frequently been used
by the court to determine whether a particular kind of district, such
as irrigation or water conservancy, is one or the other. For example,
no district has ever first been declared to be a public or quasi-public
corporation and consequently denied the power to levy general ad
valorem taxes. Rather, the presence or absence of this power has
first been noted, and the district then found to be either quasi-
municipal or public or quasi-public.
43
D. Tax Exemption
Quasi-municipal corporations are exempt from state and county
taxes. Three of the enabling statutes contain specific exemptions.
144
The remaining eight districts are exempt from taxes because of their
quasi-municipal status. In response to the question of what criterion
is used to determine whether or not a particular district is exempt
from taxation, the Colorado Tax Commission replied that municipal
corporations are exempt from state and county taxes under the Colo-
rado constitution,'14 and added, "Examples of districts which are not
subject to local taxes would include fire, recreation, water, hospital,
sewer." 146 Three of these have been held by the courts to be quasi-
municipal corporations. The others are similar in all material respects.
Thus, unlike public or quasi-public corporations, quasi-municipal cor-
porations are exempt from local taxation without a special statutory
exemption. In this respect they are treated as municipal corporations.
A problem arises, however, as to the classification of irrigation
districts formed under the Irrigation District Act of 1935.147 Under
142 102 Colo. at 305-06, 79 P.2d at 285.
143 See Petition of Board of Directors of Tillamook People's Util. Dist., 160 Ore. 530,
86 P.2d 460 (1939); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Municipal Util. Dist.,
92 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1937). However, this logic has been criticized. See Brown,
People's Utility Districts in Oregon, 20 ORE. L. REV. 3 (1940). "[TIhe nature of
the taxing power would seem to result from the nature of the district rather than
the converse, since, if the agency is a municipal corporation, it may exercise a general
taxing power, but otherwise not." Id. at 10.
144 Grand Junction Drainage District, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-12-27 (1963)
Domestic Waterworks Districts, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-1-14 (1963)
Metropolitan Sewage Disposal Districts, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 89-15-42 (1963).
145 CoLo. CONST. art. X, § 4 (quoted at note 79 supra).
146 Letter from Howard A. Latting, Chairman, Colorado Tax Commission, to Benjamin
Novak, December 2, 1966.
147 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 150-3-1 to -88 (1963).
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this act irrigation districts are granted the power to levy general ad
valorem taxes. 148 If, as was stated above, the presence of this power
alters the nature of the district, changing it from a public or quasi-
public corporation into a quasi-municipal corporation, could it not be
argued that they should be exempt from local taxes under the consti-
tution? This argument has not yet been tested before the courts and
all irrigation districts are at present subject to taxation. Were this to
be litigated, the court would be presented with interesting alternatives.
If the court chose to remain consistent, it could either void the power
to levy ad valorem taxes, saying that an irrigation district was either
intended by the legislature to be, or is per se, primarily for the
benefit of the private landowners. Or it could decide that an irriga-
tion district granted such power is quasi-municipal in nature and thus
falls under the constitutional exemption applicable to other quasi-
municipal corporations. On the other hand, the court, by taking a
position inconsistent with its former decisions, could maintain both
the power and the tax liability of irrigation districts. However, it
would seem strange if an irrigation district possessing all the powers
of, say, a water district, were to be taxed by the state solely because it
supplied water for agricultural and rural uses rather than industrial
and urban uses. What the courts will do remains to be seen.
E. Quasi-Municipal Distinguished from Municipal Corporations
Quasi-municipal corporations have been distinguished from
public or quasi-public corporations on the basis of the greater public
powers and purposes accorded to the former. In many respects quasi-
municipal corporations are indistinguishable from municipal corpo-
rations proper. In more than one case, districts which have been
classified here as quasi-municipal have been referred to as municipal
corporations proper. As regards tort liability quasi-municipal cor-
porations are treated as municipal corporations.' Authority to be
granted the power to levy general taxes as well as exemption from
taxation is derived from the "other municipal corporations" clauses
of article X, sections 4 and 7, respectively, of the Colorado constitu-
tion. Three of the 11 enabling acts under which these districts are
formed state that they either "shall be a municipal corporation" or
"shall have the powers of a municipal corporation."' 5 0 Why, then,
are these districts classified as "almost," or quasi-municipal corpo-
rations? And how are quasi-municipal corporations distinguished
from municipal corporations proper?
148
1./. § 150-3-35.
149Cerise v. Fruitvale Water and Sanitation Dist., 153 Colo. 31, 384 P.2d 462 (1963).
15 Domestic Water\orks Districts, CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-1-11(1) (1963);
Metropolitan Stadium District, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-19-2 (Supp. 1967);
and Mine Drainage Districts, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 92-98-10 (1963).
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The majority of the enabling acts for these districts specifically
state that the districts formed under them shall be quasi-municipal
corporations.1"' The wording of the Metropolitan Districts Act is
typical: "[T]he district shall be a governmental subdivision of the
State of Colorado and a body corporate with all the powers of a
public or quasi-municipal corporation."' 52  Commenting on this
clause, the Colorado Supreme Court, in the case of Aurora v. Aurora
Sanitation District,5 ' said:
The significance, as well as the definitive limitations, of the latter
legislative declaration, is made apparent when it is considered that
a quasi-municipal corporation is not a true municipal corporation
having powers of local government, but is merely a public agency
endowed with such of the attributes of a municipality as may be
necessary in the performance of its limited objective.154
This element of the "powers of local government," which the
court has denied to quasi-municipal corporations, is listed by McQuil-
lin as one of the six elements necessary to constitute a municipal cor-
poration in its strict and proper sense.' 5 What is meant by the term
"power of local government" was explained in the case of Stermer v.
Board of Commissioners.5 6  The court in Stermer held that the
primary purpose of a municipal corporation is the regulation of
conduct and the administration of its own internal affairs. Speaking
of a community with the power of local self-government, the court
said:
It is a community invested with peculiar functions for the benefit of
its own citizens. It possesses a local government of its own, with
executive, legislative, and judicial branches. It can enact and enforce
ordinances, having the force of laws, for the regulation of its
domestic concerns and the preservation of its peace.15 7
No quasi-municipal corporation in Colorado presently possesses
this kind of power. However, the history of police protection districts,
which until 1965 were enabled to be formed possessing substantial
powers of local government, should well illustrate the importance of
this distinction. The Metropolitan Districts Act of 1947 authorized
the formation of a number of different kinds of districts, either singly
151 Metropolitan Districts, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-3-8(7) (1963); Water and
Sanitation Districts, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-5-7(7) (1963); Fire Protection
Districts, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89.6-7(7) (1963); Metropolitan Recreation
Districts, CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 89-12-7(6) (1963); Metropolitan Water
Districts, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-13-3 (1963); and Metropolitan Sewage
Disposal Districts, CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 89-15-6(2) (1963).
152 Metropolitan Districts, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-3-8(7) (1963).
153 112 Colo. 406, 149 P.2d 662 (1944).
54 Id. at 411, 149 P.2d at 664.
155 1 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 2.07 (3d ed. 1949).
156 5 Colo. App. 379, 38 P. 839 (1895).
157 Id. at 388, 38 P. at 842 (emphasis added).
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or in combination. One of these kinds was a "police protection dis-
trict." Under the act, such districts were empowered:
(a) To license, tax, regulate, or prohibit hucksters, peddlers,
pawn brokers, billiard or pool halls, places of amusement, junk
dealers, and the transportation or storage of any dangerous or
inflammable liquids, gases or solids within the district.
(b) To establish and regulate a police force for the district
and to pass and enforce all necessary police regulations. Prosecution
for violation of any regulations of the district shall be handled by
the District Attorney ...in the same manner as ...provided by
law for the prosecution of misdemeanors ....
(d) To make, adopt, amend, extend, add to or carry out a
master plan for the physical development of the district .... [TJhe
board shall have all of the powers granted to the zoning commission
of any first class city .... 158
No district was ever formed to provide for police protection
under this act, and consequently there are no cases testing its con-
stitutionality before the courts. But in 1964 the Governor's Local
Affairs Study Commission leveled such deep criticism and raised such
doubts as to its constitutionality that the police protection provisions
of the Metropolitan Districts Act were repealed by the legislature the
following year.'5 9 Among the criticisms aimed at these provisions
was the following comment:
[TJhe act apparently would permit the district directors to exercise
powers similar to the ordinance power exercised by municipal
governing bodies to determine offenses punishable by fine and
imprisonment. The central question presented is: Can the general
assembly constitutionally delegate to the governing bodies of quasi-
municipal corporations legislative power to determine what is in
the interest of public health, welfare and safety?1 6o
Under Aurora and Stermer the answer clearly would be no. For
with the power to enact police, zoning, and other ordinances having
the force of law, and the power to enforce them, these districts clearly
fell into the definition of municipal corporation given in Ster'mer;
and these powers would certainly qualify as the power of local gov-
ernment referred to in Aurora. Indeed, the Local Affairs Study
Commission referred to these districts as "Junior City Districts." 161
If districts could be granted these powers, any distinction between
cities and towns and such districts would be without a difference.
On the basis of the Aurora and Stermer decisions, taken together,
it is safe to say that no quasi-municipal corporation can be granted
the power of local self-government.
' Ch. 238 § 15, [1947) Colo. Laws 668-69 (repealed 1965).
159Ch. 218, § 2, [1965) Colo. Laws 866.
12O GOVERNOR'S LOCAL AFFAIRS STUDY COMM'N, ANALYSIS OF THE 1947 METROPOLI-
TAN DISTRICTS ACT - THE ORGANIZATION, FUNCTIONS, POWERS, AND PROBLEMS OF
METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS 8 (1964).
161 Id. at 9.
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However, this does not mean that special districts cannot make
any regulations. Public or quasi-public and quasi-municipal corpora-
tions can, of course, make regulations which are administrative in
nature, relating to the local improvement or special service with
which they are charged. Further, referring to the Cheyenne decision
upholding the power of soil erosion and soil conservation districts
to enact "land use ordinances," where the regulations are in the nature
of bylaws of a private corporation, they will be upheld.
The Aurora decision, in which the negative definition of quasi-
municipal corporations already mentioned was given, involved the
question of whether quasi-municipal corporations could exist within
the boundaries of municipal corporations proper. The City of Aurora
sought to enjoin the operations and nullify the existence of the
Aurora Sanitation District which lay wholly within the City's bound-
aries. The City argued the well-known principle, "There cannot be
at the same time, within the same territory, two distinct municipal
corporations, exercising the same powers, jurisdictions and privi-
leges."' 62 The court held that the district was a quasi-municipal
corporation, and that the district and the City did not have the same
powers, and thus, although two municipal corporations could not
exist in the same territory, a municipal corporation and a quasi-
municipal corporation did not conflict with each other. This prin-
ciple was affirmed in a similar case three years later.6 83
There are other differences between quasi-municipal and munic-
ipal corporations. In 1936 the Colorado constitution was amended
to permit the legislature to impose an annual specific ownership tax
upon motor vehicles, trailers, et cetera, the proceeds to be distributed
"to the State and its political subdivisions" in lieu of all ad valorem
taxes upon property.' 64 In Northern Colorado Water Conservancy
District v. Witwer. 65 the sole question to be decided was whether a
water conservancy district was one of the political subdivisions of
the state within the purview of the amendment to the constitution.
The court held that water conservancy districts, despite the holding
in the Letford case that they are "almost" municipal corporations,
were not subdivisions of the state in the same sense as counties, cities,
towns, and school districts, and thus could not claim any revenue
from the motor vehicle tax.
Besides the explicit distinctions and differences of the Aurora
and Witwer decisions, another distinction in the form of a limitation
162 City of Aurora v. Aurora Sanitation Dist., 112 Colo. 406, 410, 149 P.2d 662, 664
(1944).




COLO. CONST. art. X, § 6.
165 108 Colo. 307, 116 P.2d 200 (1941).
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upon quasi-municipal corporations was implied in the case of Four
County Metropolitan Capital Improvement District v. Board of
Commissioners.6 ' M.C.I.D. was "a device for collecting a sales tax
on a region-wide basis, with the proceeds earmarked, by units of
government, for capital improvements and capital equipment."' 1
67
The district directors were given power to levy a 2 percent sales tax
to be collected in all of the municipalities of the metropolitan area
of Denver, to keep separate accounts for each unit of government in
the area in which the taxes were collected, and to purchase capital
equipment or construct capital improvements in accordance with the
desires of each of the units of government within the district, and
upon completion of the purchase or construction, to turn the equip-
ment or improvement over to the unit of government from which the
sales tax was collected, and by whom it had been requested. The
district was declared unconstitutional on many grounds, the most
significant relating to its violation of the home rule provisions of the
Colorado constitution. But in elaborating upon its original opinion
in the case, the court, upon its denial of the petition for rehearing,
raised another objection which implies a further distinction between
municipal and quasi-municipal corporations. The court appeared to
limit constitutional validity of districts "which would increase the
value of real property proportionately to the value of the improve-
ment":168
So far as the pronouncements of this court are concerned our recog-
nition has never been given to any departure from the basic concept
that an "improvement district" is geared to enhance the value of
property; that such districts are financed by ad valorem taxes, or
special assesments upon property; that the directors of such districts
function as administrators of funds derived from taxes on real
property the value of which has been enhanced by the "improve-
ment." '
6 9
This statement by the court is confusing. If the court was imply-
ing that because the word "improvement" appeared in the district's
title, that it was a local improvement district, and thus a public or
quasi-public corporation, then the court is correct in saying that the
district must be geared to enhance the value of property. But such
districts are not financed by ad valorem taxes. On the other hand,
if the district were a quasi-municipal corporation (the court nowhere
classified the M.C.I.D.), then, while it could levy ad valorem taxes,
166 149 Colo. 284, 369 P.2d 67, petition for rehearing denied, 149 Colo. 302, 369 P.2d
76 (1962).
1
67 F. BRIDGE, IMIETRO-DENVER: MILE-HIGH GOVERNMENT 63 (1963).
1
68 Id. at 64.
169 149 Colo. at 304, 369 P.2d at 77.
1968
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
its improvements or services need not be related to the value of
property.
170
This apparent dilemma may be solved by a different interpreta-
tion. In the next paragraph the court states: "A sales tax of 2%0 is
imposed throughout the district. Thus at the very outset we have a
significant departure from any district heretofore declared legal by
this court." 171 Perhaps what the court is trying to say here is that
quasi-municipal corporations, although they have been referred to as
state agencies, cannot be given the power to levy a sales tax, though
presumably this power might be given to municipal corporations
proper. It should be noted that although it is true that the court has
never passed upon the validity of a sales tax levied by a quasi-
municipal corporation, the M.C.I.D. was not the first district author-
ized by the legislature to levy such a tax. Mine drainage districts
have been authorized by the legislature since 1911 to levy a limited
sales tax.' No other type of district is presently authorized to levy
any kind of sales tax, but there would appear to be no constitutional
reason why such a power could not be authorized by the legislature.
F. Quasi-Municipal Corporations - Conclusion
Quasi-municipal corporations constitute a unique class of special
districts, partaking of those characteristics and powers of a municipal
corporation which are necessary to perform their limited objective and
achieve their limited purposes, as defined in their enabling acts. They
have a legal nature all their own, and a function for which they are
molded in powers and purposes by the legislature and the courts to
provide for the needs of the citizens of the state. They establish a
continuum between public or quasi-public corporations as classed
herein and municipal corporations proper. It is hoped that this anal-
ysis will contribute to a better understanding and more effective use
of them in the State of Colorado and in other states to which the
same classificatory principles apply.
170 See text accompanying notes 119-25 supra.
171 149 Colo. at 305, 369 P.2d at 77.
'2 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 92-28-19(5) (1963).
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AN ENGINEERING-LEGAL SOLUTION
TO URBAN DRAINAGE PROBLEMS
By W. JOSEPH SHOEMAKER*
The commonplace problem of surface water drainage has been
around for so long that some municipal officials have ignored the
flood and health hazards which outmoded drainage systems pose to
our growing cities. The courts have contributed to the delay in
building drainage improvements by their failure to allow construc-
tion of new facilities financed by conventional methods of property
tax assessment. The legal tangle in Colorado which this article
explores involves difficulties in relating the constitutionally required
"benefits" of storm sewer protection to each urban landowner's
position in relation to who discharges and who gets flooded by
excess surface waters, all within the context of case developed
surface water law. The author relates the physical engineering and
legal requirements to each other, and proposes an equitable and
workable solution to the current drainage improvement standstill.
"[Y]our Father which is in Heaven... sendeth rain on the just and
on the unjust." - Matthew 5:45
INTRODUCTION
R ECOGNIZING that the problem of storm drainage is as old as
the law, the Colorado Supreme Court recently had occasion to
remark that "neither the trial court nor this Court can overrule
Newton's law of gravitation, and prevent 'water from running down
hill.' "1 Because the problem has been around for so long, the people
who should have come up with solutions to apply in our cities have
forgotten or chosen to overlook the damage created each year by the
lack of adequate storm drainage facilities. 2 Municipal officials
especially have failed to adopt modern techniques to solve this every-
day problem. Instead, they have focused their attentions on the newer
problems of air pollution, mass transportation, supersonic jets, riots
in the streets, urban renewal, and professional sports stadiums. Al-
though these matters certainly deserve the energies of public officials,
3
*Partner in the Denver law firm of Schneider, Shoemaker, Wham and Cooke. B.S.,
United States Naval Academy, 1947; J.D., University of Iowa, 1956. Former Manager
of Public Works, City and County of Denver (1960-62).
1 Clark v. Beauprez, 151 Colo. 119, 126, 377 P.2d 105, 109 (1962).
2 Average damages in the City and County of Denver alone have been estimated at over
one million dollars a year. This does not include lost manpower in clean-up work and
traffic congestion caused annually by flooding.
3 Air and water pollution, it goes without saying, have lately received widespread legis-
lative attention. It is hoped that this article may stimulate some legislative decisions
about storm drainage, which likewise involves the health and well-being of urban
residents.
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storm drainage4 problems are older and more acute in urban areas.5
Once in awhile, when a city is deluged by a flood such as the
one which hit Denver, Colorado, in June of 1965, causing loss of life
and millions of dollars worth of property damage, we no longer face
an irritating local drainage problem, but instead a disaster of great
magnitude which goes to the top of the governmental problem list.
However, both citizens and officials have a way of forgetting. Ade-
quate storm drainage is like saving money -you don't miss it until
the unforeseen happens. And like saving money, the habit of building
drainage facilities has to be formed. At the present time we have lost
the habit of building such facilities, and consequently taxpayers and
property owners spend millions each year in repairing damage to
property which should never have been exposed to floodwaters in the
first place.'
Why this seeming lack of interest when more streets, highways,
airports, sanitary sewers, and water systems are being built than ever
before? 7 The reason is a curious mixture of lack of private and
public concern - of legal and engineering problems. One result, at
least locally: not one drainage improvement district has been formed
in the Denver metropolitan area since 1952. In the same area prior
to 1952 the only storm sewer districts formed were within the City
and County of Denver, only one of five counties in the metropolitan
area in question."
To understand why local governments have come to a standstill
in drainage development, and to appreciate the need for a coordi-
nated, cooperative metropolitan attack on vital drainage problems,
one has to review both the legal and engineering considerations
involved.
A brief look will be taken first at the law of surface waters,
because the lack of storm sewer construction, especially by special
taxing districts, is predicated on what lawyers and engineers think
4 It should be noted at the outset that there are two general classes of storm drainage
systems. The "minor" system generally consists of closed and open conduits, gutters,
and their appurtenances. The "major" system is the route, normally a stream or river-
course, which a flood will follow when the minor system is inadequate or is inoper-
able.
5This is not meant to minimize drainage problems and damage in rural areas. In the
urban environment, however, serious health and safety problems can be an instant
threat to human beings living close together where poor drainage conditions exist.
6 See FEDERAL TASK FORCE ON FLOOD CONTROL POLICY, A UNIFIED NATIONAL PRO-
GRAM FOR MANAGING FLOOD LossEs, H.R. Doc. No. 465, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966).
7 In metropolitan Denver alone in 1966, more than $11.3 million was spent on streets
and highways, $2.4 million on airports, $2 million on sanitary sewers, and $22.8
million on water systems. There is no record of any expenditure on storm sewers, by
any of the local units of government in the area during the same period.




is the surface water or drainage law in Colorado.' Next, statute and
charter authorities for dealing with drainage will be reviewed to
probe the lack of success in making use of this legislation. Some
engineering considerations will then be examined from an evidentiary
standpoint. And finally, some possible solutions will be suggested,
based on language in recent Colorado Supreme Court cases. The
writer is very encouraged by what appears to be the attitude of the
court in deciding surface water cases.'0 Based on both the results and
the language, there is real hope that if lawyers, engineers, and public
officials do their evidentiary and legal homework, many more drain-
age facilities will be built in urban areas in the future.
I. SURFACE WATER LAW
1 1
The owner of a dominant estate has a legal
as well as natural easement for servitude
on the lands downstream for drainage of
surface water flowing in its natural course."
This recent statement by the Colorado Supreme Court in a con-
troversy between some private urban landowners accounts in one
sentence for the frustrations faced by municipal engineers and
lawyers in taking steps to provide public drainage improvements.
If the land below must, by law, take the water draining from above,.
how can the land above be said to benefit from the construction of a
drainage improvement? The upper owner has all the "benefit" he
needs by, figuratively speaking, living on top of the hill. And if no
benefit can be shown, how can the owner of the high land be requlired
to pay a special assessment for the improvement? The linkage be-
tween a private dispute over surface water runoff and municipal
efforts to assess upland property owners for a drainage facility is the
thrust of this article. Ambrosio v. Perl-Mack Construction Company
13
and other Colorado cases which will be discussed herein are merely
9 A complete treatment of the law of surface waters is outside the scope of the "policy
and problem solving" approach of this article. For a detailed treatment of the Colo-
rado law on this subject see Kenworthy, Urban Drainage: Aspects of Public and
Private Liability, 39 DICTA 197 (1962). An excellent nationwide examination is
Maloney & Plager, Diffused Surface Waters: Scourge or Bounty?, 8 NATURAL RES. J.
1 (1968).
10 E.g., the recognition by the court of the value in the testimony of a water engineer
called as an expert witness, in Hankins v. Borland, 431 P.2d 1007 (Colo. 1967).
11 "Surface waters" have been described, as the term indicates, as water on the
surface of the ground of a casual or vagrant character following no definite
course, of a more or less temporary existence, which spread at random over
the ground and are lost by percolation into the soil and by evaporation.
They are to be distinguished from the water of creeks, streams, rivers, ponds
and lakes, having a substantial existence and a substantially definite location.
Hunt v. Smith, 238 Iowa 543, 555, 28 N.W.2d 213, 218-19 (1947).
12Ambrosio v. PerI-Mack Constr. Co., 143 Colo. 49, 55, 351 P.2d 803, 806 (1960).
13 143 Colo. 49, 351 P.2d 803 (1960).
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evidence of what appears to be the argument for no connection be-
tween a private dispute and municipal assessment difficulties. Since
most drainage improvements have been constructed by forming spe-
cial districts to tax those property owners who will benefit from the
improvements, this set of questions has to be answered in order to
solve the problem of drainage in urban areas. It is interesting to note
that the Colorado legislature has never acted on surface water law as
such. There has, however, been considerable legislative consideration
of the construction and assessment of cost for the constructing of
drainage facilities.' 4 But the law of drainage has been left to the
judges. 1"
Over the years, two general rules of law have developed with
respect to surface waters. One, the "common enemy" doctrine, con-
siders surface waters to be a common enemy and each landowner
may reasonably do as he pleases to protect or improve his land. The
"civil law" rule places a servitude in the lower land in favor of the
upper or dominant landowner to receive all natural drainage, and the
natural passage of the water cannot be obstructed by the servient
owner to the detriment of the dominant owner.'8 Colorado is among
the states which follow a "modified civil law" rule," which has
been stated as follows: "Natural drainage conditions may be altered
by an upper proprietor provided the water is not sent down in a
manner or quantity to do more than formerly."' 8 It should be noted
here that the word "natural" (meaning both natural in amount and
velocity) is the key to using doctrinal surface water law as a spring-
board for successfully assessing upper landowners for benefits re-
ceived in the construction of storm sewer facilities.
A. Private Landowner versus Municipality.
The cases dealing with surface waters allow municipalities to be
sued the same as private parties, usually in an action by a lower land-
owner for an injunction and damages. The theories used as a basis
for suits range from negligent planning and construction of a storm
sewer system to nonfeasance for failure to do anything, or even
nuisance. However, it is quite apparent that Colorado's supreme
court has been lenient in its treatment of defendant municipalities in
14 See discussion in text at Part II intra.
15 See 59 A.L.R.2d 421 (1958); 18 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.140
(3d ed. rev. 1963); 4 J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1731 (5th ed. 1911);
3 H. FARNHAM, WATER & WATER RIGHTS § 877 et. seq. (1904) ; Kenworthy, supra
note 9; and Maloney & Plager, supra note 9.
16 Maloney & Plager, supra note 9, at 76.
17 Kenworthy, supra note 9, at 201.
18 Hankins v. Borland, 431 P.2d 1007, 1010 '(Colo. 1967) (emphasis added). See also
Clark v. Beauprez, 151 Colo. 119, 377 P.2d 105 (1962); Olney Springs Drainage
Dist. v. Auckland, 83 Colo. 510, 267 P. 605 (1928) (district enjoined from diverting
water collected in drainage system away from its outlet above plaintiff's lands.)
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surface water cases. Aicher v. City of Denver"9 set the pattern for
such favored treatment. The plaintiff's property was flooded as a
result of the city having improved and raised the level of the street.
The city had put in an 18-inch culvert to carry water under and across
the street, but it was too small and the street grade acted as a dam,
backing water up onto Aicher's lower-than-street-level land. The
Colorado Supreme Court held that a city is not bound to protect from
surface waters those who are so unfortunate as to own property which
is below the general level of the street.
20
This kind of approach to municipal responsibilities (or the lack
thereof) for drainage has been rather consistently followed in Colo-
rado, including the recent case of City of Englewood v. Linkenheil.
2
1
Linkenheil contended that the city, through a system of drains, catch
basins, intakes, and pipes, had channeled water from a higher place
to a place contiguous to the land of plaintiff so as to overflow plain-
tiff's land, resulting in an illegal taking of his property under article
II, section 15, of the Colorado constitution, The Colorado Supreme
Court, after deciding against the plaintiff on a technicality, went on
to state, quoting from Aicher, that "the only matter which would be
involved, if a case had been made by the proof, is the responsibility
of the city for changes in its streets which may so affect the flow,
direction and drainage of surface waters as to occasion consequential
damages to adjacent property." 2 The court held that the plaintiff
was "within the doctrine that subjects the servient owner of land to
a drainage easement in favor of those who are fortunate enough to
own adjacent land on the higher level." 
24
It is submitted that this statement involving a municipality is
not in line with more recent decisions as to private defendants.
Furthermore, this favorable treatment in negligence actions against
local units of government is, ironically, at the root of municipal failure
to build storm sewer systems.
B. Between Private Landowners
Two recent cases illustrate, among other things, the importance
of the factual material which is developed and presented to the court
in a surface waters conflict.
19 10 Colo. App. 413, 52 P. 86 (1897).
20 Id. at 417-18, 52 P. at 87.
21 146 Colo. 493, 362 P.2d 186 (1961). See also City of Boulder v. Boulder & White
Rock Ditch & Reservoir Co., 73 Colo. 426, 216 P. 553 (1923) ; City & County of
Denver v. Stanley Aviation Corp., 143 Colo. 182, 352 P.2d 291 (1960).
22 CoLo. CONST. art. II, § 15.
- 146 Colo. 493, 502, 362 P.2d 186, 190 (1961).
2Id. at 502, 362 P.2d at 191.
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In Clark v. Beauprez,"5 the defendant installed a permanent
drain tile with the assistance of the U.S. Soil Conservation Service to
take away the seepage in his land and drain it into a man-made ditch.
The drained water then went into a natural ditch which crossed the
plaintiff's land, resulting in more water coming onto plaintiff's land.
The defendant was enjoined from doing this. A factual case was
presented by attorneys for the plaintiff, including expert engineering
testimony, which left no doubt in the trial court, and in the supreme
court on appeal, that a greater than natural quantity of water was
coming over the plaintiff's land than previously.
26
In Hankins v. Borland,2T the defendants in Larimer County
were making irrigation use of an increased quantity of water which
became available from the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy
District through the Big Thompson project. As a result, more than
the natural amount of water drained onto plaintiff's farm, due in
part to defendant's installation of a drainage tile in place of an
open ditch.
The supreme court agreed with the finding of the trial court
that the combined water from Hankins and other defendant irrigators
was sent down in excess of natural amounts and in a manner and
quantity to do more harm than it formerly had done.2" The high
court then made the following disposition:
If, after a reasonable time, an agreement has not been reached,
the trial court should hold additional hearings to determine what
must be done by all the dominant owners by way of replacement,
repair, and maintenance, to put the servient drain tile in such
condition as will carry off drainage in a manner so as not to injure
[plaintiff's] land. The proportionate share to be paid by each dom-
inant owner for this work shall also be determined by the court.
If, after such a determination, the dominant owners fail, neglect, or
refuse to make the replacement, repairs, or maintenance, ordered by
the court, it will be appropriate for the trial court to enjoin the
dominant owners from use of the servient drain unless and until
such replacement, repair, or maintenance has been accomplished as
directed.
29
Although Clark and Hankins involved rural rather than urban
land, facts could be developed involving urban land that should
sustain a similar result, even against a municipality." A lower urban
2 151 Colo. 119, 377 P.2d 105 (1962).
2Id. at 125, 377 P.2d at 109.
2 431 P.2d 1007 (Colo. 1967).
2 Id. at 1011.
2Id. at 1011-12 (emphasis added).
30 In Ambrosio v. Perl-Mack Constr. Co., 143 Colo. 49, 351 P.2d 803 (1960), for
example, a subdivision developer was sued by a number of landowners who claimed
that a storm sewer system installed by the developer which brought water into a
natural drainage ditch, as before, had caused them damage. Held: the installation of
the storm sewer system had not materially increased the flow of water.
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landowner who could prove that one or more upper landowners were
discharging more water on him than "naturally" would flow (because
of hardsurfacing the ground for example) would have the same legal
basis for remedy that the rural owners had in the two cases dis-
cussed above.
Although in urban drainage situations it has been customary to
make a municipality the sole defendant, it is submitted that a better
case could be made against other urban private landowners, whether
they live in the municipality or the surrounding county. One key to
the court's possible attitude in future cases involving urban land is
found in City and County of Denver v. Stanley Aviation Corpora-
tion." There, the City of Denver was held not liable for a storm
sewer it had installed across Stapleton Airfield. The sewer could not
handle the quantity of water draining into it, and the water backed up
and flooded plaintiff's property. Reviewing the development of the
land draining into the storm sewer, the court stated: "Since 1936
Aurora and the environs of what is now plaintiff's property had
experienced phenomenal growth with attendant paved streets and
highways, air fields, residential and industrial buildings, which had
rendered a great part of this drainage area impervious to moisture."' 2
The court in Stanley Aviation recognized on its own that more than
natural drainage now generally flows onto the land of servient
owners in urban areas. And further, that the upper owner who
materially increases the amount of water must be prepared to pay for
any damages caused thereby. How much damage and from whom it
flows is a factual matter for engineers to determine.
Municipalities have received favorable treatment in negligence
suits against them in drainage matters because the injured landowners
failed or were unable to develop facts to accurately attribute damage
to the specific municipality. Perhaps the plaintiff in Stanley Aviation
should have sued private parties. The higher ground lands in urban
areas generally have been changed from their natural state by im-
provements, and the quantity of water flowing downhill from a new
housing subdivision or a shopping center parking lot, for example,
is almost always materially increased over the "natural" passage of
water. It is therefore an obligation of the plaintiff to pinpoint
responsibility, even though this could lead to a complicated array of
multiple parties.
Development of the evidence necessary to prevail in a surface
water damage suit is directly related to the amount of evidence
needed to sustain the "benefit" required to lawfully assess property
31 143 Colo. 182, 186, 352 P.2d 291, 294 (1960).
12 Id. at 186, 352 P.2d at 294.
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owners for drainage facility improvements contemplated by a special
improvement district or ordinance."
II. AUTHORITY FOR DRAINAGE FACILITIES
A general power to construct and main-
tain streets is sufficient authority to
authorize the construction of a storm
sewer to carry off storm waters.
3 4
Colorado cities have the authority to construct drainage facilities.
The power of a municipality to acquire, construct, and maintain
sewers and drains is conferred by state law, charter, or both, though
numerous cases on these authorities show the difficulties encountered
in making use of the legislation."
A. The Colorado Constitution
Under the Colorado constitution, home rule cities have broad
powers, including the power to construct, purchase, acquire, conduct,
and operate local public works and collect taxes thereon for municipal
purposes and special assessments for local improvements.3 " The
effect is to give home rule cities, such as the City and County of
Denver, the power to provide by charter and ordinance for local
improvements of which drainage facilities is one.
33 Some idea of the amount and kind of evidence needed is given by the text discussion
in Part III infra.
34 Kramer v. City of Los Angeles, 147 Cal. 668, 82 P. 334, 337 (1905). The United
States Supreme Court has said, "It is the commonest exercise of the police power of a
State or city to provide for a system of sewers ... " Hutchinson v. City of Valdosta,
227 U.S. 303, 308 (1913).
35 From a questionnaire submitted to a number of Colorado city attorneys by the author,
asking for copies of storm drainage ordinances used by the cities, typical responses
were received as follows:
1. We do not have any general laws pertaining to storm drainage. Our
Director of Public Works advises me that this matter is handled in each
case on an individual basis.
2. We have had a rather disappointing experience with our storm drainage
efforts. As the City was experiencing a very explosive type of growth,
it became apparent that there was going to have to be some provision for
storm drainage both for protection of property owners and because of
FHA requirements. An Ordinance was enacted which contemplated a
storm drainage facility. However, as we collected these fees the draining
problems changed almost daily as our city expanded. As a result of this
we had four law suits filed against the City. The Judge found that the
Ordinance was an invalid exercise of the powers held by the City, par-
ticularly since no storm drainage facilities had been installed. Even
though we had done thousands of dollars worth of engineering, the
Ordinance was found to be invalid.
3. The practical realities of the situation are that it is impossible for a
single developer to construct drainage facilities to take care of the
increased drainage caused by his development, unless there is an adequate
drainage system into which his facilities can be connected.




Colorado statutes authorize all cities and towns to construct
storm sewer improvements.87 The essential element of an assessment
of real estate by a special improvement district under the statute is
that the planned improvements shall benefit the property. Further-
more, the assessment must be directly related to benefit received.
This requirement is quite different from the situation faced by a local
improvement district 8 in which assessments are directly related to
real property valuation.39
Herein lies the problem in using a special improvement district
to build storm sewers. When such a district builds sidewalks, streets,
alleys, and sanitary sewer districts, it is reasonably easy to establish a
benefit to an abutting landowner, who usually makes some use of
the improvement. In addition, the cost is directly related to the
value of his property. However, even sanitary sewers and streets
have not always had easy sledding under this statute, and judging
fr6m the result and language of Town of Fort Lupton v. Union
Pacific Railroad Company,40 special benefits are going to have to
be proved rather than assumed because a legislative body passed
an ordinance which merely declared that there were benefits. The
case points up the difficulties inherent in proving benefits to an
upper landowner from a storm sewer.
Fort Lupton was an action by the railroad to enjoin assessment
on its property for a pro rata portion of a street and curb improve-
ment. The railroad had filed a protest at the time the improvement
was sought, but the board of trustees, after a hearing, denied the
protest and adopted ordinances establishing the district and financing
the improvements. The railroad pointed out that the street improve-
ment provided no additional access for its customer traffic, no in-
crease in revenues to the railroad, and that the improvements provided
no physical benefit to the railroad's property. In fact, there was an
engineer's testimony to the effect that the new curbing prevented
drainage from railroad property. The city contended that under the
statute,41 adoption of an ordinance assessing the costs of the improve-
37"ti shall be lawful ... to construct any of the local improvements mentioned in this
article and to assess the cost thereof... upon the property especially benefited by such
improvements." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-2-1 (1963). Further, "Such improve-
ments may also consist of the construction of sewers .... " CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 89-2-2 (1963).
8 Under COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-4-13 (1963).
39 See generally the discussion by Mr. Novak on Colorado local districts elsewhere in
this issue.
40 156 Colo. 352, 399 P.2d 248 (1965).
41 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-2-18 (1963).
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ments is prima facie evidence that property has been specially bene-
fited. The court held that this was not a valid argument.42
On the other hand, the Colorado local improvement district
statute 43 authorizes cities and towns to form local improvement dis-
tricts on the petition of a majority of the taxpaying electors. Taxes
are then levied on an ad valorem basis to pay for the improvements.
Storm sewers can be built under this authority but, as a practical
matter, they have not been. Virtually any district large enough to
finance improvements includes property owners on high ground who
do not feel they face a problem or have a responsibility for drainage,
and consequently such bond issues are voted down.
Counties have no present authority to construct storm drainage
facilities, unless it can be found in the general power to construct
roads. And storm drainage is no exception, since Colorado counties
are generally restricted in their authority to deal with urban problems.
(Legislation is definitely needed to remedy this situation.)
C. City Charter Provisions
The provisions found in the charter of the City and County of
Denver are clear and to the point with respect to storm drainage
facilities. The drafters even took into consideration the fact that
storm drainage facilities built now should be large enough to handle
increased drainage.4 The following excerpts from Denver's charter
relate directly to storm drainage and leave little to be desired in terms
of assisting public officials in making improvements.
A2.4 . . . The City and County shall have the power to contract for
and make local public improvements, to assess the cost thereof
wholly or in part upon the property especially benefited and to
make and contract for . . . storm drainage, larger than required by
a local public improvement district, to pay from any lawful fund
that portion of the cost which is in excess of the cost required by
the district, and, upon the extension at a later time of the mains
or submains into an area not included within the district for which
such mains or submains were made and contracted for, to assess fhe
amount paid by the City and County as a lien upon the real property
benefited by the oversize construction and extension of the mains
and submains .... [Emphasis added.]
A2.6 . . . In all cases when the cost of a local public improvement
is to be assessed wholly or in part upon the property benefited,
the cost shall be assessed in proportion to benefits received. Such
assessment may be in proportion . . . as the area of each piece of
4 156 Colo. 352, 354, 399 P.2d 248, 249 (1965).
43
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-4-4 (1963). See also COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 139-
75-1 (1963), authorizing cities of the first class to establish local improvement
districts for storm sewers in the same manner with the same results, and COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 139-78-3 (1963), essentially providing the same districting and taxing
powers to cities of the second class.
44 Compare this with the situation in which one city attorney found his city, note 35
supra, response no. 2.
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real estate in the district is to the area of all the real estate in the
district or may be by any other method that will result in assess-
ments being most equitably in proportion to benefits received.
[Emphasis added.]
A2.7 ... [Tlhe Manager of Public Works... may initiate and propose
... storm sewers....
A2.10-2 . . . [Tlhose local public improvements which may be
proposed by the Manager without the filing of a petition therefor
shall not be subject to remonstrance, but such improvements (except
sanitary and storm sewers) shall not be ordered by the Manager if
the amount to be assessed therefor on any parcel of real estate will
exceed one-half the assessed value of such parcel of real estate for
general taxes for the year preceding the proposed order.
D. Court Decisions
Although, as we have seen, the state constitution, statutes and
Denver's charter provisions clearly intend the construction of drainage
facilities, litigation brought by affected property owners against
municipalities attempting to build and assess for such facilities
explains the present hesitancy of public officials to attempt drainage
projects financed by special districts.
The most recent case involving a special improvement district
attempted by Denver, City and County of Denver v. Greenspoon,
45
sets forth some of the ground rules to which the Colorado court
expects the initiating authority to adhere. The facts showed that no
special benefit would be received by plaintiff. However, an equally
important legal aspect of the case involved the court's decision that
a property owner has the right to raise the question of benefit, or
lack thereof, at any time.4 6
Plaintiff Greenspoon owned real property located within a
Denver sanitary sewer improvement district. A sewer line was con-
structed in the street adjacent to plaintiff's property not far from an
existing line. Plaintiff attacked the assessment on three grounds:
(1) his property was already fully and adequately served by a sewer
line; (2) his property could never derive a benefit from the newly
established sewer line; and (3) his property would never need addi-
tional sewer services. Denver claimed that the plaintiff had not
commenced his action on time. The trial court found that the plain-
tiff had assumed and sustained the burden of proof that the sewer
line was of no special benefit to his property, and therefore not
assessable, and that the issue of benefit could be raised at any time if
the plaintiff was prepared to sustain the burden of showing no bene-
fit. The supreme court, in affirming the lower court, quoted from
section 20 of the Denver charter: "The city and county shall have
45 140 Colo. 402, 344 P.2d 679 (1959).
46 Id. at 406, 344 P.2d at 681; accord, Town of Fort Lupton v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.,
156 Colo. 352, 399 P.2d 248 (1965).
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power to contract for and make local improvements, and to assess
the cost wholly or in part upon the property especially benefited
. 47 The court agreed that the plaintiff had showed no benefit
to exist. 8
Cook v. City and County of Denver49 involved the last attempt
by the City and County of Denver to form a storm sewer improve-
ment district, this one for the Valverde area, a drainage problem area
then as well as now, since it is at the bottom of an urban drainage
basin extending over two counties. Several taxpayers sought equitable
relief and an injunction to prevent the city from building a storm
sewer and including them in the assessment, saying they would not
be benefited. The supreme court affirmed the granting of an injunc-
tion on the basis of Ross v. City and County of Denver,50 a case
decided 32 years earlier and turning on the issue of lack of showing
of special benefit.
Ross was an action against the city by land owners in the pro-
posed Park Hill Storm Sewer District, to enjoin the establishment of
the district on the basis that they would not receive any benefit from
the storm sewer. The proposed sewer district comprised an area of
14 square miles and 51,292 separate 25 x 125 foot lots. The ordi-
nance proposed assessment on an area basis (as is set forth in the
present charter provision-") for a total cost of 1.6 million dollars.
The supreme court held that an assessment for special improvements
apportioned by land area, insofar as it exceeded benefits, is a taking
of private property without just compensation. There was no show-
ing by the city that the property of the plaintiffs would benefit from
the proposed improvements.
52
Santa Fe Land Improvement Company v. City and County of
Denver,5 ' decided at the same time as Ross, was an action by the
Santa Fe Land Company and 46 other land owners included in the
West and South Side Sanitary Sewer District to have a special assess-
ment declared invalid and to enjoin its collection because the proposed
project was of no special benefit to them. As in Ross, the city had
proposed assessment on an area basis. The lower court granted the
city's motion to dismiss. In reversing that decision, the supreme court
held that (1) irrespective of the method of apportionment, all special
assessments are fundamentally and basically founded upon special
47 City & County of Denver v. Greenspoon, 140 Colo. 402, 344 P.2d 679 (1959).
48 128 Colo. 578, 265 P.2d 700'(1954).
49 Id.
5089 Colo. 317, 2 P.2d 241 (1931).
51 See text at Part II C supra.
52 89 Colo. at 323, 2 P.2d at 243.
5 89 Colo. 309, 2 P.2d 238 (1931).
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benefits, without which they cannot stand; and (2) the amount of
the assessment cannot exceed the value of the special benefit.54
Although legislative bodies have provided procedures whereby
drainage facilities may be constructed and the costs assessed to those
receiving the benefits, municipalities have not provided the back-
up identification of these benefits necessary to sustain assessment
ordinances.
As we have already seen, upper landowners who materially
change the natural condition of their lands receive a special benefit
when the lower owner takes care of the additional surface drainage
created by such improvements as paving or other development of the
upper owner's land. Since the lower owner could enjoin discharge
of the additional surface water, a storm sewer improvement which
receives the additional water and transports it across the lower
owner's land without damage to him is certainly a special benefit to
the upper owners. The problem becomes one of identification and
measurement, and this is where the process involving drainage im-
provements has broken down. It is also the reason for a lower owner's
hesitancy to bring an injunction action against an upper owner or
owners.
III. ENGINEERING CONSIDERATIONS
Federal Housing Administration officials have long been con-
cerned with urban drainage hazards to federally insured mortgage
property. And there is a trend now for the federal government to
refuse to financially assist such undertakings as urban renewal, public
housing, and highways where there is a lack of adequate drainage
facilities in the area involved.55 It has been the questionable practice
until recently, however, of the Federal Housing Administration to
insure mortgages on private dwellings in flood plain zones.
Municipal engineers are generally aware of the legal deterrents
to construction and assessment for drainage facilities. They further
realize that in an area of multiple governmental entities such as
metropolitan Denver, the practical problems are increased, because as
new, generally suburban development occurs on the upper land within
one governmental unit, the solutions downhill in another become
54 Id. at 313-14, 2 P.2d at 240. See also City & County of Denver v. Widom, 90 Colo.
147, 7 P.2d 406 (1932), indicating that assessment for a street improvement on a
front foot basis was in error. The assessment must be based on special benefits.
Although the case turned on a procedural error, there was little doubt as to the court's
attitude that special benefits must be proved before a special assessment will be
upheld.
5 Evaluation of Flood Hazard in Locating Federally Owned or Financed Buildings,
Roads, and Other Facilities, and in Disposing of Federal Lands and Properties, Exec.
Order No. 11,296, 3 C.F.R. 139 (1966 Comp).
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geometrically more complex. 6 Low land property owners, who might
have once been willing to tax themselves for the necessary facilities,
are less and less enthusiastic as more water comes downhill onto their
land due to someone else's probably profitable development of the
uphill areas.
Traffic engineers look at streets, which are used by many cities
as surface water runoff channels, quite differently than city public
works engineers. A street with an 8-inch curb and a channel down
the middle makes a good drainage conduit but a poor traffic arterial.
How much water a street should be expected to carry for how long
and how far are questions for which there are no uniform answers
among the engineers as yet.
Waste water control engineers are making more use of ponds
and upstream detention reservoirs, channel improvements, and good
drainage and soil conservation practices where possible in urban areas
to help protect against flooding.
These engineers have also been assisted in reducing flood dam-
ages by such land-use measures as zoning flood plains,5 7 subdivision
regulations, building and housing codes, and the reservation of low
lying areas for parks and recreational facilities. These latter preventa-
tive land use measures have been accomplished through the general
use of the police power by local bodies, but with little or no outlay
of tax money. Although these interrelated measures are helpful and
56 See, e.g., for a good illustration of the intergovernmental problems, Finley, Muddle,
Blotch, and Blunder, in SOIL, WATER AND SUBURBIA (GPO, 1968). Is it any wonder
that a private subdivider questions of what use it will be to install a 48-inch storm
sewer in his housing development in the county, when county officials have no author-
ity to install or require construction of storm sewers for the subdivision to join to?
Although there are a multitude of drainage cases involving a private party and
a municipality, or two private parties, there have been a limited number of cases
involving one municipality enjoining another from sending its surface waters onto the
lower municipality. There is authority, however, for a municipality assessing county
property for a special benefit received by the county from the construction of a special
improvement. Board of County Comm'rs v. Town of Castle Rock, 97 Colo. 33, 46
P.2d 747 (1935) ; County Comm'rs v. City of Colorado Springs, 66 Colo. 111, 180
P. 301 (1919).
57 Courts in California, Connecticut, Georgia, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York,
South Carolina, and West Virginia have decided that the regulation of land use in
floodable areas is a proper purpose for the use of the police power. E.g., McCarthy v.
City of Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953). Compare Vartelas
v. Water Resources Comm'n, 146 Conn. 650, 153 A.2d 822 (1959), with Dooley v.
Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964). For a dis-
cussion of the Dooley case, see 4 NATURAL REs. J. 445 (1965). In State v. Metro-
politan St. Louis Sewer Dist., the court there stated:
Providing for drainage and sewerage is a governmental function and an
exercise of the police power of the state .... Therefore, it was proper to
provide in the plan for powers to prevent pollution of water,... to regulate
drainage by establishing building lines and floodway reservations along
water courses, to prevent building within such lines, to police and clean
out channels of streams and to prevent dumping therein.
365 Mo. 1, 275 S.W. 2d 225, 230 (1955).
An excellent treatment of the subject is Note, Flood Plain Zoning for Flood Loss
Control, 50 IowA L. REv. 552 (1965).
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important in alleviating drainage problems, they are not the subject
of this article.
The problem for the city engineers, then, is not how to design
adequate facilities but how to finance them in built-up, largely urban
areas. How can a dominant, high ground landowner be required to
help pay for a drainage facility? What provable benefit, in other
words, is there for upper or dominant landowners? We have already
seen that, in Colorado at least, this benefit must be proved; it cannot
be assumed. This raises a host of difficult questions of fact, law,
and public policy. What was the runoff rate of the particular piece
of ground in its natural condition? What is the rate now? How
much more water is a plot of ground now developed as a single
family residence, industrial park, shopping center, or movie theatre
sending downhill than when it was in its natural state? What about
schools and other public property? Should churches and other char-
itable, religious, or educational land belonging to nonprofit corpora-
tions carry an equitable burden of the assessment? One value of a
special improvement district as opposed to a local improvement dis-
trict or general taxing entity is that real property of charitable and
other organizations exempt from general taxation is not exempt from
assessment for special improvements. 8
In summary, the fact that a lower owner receives more water
than is natural has to be established. It is not enough to declare a
benefit and then attempt to assess on a property line frontage or area
basis. This is where the engineer has to know the facts in answer to
the technical questions of how much water is coming from each piece
of ground, how fast, and how often, as compared to when the
ground was in its natural state. He must have also established
technical design criteria for storm sewers or other drainage facilities
which take into account hydrological answers to these questions, and
provide further answers as to the cost of providing the necessary
facilities.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
In Denver, the Storm Drainage Advisory Committee of the In-
tercounty Regional Planning Commission59 is well on its way toward
developing the necessary facts for a drainage basin plan in the metro-
politan area,6" complete with the necessary design criteria so that
proper facilities may eventually be built to handle the existing and
58 Board of County Comm'rs v. Town of Castle Rock, 97 Colo. 33, 46 P.2d 747 (1935).
59 An area-wide, "council of governments"-type planning body provided for in COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 106-2-4 (1963).
60 Defining the approximate boundaries of the basin is most important, for if an indi-




future drainage. Some understanding of these physical requirements
is necessary to an understanding of proposed solutions.
A. Design Criteria
Design criteria have as their purpose the development of routine
methods for planning, designing, and checking of storm sewer plans
and specifications. The criteria list the basic data required for both
preliminary and final drawings of drainage facilities. These recom-
mended design procedures are prepared in order to achieve a basic
uniformity in storm sewer works for an area, and relate engineering
design to the amount of surface water coming from the drainage
basin into the main stream channel. Various criteria for choosing
and designing outfall sewers, pipe, culverts, and open channels are
developed. Particular emphasis is placed on hydraulic continuity to
insure the obtaining of full hydraulic carrying capacity value from
facilities installed in the area to be served. Open channel design
criteria are also developed, so that flood waters may be transported
in urban areas through both densely and lightly developed parts of
the service area. Special considerations must be given to hail and
other sudden, violent storms. In addition, use of storm sewers for
draining flooded basements are studied. Studies of the drainage of
inoffensive and acceptable wastes into storm sewers and channels
are made to determine if wash waters, certain industrial wastes, and
other waste waters now going into the sanitary systems can be col-
lected by storm drainage facilities to reduce sanitary sewage treat-
ment loads.
The advantages and disadvantages of flood proofing of build-
ings, structures, and outside facilities are also reviewed. The incor-
poration of baseball fields, tennis courts, permanent fish ponds,
wildlife sanctuaries, and other compatible uses is studied in con-
junction with detention storage and pond areas to encourage auxiliary
aesthetic benefits and efficient land use.
Design criteria for using detention storage to provide for control
of runoff water are developed. The benefits and disadvantages to
using irrigation ditches for carrying storm runoff in urban areas, and
the use of emergency spillways to control the location of sudden
spills during storm runoff periods are reviewed. Thus, the design
criteria provide the basis for an overall master drainage plan con-
taining many complex elements, and for planning of the financing
of the needed facilities.
All of this is a monumental task for a rapidly urbanizing area
such as metropolitan Denver. Yet, it is the only way to lay an effective




B. Master Drainage Plan
Once the design criteria for an area have been developed, a
master drainage plan should be made which will define the main
drainage basins leading into the main river or channel, and the lateral
channels needed for the individual communities or areas of develop-
ment. These needs are determined from a compilation of required
data, and an analysis of the land within the drainage basin in its
present and anticipated uses.
C. Financing Storm Drainage Facilities
The major drainage system may be constructed and maintained
by an area-wide district which can be authorized by the state legis-
lature. In all likelihood, the district will be financed on a service
contract basis. However, a general ad valorem tax approach to
financing the major works may still prevail. Local drainage facilities,
however, will be constructed as the local unit determines. With the
necessary facts at hand, the cost and maintenance of local storm
drainage systems can be predicated on a special assessment to the
property affected based on the benefit received. Perhaps an annual
service charge predicated on benefit or use may logically be developed.
This could serve as the financial base for the issuance of bonds to pay
for construction of drainage facilities.
D. Assessment.
An equitable and accurate sytem for gauging the burden of
surface water drainage for all affected property owners in a given
area can be developed along the following lines. The engineers will
determine how much water is coming from an owner's property and
how fast. This will then be compared with the natural or unimproved
condition of the lot. A base valuation or use factor will be established.
These valutions, based on additional surface water flow, will be
placed on data processing cards in the same manner as real property
valuations are documented in most counties today. A vacant piece of
property could be worth millions of dollars but contribute no addi-
tional surface water. On the other hand, a church parking lot, assessed
at zero value for general tax purposes, could be found to contribute
substantially in additional surface water flow. The otherwise exempt
property can be made to pay its fair share for improvements under-
taken by the special improvement district, which under the statute, 1
grants no charitable exemptions.
The benefit the improved upper property will receive from
storm drainage facilities lies in the fact that a lower owner will no
longer have a cause of action to enjoin the upper property from dis-
61
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 89-2-5, -7 (1963).
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charging its water onto the lower owner who can now prove that the
church, for example, by black topping its parking lot has materially
increased the flow of water downhill. Such a chain reaction takes
place from top to bottom, each lower property owner having the same
cause of action against upper owners but in different degrees, de-
pending on how the upper property was improved and the amount
and velocity of the water flowing downhill. With modern informa-
tion processing techniques, all of the necessary data can be combined
in a complete cost and benefit assessment of any special improvement
district for which the necessary engineering data has been developed.
CONCLUSION
It is obvious to many that if the job of reducing loss and dam-
ages from surface water is to be accomplished, both protective and
preventive works must be undertaken. Such works are proper
applications of the police power of local governments. The Colorado
legislature is in a position to establish area-wide districts which could
construct the major protective facilities, and institute preventive
measures, such as flood plain zoning and the like, along such major
facilities. The legislature is also in a position to grant counties the
same powers as cities now have to deal with local drainage problems.
The Colorado Supreme Court has established a sound precedent
in dealing with surface water problems. There is already adequate
legislative authority for financing storm drainage improvements by
special districts and, in this writer's opinion, the Colorado Supreme
Court would sustain such a storm sewer district assessment of upper
landowners on a benefit theory if facts were properly documented
to show that the actions of the upper landowners had materially
increased the natural flow of water onto the lower landowners'
property.
It is imperative that engineers develop these facts for the use of
municipal, and hopefully, county administrators. The combination
of providing engineering facts to legal and equitable theories should
produce practical solutions to a heretofore virtually insoluble urban
problem.
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MCCRAY V. ILLINOIS: PROBABLE CAUSE
AND THE INFORMER PRIVILEGE
By JOSEPH R. QUINN*
In recent years, no area of the law has been the subject of so
many court opinions or has engendered more public controversy than
has the law of criminal procedure. In this decade alone, the many
decisions of the United States Supreme Court dealing with the
Constitutional rights of the criminally accused has wreaked havoc
among defense attorneys, prosecutors, lower court judges, law school
professors and text writers, and the public. The arena of criminal
procedure is caught up in the pangs of rapid transition and has
been the subject of innumerable legal articles in scholarly journals.
Mr. Quinn, of the Denver Public Defender's office, devotes his
attention in this article to one particular area of criminal procedure
- the acquisition of evidence by police officers from a search and
seizure based on the tip from an undisclosed informer. The recent
Supreme Court decision of McCray v. Illinois dealt with this area,
and the author is critical of the decision. After considering the
historical use of the informer in law enforcement, the author con-
siders in depth the dual problems of when an informer's tip can
constitute probable cause for a search and seizure and when the
identity of the informer should be disclosed to the accused in con-
nection with a pre-trial motion to suppress the seized evidence.
S INCE the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Weeks
v. United States,' the law of search and seizure has assumed
significant dimensions in the administration of criminal justice.
Weeks held that the fourth amendment barred the use in federal
courts of evidence secured through an unconstitutional search and
seizure. In Mapp v. Ohio,' the Supreme Court made applicable to
the states under the fourteenth amendment the exclusionary rule
of Weeks. As a result of Mapp, intricate problems of evidentiary
acquisition by law enforcement officials have become critical in
every jurisdiction of the United States. In order to implement the
exclusionary rule first enunciated in Weeks, rule 41(e) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure was enacted; it has since been
adopted by several states, including Colorado.3 Federal rule 41(e)
affords a party aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure the
right to move the court for an order suppressing for use as evidence
anything so obtained on the ground that "(1) the property was
illegally seized without warrant, or (2) the warrant is insufficient
*Assistant Public Defender, Denver, Colorado; A.B., St. Peter's College (1957) ; LL.B.,
Rutgers Law School (1961).
1232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3 COLO. R. CRIm. P. 41 (e).
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on its face, or (3) the property seized is not that described in the
warrant, or (4) there was not probable cause for believing the
existence of the grounds on which the warrant was issued, or (5)
the warrant was illegally executed."'
This article will focus on one area of evidentiary acquisition
by law enforcement officials: a search and seizure based on a tip
from an undisclosed informer. 5 Generally, the term "informer"
refers to anyone who, unknown to the alleged offender, communi-
cates to law enforcement officials information concerning criminal
activity on the part of another.' In practical application, particularly
within the area of search and seizure, an informer is someone who
furnishes the police with information or a "tip" concerning another's
criminal acts, which tip serves as an ostensible reason to arrest and
search the person or premises of the alleged offender, while the in-
former's identity remains unknown to the person arrested. The term
can also include those who, having participated in some criminal
offense and having been apprehended, disclose information of
another's criminal activity to the police under a promise of immunity
from prosecution or reduction of the criminal charges, the identity of
the informer once again being unknown to the one whose criminal
conduct is reported.
The initial question in the informer-search and seizure area is
whether a tip from an undisclosed informer constitutes probable
cause. Of equal significance is the question whether, and under what
circumstances, the identity of the informer should be disclosed to
the one aggrieved by the search.
The problem of balancing the public interest in effective law
enforcement with the often competing constitutional right to be
secure against an unreasonable search and seizure is no more apparent
than in the case of a search based on an informer's tip to the police;
the prosecution in such a case will universally claim the informer
privilege, that is, the evidentiary privilege of withholding the in-
former's identity upon a demand for disclosure by the defendant.
While the effect of the privilege is to protect the informer's identity,
4 FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 1 (e). See 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACE, ff 41.02 (1966).
5 For an excellent and detailed analysis of the entire search and seizure area, although
principally examining Illinois law, see LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of
True Law ... has not... Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L. F. 255.
6 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2374 (McNaughton rev. 1961). For an emperical study
as to the nature of informants, see Comment, An Informer's Tale: Its Use in Judicial
and Administrative Proceedings, 63 YALE L.J. 206 '(1953).
7 Donnelly, judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons and Agent Provoca-
teurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1092 (1951).
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it is not the informer, but rather the government or prosecution
which has the privilege and the legal standing to claim it.8
Several federal and state courts have addressed themselves to
the problem of the informer privilege in search and seizure situ-
ations,9 and the decisions have ranged in approach from unqualified
dismissal of the criminal charge in the absence of disclosure of the
informer's identity'0 to the sustainment of the privilege, even at the
expense of depriving the defendant of the only effective device
of protecting his fourth amendment rights." Without the benefit
of a conclusive constitutional mandate from the Supreme Court, the
thrust of recent judicial opinion in state and lower federal courts
has been noticeably in the direction of abrogating the privilege in
the interest of affording the defendant fundamental fairness in liti-
gating his constitutional right to be secure against an unreasonable
search and seizure.'
2
Recently the Supreme Court of the United States in McCray v.
Illinois'3 considered the issue of whether probable cause existed in
a warrantless arrest and search and seizure, predicated primarily on
an informer's tip which was partially corroborated by police observa-
tion of, and previous acquaintance with, the defendant, and the
further issue of whether the sixth and fourteenth amendments neces-
sitated a total abandonment of the informer privilege. By a 5-4
decision the court held: (1) there was probable cause for the arrest,
search, and seizure of McCray; and (2) McCray's challenge to the
informer privilege did not pose a constitutional issue, the problem
8 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2374 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Roviaro v. United
States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) ; Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390, 392 (3d Cir.
1932).
9 E.g., United States v. Robinson, 325 F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1963) ; Lane v. United States,
321 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1963) ; Costello v. United States, 298 F.2d 99 (9th Cir.
1962); United States ex rel. DeNegris v. Menser, 247 F. Supp. 826 (D. Conn.
1965); United States ex rel. Coffey v. Fay, 234 F. Supp. 543 '(S.D.N.Y. 1964);
People v. Perez, 62 Cal. 2d 769, 401 P.2d 934 (1965) ; People v. McShann, 50 Cal.
2d 802, 330 P.2d 33 (1958) ; Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d
39 (1958) ; People v. Gutierrez, 171 Cal. App. 2d 728, 341 P.2d 54 (1959) ; Drouin
v. State, 222 Md. 271, 160 A.2d 85 (1960) ; State v. Oliver, 92 N.J. Super. 228, 222
A.2d 761 (1966). See generally Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 257 (1961).
10In Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958), the California
Supreme Court issued a peremptory writ of prohibition, preventing defendant's trial.
'1 Commonwealth v. Carter, 208 Pa. Super. 245, 222 A.2d 475 (1966), and 71 DICK.
L. REV. 366 (1967), which criticizes the Carter decision. See cases cited in 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2374 n.10 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
12 Cases cited note 9 supra. But cf. Commonwealth v. Carter, 208 Pa. Super. 245, 222
A.2d 475 (1966). See 28 U. PITT. L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1967).
13 386 U.S. 300 (1967). For case comments on McCray v. Illinois, see 32 ALBANY L.
REV. 218 (1967); 1967 DUKE L.J. 888; 36 U. CN. L. REV. 746 (1967); 7 WASH-
BURN L.J. 115 (1967) ; 42 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 270 (1967). See The Supreme Court,
1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REV. 112, 196 (1967).
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instead being primarily of evidentiary, as opposed to constitutional,
dimensions and, therefore, a proper subject of state control.1
4
This article will trace the development of the informer privilege
prior to McCray, and then analyze McCray and the dual problems
of probable cause and disclosure of an informer's identity upon
demand by the accused in connection with a motion to suppress.
I. THE INFORMER PRIVILEGE
Over the centuries law enforcement officials have depended
on informers to furnish them with information of criminal activities.
In medieval England, a procedure called "approvement" developed,
by which a person arraigned for treason or another felony would
confess his guilt and then offer to inform and convict other criminals
in exchange for a pardon; if they were convicted he was pardoned,
if not, he was hanged. 5 During the 16th and 17th centuries, statutes
were passed creating what has been called the "informer suit,"
whereby any member of the public had the right to sue for, and
retain a part of, the fine imposed for statutory violations. 6 Motivated
by personal profit, persons made false accusations to such an ex-
tent that Coke characterized the informer as a "viperous vermin,
which endeavoured to have eaten out the sides of the church and
common-wealth.''17 Even today, vestiges of the "informer suit" re-
main with us in the form of statutes which award the informer a
share of the fine. 8
The law has long accorded privileged status to the identity of
persons supplying law enforcement officials with information con-
cerning the commission of criminal offenses. 9 The theoretical pur-
14 The Court in McCray also stated that it had not laid down any hard and fast eviden-
tiary rules to guide the federal courts in this area of disclosure and would not do so.
The ambivalent and case-by-case approach of the Supreme Court in this area readily
explains the wide ranging opinions by lower federal and state courts when confronted
with informer-search and seizure cases.
15 Donnelly, supra note 7, at 1091.
16 Id.
17 E. COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE *194.
18 Various federal statutes provide for compensation to informers providing information
relating to criminal offenses. They range over a broad area, including but not limited
to the following: contraband articles, 49 U.S.C. § 784 (1964); cotton futures, 26
U.S.C. § 7263 (1964) ; custom law violations, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1619, 1620 (1964);
vessels engaging in slave trade, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1351, 1353 '(1964) ; Indian liquor traffic
violations, 18 U.S.C. § 3113 (1964) ; Indian law violations, 25 U.S.C. § 201 (1964) ;
narcotic drug violations, 21 U.S.C. 8§ 183, 199 (1964) ; postal law violations, 39
U.S.C. § 2407 (1964) ; export of war materials, 22 U.S.C. § 401 (1964) ; presiden-
tial assassination, kidnap or assault, 18 U.S.C. § 1751 (Supp. II, 1967).
19 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2374 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Rex v. Akers, (1790),
as cited in footnote in King v. Howe, 6 Esp. 124, 125-26, 170 Eng. Rep. 849, 850
(N.P. 1808). For an annotation collecting the federal cases on the government's
privilege of nondisclosure, see Annot., 1 L. Ed. 2d 1998 (1957). See generally
Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 257 (1961).
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pose of the informer privilege is to spur the public interest in
effective law enforcement by protecting the personal welfare and
preserving the anonymity of the informer, thus encouraging him to
communicate his knowledge of criminal violations.
20
So frequent is the use of informer's tips by law enforcement
officials as justification for an arrest and search that one Supreme
Court Justice has characterized the times as "an age where faceless
informers have been reintroduced in our society in alarming ways."21
Thus far, there remains a prevailing judicial adherence to the value
judgment that "the informer is a vital part of society's defensive
arsenal.'"' Even courts which strongly urge the preservation of the
informer privilege have, however, imposed various limitations on
that privilege. Thus the privilege applies only to communications
made to law enforcement officials who have the responsibility of
investigating crime.2 ' And the privilege protects only the identity
of the informer; the content of the communication is not privileged.
24
2 0 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957); Worthington v. Scribner, 109
Mass. 487, 488-89 (1872) ; State v. Hall, 189 Wash. 174, 178, 64 P.2d 83, 85 (1957).
See 42 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 270, 279-80 (1967). For an example of the premise that
there exists a very real danger of personal retaliation in informer cases, see Schuster
v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958), relating the notorious
case of Arnold Schuster who was murdered after informing on bankrobber Willie
Sutton. See Comment, An Informer's Tale: Its Use in Judicial and Administrative
Proceedings, 63 YALE L.J. 206, 207-08 (1953).
In THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY: A REPORT BY THE PRES-
IDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
(1967), the Commission, in detailing the difficulties in obtaining proof in combating
organized crime, states at 198:
IT~he true victims of organized crime, such as those succumbing to extor-
tion, are too afraid to inform law enforcement officials. Some misguided
citizens think there is social stigma in the role of "informer", and this tends
to prevent reporting and cooperating with police.
Law enforcement may be able to develop informants, but organized
crime uses torture and murder to destroy the particular prosecution at hand
and to deter others from cooperating with police agencies. Informants who
do furnish intelligence to the police often wish to remain anonymous and
are unwilling to testify publicly.
Concerns other than anonymity often affect the informant's motives in telling his
tale to the police. This is particularly true in the area of narcotic violations and drug
abuse. As stated by the Commission, at 218:
The use of informants to obtain leads ... is also standard and essential. An
informer may or may not be a person facing criminal charges. If he is not,
he may supply information out of motives of revenge or monetary reward.
More typically the informant is under charges and is induced to give infor-
mation in return for a "break" in the criminal process such as a reduction
of those charges. Frequently he will make it a condition of cooperation that
his identity remain confidential.
21 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 273 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting opinion).
22 State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377, 201 A.2d 39, 44 (1964), as quoted in McCray v.
Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 306-08 (1967).
23 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §-2374 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
2 4 1d. See Mitchell v. Bass, 252 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1958) ; Henrik Mannerfrid Inc. v.
Teegarden, 23 F.R.D. 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Nola Elec. v. Reilly, 11 F.R.D. 103
(S.D.N.Y. 1950).
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The informer privilege has come under most serious scrutiny
in cases involving the fourth amendment." The questions posed
are usually the two mentioned before: (1) whether and under
what circumstances an informer's tip constitutes probable cause for
an arrest, search, and seizure; and (2) whether and under what
circumstances the defendant has a right to know the identity of the
informer. The genesis of judicial concern over the informer privilege
largely stems from Roviaro v. United States." In Roviaro the anony-
mous informer was potentially a material witness on the issue of
guilt, rather than the source of information leading to the search
and seizure. Roviaro had purchased narcotics from the informer who
was riding in Roviaro's vehicle, while a government agent, riding in
the trunk of the vehicle, overheard conversation between the informer
and Roviaro concerning the sale. Both before and at the trial the
defendant requested the name of the informer on the ground that
he might be able to give relevant and exculpatory evidence. The
motion for disclosure was denied, and Roviaro was convicted. The
Supreme Court of the United States reversed the conviction and in
the course of its opinion limited the proper invocation of the
privilege as follows:
A ...limitation on the applicability of the privilege arises
from the fundamental requirements of fairness. Where the dis-
closure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communi-
cation, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is
essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give
way. In these situations the trial court may require disclosure and, if
the Government withholds the information, dismiss the action.27
In dictum the Court in Roviaro discussed the informer privilege
as it related to the issue of probable cause. Recognizing that probable
cause and informer privilege are practically inseparable issues, the
Court stated that in informer cases "the Government has been
required to disclose the identity of the informant unless there was
sufficient evidence apart from his communication.
' 28
Subsequent to Roviaro, several courts have required the dis-
closure of the informer's identity when a warrantless search and
2 U.S. CONSr. amend. IV, provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized."
26 353 US. 53 (1957).
27 Id. at 60-61.
28 Id. at 61.
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seizure were predicated on an informer's tip.2" Relying on Roviaro's
dictum, Mr. Justice Traynor in Priestly v. Superior Court"° held that
if communications from an informer are necessary to establish prob-
able cause, then disclosure should be compelled in order to give the
defendant a fair opportunity to rebut the testimony of the officer
concerning the informer's tip. Otherwise, the arresting officer would
become the sole judge of the existence of probable cause to make
the search.
It was in the context of the growing judicial reluctance to
sanction the privilege that the McCray decision arose. To glean the
significance of McCray, a detailed analysis of the opinion is in order.
II. THE MCCRAY CASE AND
PROBABLE CAUSE
A. McCray v. Illinois
On January 16, 1964, at about seven o'clock in the morning,
George McCray was arrested without warrant for possession of
narcotics near the intersection of 49th Street and Calumet Avenue
in Chicago, Illinois. The arresting officers found a package on
McCray containing heroin, and he was indicted for its unlawful
possession. Before trial he filed a motion to suppress, claiming that
the police had acquired the heroin in an unconstitutional search and
seizure. At the suppression hearing McCray testified that until about
one-half hour before his arrest he had been at a friend's house, that
after leaving, he had walked with a lady to 48th Street and South
2 9 E.g., Costello v. United States, 298 F.2d 99, 101 (9th Cir. 1962) ("The 'privilege'
must give way when a challenge of the informant is essential to the proper disposition
of the case. The determination of the validity of an arrest, search and seizure is
essential to such a disposition.") ; United States ex rel. Coffey v. Fay, 234 F. Supp.
543, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) ("Upon a review of the entire record the Court concludes
that the informer's identity was necessary to resist the State's evidence on the issue
of probable cause, and that without it he was denied the only effective and available
means of rebutting Gilhofer's testimony, and consequently deprived of a fundamen-
tally fair trial.") ; People v. Gutierrez, 171 Cal. App. 2d 728, 341 P.2d 54 (1959);
Drouin v. State, 222 Md. 271, 160 A.2d 85, 92-93 (1960).
Even prior to Roviaro, courts have compelled disclosure when essential to the
issue of the validity of an arrest, search, and seizure without warrant. United States
v. Blich, 45 F.2d 627, 629 (D. Wyo. 1930) (-[T]he only safe rule to adopt will be
to require officers who presume to make search and seizures ...without warrant,
to disclose every element which goes to make up their case of probable cause, and
that this rule reasonably includes the source of their information ....") ; Wilson v.
United States, 59 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1932) ; United States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639
(W.D. Ky. 1937); Smith v. State, 169 Tenn. 633, 90 S.W.2d 523 (1936).
Various courts have recognized the rule of disclosure but did not require it in
the particular case. E.g., Lane v. United States, 321 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1963)
United States v. One 1957 Ford Custom Tudor, 264 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1959)
McQuaid v. United States, 198 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1952) ; Cannon v. United States,
158 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1946); Shore v. United States, 49 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir.
1931) ; People v. McMurray, 171 Cal. App. 2d 178, 340 P.2d 335 (1959) ; Ferrara
v. State, 101 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1958) ; People v. Mack, 12 111. 2d 151, 145 N.E.2d
609 (1957) ; Brewster v. Commonwealth, 278 S.W.2d 63 (Ky. 1955) ; Arredondo
v. State, 324 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 1959).
30 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958).
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Park, and that as he approached 49th Street and Calumet Avenue,
an officer stopped him in an alley. McCray further testified that the
officer did not show him a warrant but rather proceeded to search
his person and seize the narcotics.
One of the arresting officers, Jackson, testified that on the
morning of the arrest he and two fellow officers had a conversation
with an informer in their unmarked police car. Jackson had been
acquainted with the informer during the past year, and during this
period the informer had supplied him with information about
narcotics activities on at least 15 or 16 occasions; the information
was accurate and resulted in numerous arrests and convictions. Jack-
son furnished to the court the names of persons convicted of nar-
cotics violations as the result of the informer's previous tips.
Jackson testified that on the morning of McCray's arrest the
informer told him that McCray "was selling narcotics and had
narcotics on his person and that he could be found in the vicinity
of 47th and Calumet at this particular time."3 1 Officer Jackson, who
was acquainted with McCray, drove with the informer and other
police officers to the vicinity of 47th and Calumet. The informer
observed McCray, pointed him out to the police, and then left on foot.
Officer Jackson testified that McCray was seen "walking with a
woman, then separating from her and meeting briefly with a man,
then proceeding alone, and finally, after seeing the police car,
'hurriedly walk[ingl between two buildings.' "32 Thereupon Jack-
son and his partners left their patrol car, accosted McCray, and
informed him that he was under arrest.
Arresting Officer Arnold also testified at the suppression hear-
ing, and gave substantially the same account of the circumstances
of McCray's arrest and search. Arnold testified that he had known
the informer for approximately two years and that, during that time,
the informer had given him information concerning narcotics viola-
tions about 20 or 25 times, and that the tips had resulted in con-
victions.
Officers Jackson and Arnold were asked on cross-examination
by McCray's counsel to reveal the name and address of the informer.
The immediate objection by the prosecution on grounds of privilege
was sustained by the trial court. The motion to supress was denied,
McCray was ultimately convicted, and the Supreme Court of Illinois
affirmed.33 On certiorari to the Supreme Court 4 the judgment was
affirmed, the Court holding (1) that there was probable cause to
31 McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 302 (1967).
32 Id.
33 People v. McCray, 33 I1. 2d 66, 210 N.E.2d 161 (1965).
34 384 U.S. 949 (1966).
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sustain the arrest and incidental search and seizure, and (2) that
neither the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment nor the
sixth amendment rights of confrontation and cross-examination
were violated by Illinois' recognition of the informer privilege on
these facts.
B. Informer-Probable Cause
To establish probable cause for a search and seizure, more is
demanded than common rumor or report, suspicion, or even strong
reason to suspect.3 5 Probable cause is based on probabilities - "the
factual and practical considerations of every day life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."3 6 In other
words, are "' the facts and circumstances within . . . [the officers']
knowledge, and of which they had reasonably trustworthy informa-
tion ... sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being com-
mitted" ?37 The factors constituting probable cause are no different
in the case of a warrantless search than in the case of a search pur-
suant to warrant.38 Thus, whether probable cause can be predicated
on an informer's tip depends primarily on whether the tip is "reason-
ably trustworthy." The trustworthiness of the tip will depend on
such factors as (1) the proven reliability of the informer, i.e., the
consistency with which prior disclosures led to successful arrests
and productive searches; (2) the timeliness of the information con-
veyed;39 (3) the apparent basis of the informer's knowledge -
whether personal knowledge ("I saw") or hearsay knowledge ("I
heard") ; (4) the factual content of the communication itself; and
(5) the corroboration, if any, of the content of the informer's tip
by independent observation or knowledge.
40
The Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas4" indicated what was
needed for an informer's tip to constitute probable cause. Aguilar,
35 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160 (1949) ; Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
36 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949), modifying Grau v. United
States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932), which had indicated that only evidence competent in a
jury trial may be adduced to show probable cause.
3 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949), citing Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
3 8 E.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). This is not to say that the search
will be considered valid so long as probable cause exists, regardless of the existence
of a warrant. The Supreme Court strongly prefers searches under a warrant, and a
doubtful or marginal case of probable cause may be sustained under a warrant where
without one the search might be considered unlawful. Ventresca v. United States, 380
U.S. 102, 106-07 (1965) ; Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960).
39 For an excellent collection of cases dealing with the sufficiency of a showing as to
the time of occurrence of the facts relied upon to support an affidavit for a search
warrant, see Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 525 (1965).
40 See generally Comment, Informer's Word as the Basis for Probable Cause in the
Federal Courts, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 840 (1965).
41 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
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a case involving a search pursuant to a warrant, held that the under-
lying facts and circumstances of the informer's tip must be affirm-
atively set forth in the police officer's affidavit; mere conclusions
are insufficient. More specifically, Aguilar held that there must
be a showing not only of the factual circumstances which led the
officer to believe the informer (such as informer reliability) but
also of the factual circumstances which demonstrate that the in-
former really knew those things which he told the police (credibility
of information) 42
Informer reliability is predicated on the accuracy of information
given by the informer to law enforcement officials on prior oc-
casions;4" the mere testimonial characterization of the informer as
previously reliable is, of course, a conclusion and therefore im-
proper.44 Prior reliability should be established factually. Thus, the
fact that an informer has previously given information which merely
resulted in arrests would not ipso facto establish his reliability, since
the subsequent arrests might not have been for the reason initially
indicated by the informer, and might not necessarily have resulted
in the discovery of the anticipated contraband.45 Where, however,
it is established that the informer on two separate occasions in the
past gave information "regarding the possession of marijuana by
various persons," and "on each of these occasions said information
proved to be correct and resulted in two arrests for possesion of
4 See Ventresca v. United States, 308 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1965). Precisely how much
factual information of the underlying circumstances is needed to obtain a warrant
pursuant to affidavit varies, depending upon the type of offense. For example, a few
simple facts would logically establish probable cause in a possession of narcotics
case, but much more will be required in a tax fraud case. Jaben v. United States, 381
U.S. 214 (1965). See LaFave, supra note 5, at 262-66.
4Sin People v. McClellan, 34 Ill. 2d 572, 218 N.E.2d 97, 98 (1966), the Supreme
Court of Illinois held that the mere fact of police officers' acting on tips received
from an informer does not establish previous reliability. The accuracy of the tips
must be affirmatively shown:
The fact that the officers made three arrests based on information furnished
by Slick shows only that they acted on his previous tips and does not show
that the previous tips proved to be accurate. While it might be inferred that
the officers would not continually act on Slick's tips if they proved to be
unreliable nevertheless, we feel the informer's past reliability should not be
left to inference, when it is such an easy matter to show the accuracy of the
previous tips. It is not necessary for us to decide whether the People must
show that the previous tips from an informer resulted in convictions, as the
defendant contends; but it is sufficient, at this time, to hold that the fact
that the police acted upon previous information of an informer does not
prove that the prior information was accurate and the informer reliable.
There is apparently no minimum requirement as to the number of previous tips
received; one previous tip may be sufficient to establish prior reliability under proper
circumstances. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 at 268 n. 2 (1960).
44 People v. West, 237 Cal. App. 2d 801, 47 Cal. Rptr. 341 (1965) ; People v. McClel-
lan, 34 Ill. 2d 572, 218 N.E.2d 97 (1966). But cf. United States v. Eisner, 297 F.2d
595 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859 (1962), where the court rested its find-
ing of probable cause entirely on information received by an FBI agent which, the
affidavit simply averred, he "[believed] to be reliable."
45 People v. McClellan, 34 Ill. 2d 572, 218 N.E.2d 97 (1966) ; see also United States
v. Perry, 380 F.2d 356 (2d Cir. 1967).
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marijuana," and "said informant has never given . . . any informa-
tion that proved to be incorrect," the informer's previous reliability
is sufficiently established."
Credibility of information involves a focus upon the timeliness,
knowledgeable basis, and content of the communication from the
informer. In the absence of a firm basis in timely, personally known
facts, the informer's tip is insufficient to constitute probable cause;
for in such case the court would be at a loss to know whether the
informer spoke from recent personal knowledge or "was merely
peddling secondhand gossip overheard in a barroom. ""' Thus, in
Aguilar v. Texas,4" the Supreme Court held a search warrant invalid
on the ground that the affidavit only stated a conclusion by an un-
known informant and there was no proof that either the affiant
or the affiant's unidentified source spoke with personal knowledge.
Consequently, "the magistrate here certainly could not 'judge for
himself the persuasiveness of the facts relied on . . . to show probable
''"49
cause.
The question of whether informer-hearsay must be corroborated,
at least in part, by personal observations of the police in order to
46 People v. West, 237 Cal. App. 2d 801, 47 Cal. Rptr. 341, 343-44 n.1 (1965). How-
ever, probable cause was found wanting in West because the informer's source of
knowledge was not sufficiently established in the affidavit. See United States v.
Suarez, 380 F.2d 713 '(2d Cir. 1967).
47 People v. West, 237 Cal. App. 2d 801, 47 Cal. Rptr. 341, 345 (1965).
48 378 U.S. 108 (1964). The Supreme Court dealt with the problem of the knowledge-
able basis of the informer in Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933),
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958), and Aguilar. All three cases
involved warrants, but the statements of the Court in holding the affidavits insuffi-
cient are equally applicable to warrantless searches. In the Aguilar case, Houston
police officers obtained a search warrant based on an affidavit which recited that
'[alffiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe
that heroin, marijuana, barbiturates, and other narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia
are being kept at the above described premises .... " In holding the affidavit insuf-
ficient to constitute probable cause, the Court stated:
The vice in the present affidavit is at least as great as in Nathanson and
Giordenello. Here the "mere conclusion" that petitioner possessed narcotics
was not even that of the affiant himself; it was that of an unidentified
informant. The affidavit here not only "contains no affirmative allegation
that the affiant spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained
therein," it does not even contain an "affirmative allegation" that the
affiant's unidentified source "spoke with personal knowledge." For all that
appears, the source here merely suspected, believed or concluded that there
were narcotics in petitioner's possession.
378 U.S. at 113-14.
In United States v. Mesner, 247 F. Supp. 826, 831 (D. Conn. 1965), the court
commented on an affidavit as follows:
The affidavit here is fundamentally no more than the bare statement that
the police received information from a reliable source that pool selling was
being carried on at petitioner's premises. It nowhere discloses how the
informant came to his stated conclusion. On what facts was it based? Did
he actually see the pool selling being carried on or the "paraphernalia"?
Did he hear it from another unmentioned source, or is his statement based
on mere suspicion?
49 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964).
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constitute probable cause has never been expressly decided by the
Supreme Court. In upholding the legality of searches in several
cases,5 ° including McCray,5' the Court has pointed out that the
informer-hearsay was corroborated by the subsequent observations
of police officers. The most direct statement of the Court on the
issue of corroboration appears in Jones v. United States:
The question here is whether an affidavit which sets out personal
observations relating to the existence of cause to search is to be
deemed insufficient by virtue of the fact that it sets out not the
affiant's observations but those of another. An affidavit is not to
be deemed insufficient on that score, so long as a substantial basis
for crediting the hearsay is presented.
In testing the sufficiency of probable cause for an officer's
action even without a warrant, we have held that he may rely upon
information received through an informant, rather than upon his
direct observations, so long as the informant's statement is reason-
ably corroborated by other matters within the officer's knowledge.
What we have ruled in the case of an officer who acts without
a warrant governs our decision here. If an officer may act upon
probable cause without a warrant when the only incriminating evi-
dence in his possession is hearsay, it would be incongruous to hold
that such evidence presented in an affidavit is insufficient basis for
a warrant.
5 2
In Jones the informant's hearsay was corroborated by his pre-
vious reliability, which was known to the affiant, the timeliness of
the informer's personal observation (the day before the warrant
issued), and the fact that the accused displayed needle marks on
his arm and was a known narcotics user, facts also personally known
to the affiant. This complex of corroborating factors was therefore
more than sufficient to supply the substantial basis for crediting the
informer's tips and for the Commissioner "to conclude that narcotics
were probably present in the apartment."5
It appears that the crucial factor necessary to sustain probable
cause predicated on informer-hearsay is not so much the corrobora-
tion of the tip by the officer's personal observations,54 but rather
50 United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257 (1960) ; Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
61 In McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), the informer's tip was partially cor-
roborated by Officer Jackson's spotting McCray, with whom he was familiar, in the
vicinity where the informer said he would be, and by the officer's observation of
McCray acting suspiciously immediately prior to his arrest.
52 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269-70 (1960).
53 Id. at 271.
54 Where the informer's tip has stimulated investigation by the police which subse-
quently turns up evidence going beyond mere corroboration and showing probable
cause entirely apart from the tip, it has been held that inquiry into the identity of
the informer and the content and source of his tip is unwarranted and the informer
privilege remains absolute. Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938) ; United
States v. Elgisser, 334 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 881 (1964);
United States v. Santiago, 327 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1964) ; Miller v. United States, 273
F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1959).
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the existence of any substantial basis for crediting the informer's
tip itself. This substantial basis may, but need not, be supplied by
personal observations of the officer. Thus, when the informer's tip
is supplemented by adequate proof of prior reliability, and there
is an absence of corroboration by independent observation, probable
cause is still established. 5 While prior reliability by itself is not
ordinarily as corroborative of the validity of the tip as the officer's
subsequent independent observations,"6 it nevertheless can justify
the officer in believing that the tip is probably trustworthy. This is
especially true in the case where the informer consistently gave cor-
rect information on numerous occasions in the past, the prior tips
always resulting in successful searches. However, where there is no
showing of independent observation, and prior reliability is the only
corroborative factor, the court should carefully scrutinize the evi-
dence concerning the nature, frequency, and correctness of the prior
tips. Since in a warrantless search the burden of proving probable
cause should fall on the prosecution by clear and convincing evi-
dence,57 a weak factual showing of prior reliability should result in
55 In United States v. Freeman, 358 F.2d 459, 462 (2d Cir. 1966), the court stated:
It is true that in the Jones case the informant's story was corroborated
by other sources of information, and in United States v. Ramirez, 279 F.2d
712, 715 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 850, 81 S.Ct. 95, 5 L.Ed.2d 74
(1960) it was suggested that "Jones may require that the affidavit include
some factual information independently corroborative of the hearsay report."
We believe, however, that United States v. Ventresca, supra, Aguilar v.
State of Texas, supra and Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 84 S.Ct.
825, 11 L.Ed.2d 887 (1964), establish that such corroboration is not
required where the affiant attests to the previous reliability of the
informant.
See People v. Pitts, 26 111. 2d 395, 186 N.E.2d 357 (1962).
56 In United States v. Irby, 304 F.2d 280 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 830 (1962),
the informer was shown to have a history of mental illness and was of unstable
credibility - a pathological liar - and yet the court held probable cause to be estab-
lished, since the information furnished was corroborated by police investigation prior
to the arrest.
57 "But when the constitutional validity of that arrest was challenged, it was incumbent
upon the prosecution to show with considerably more specificity than was shown in
this case what the informer actually said, and why the officer thought the informa-
tion was credible." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964).
The federal courts have imposed the burden of proving probable cause on the
government in the case of a warrantless search and seizure. United States v. Elgisser,
334 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1964); Rogers v. United States, 330 F.2d 535 (5th Cir.
1964); United States v. Rivera, 321 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1963); Plazola v. United
States, 291 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Cervantes v. United States, 263 F.2d 800 (9th
Cir. 1959). Notwithstanding the wording quoted from Beck v. Ohio, "[tlhe
Supreme Court has never been squarely confronted with the question of which party
has the burden of proof on a motion to suppress for lack of probable cause." Note,
Probable Cause: The Federal Standard, in Student Symposium: The Fourth Amend-
ment, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 502, 527 (1964) (emphasis added). It thus appears that the
federal approach is not constitutionally binding on the states. Indeed, ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 38, § 114-12(b)(1965) states that "the burden of proving that the search and
seizure were unlawful shall be on the defendant." In People v. Rodriquez, 79 Ill.
App. 2d 26, 223 N.E.2d 414 (1967), a case of a warrantless search, the defendant
was held to have the burden of proving that the search and seizure were unlawful.
See LaFave, supra note 5, at 346-49. It is suggested that the federal approach is more
equitable, since the principal reason for imposing upon the prosecution in a warrant-
less search the burden of establishing probable cause is that the prosecution, rather
than the defendant, is in a better position to know the existence of facts within the
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suppression. In the case of a search pursuant to warrant, where
the search is considered presumptively valid and the burden of
establishing an unlawful search and seizure is on the accused,5
prior reliability should be factually demonstrated in the affidavit,
rule 41(e) expressly providing that "a warrant shall issue only on
affidavit." 9
In summary, if the informer's tip is timely, is based on per-
sonal knowledge, and contains sufficient factual content concerning
a criminal offense, then either independent observation by the police
or proof of prior reliability of the informer would elevate the tip
to the dignity of probable cause. However, in the absence of such
substantial basis for crediting the informer's tip, the tip alone
is not sufficient to establish probable cause. 0
III. THE INFORMER PRIVILEGE AND DISCLOSURE
A. Disclosure and the Warrantless Search
1. The Informer Privilege and the Sixth Amendment
As previously pointed out, if a reliable informer gives a tip
grounded upon timely and personal knowledge to the police, then
probable cause exists. McCray claimed, however, that even though
the officers' sworn testimony fully supported a finding of probable
cause for the arrest and search, nevertheless, the state court violated
the sixth amendment right of confrontation and cross-examination,
as applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment, when
it sustained the objection to the defendant's request for the in-
former's identity.6 The Supreme Court viewed this claim as frivolous
and characterized it as "absolutely devoid of merit." 2
officer's mind immediately prior to the arrest and search. Another reason is that such
a search is an exception to the constitutional corollary that a search should rest upon
a warrant. "Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the
Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes .... Only where incident to a
valid arrest ... or in 'exceptional circumstances' may an exemption lie, and then the
burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it .... " United States
v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951). See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 482
(1963); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948).
58 E.g., Irby v. United States, 314 F.2d 251 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Chin Kay v. United
States, 311 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Batten v. United States, 188 F.2d 75 (5th Cir.
1951).
59 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41'(c).
60 McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), illustrates the importance which the Court
attaches to prior reliability. Although there was some corroboration of the tip by
independent observation, it was not extensive enough to constitute a substantial basis
for crediting the tip. The substantial basis of accreditation was furnished by the
rather impressive evidence of prior reliability. Without this proof of prior reliability
in McCray, it is submitted that probable cause would not have been established.
6 1 McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 305 (1967).
62 Id. at 314.
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The right of cross-examination "is an essential and fundamental
requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's con-
stitutional goal."63 Yet, that sixth amendment right has not, at this
point of constitutional development, been extended to proceedings
at all of the pre-trial stages. During the past several years, however,
the Supreme Court has extended other constitutional safeguards
into the pre-trial stages of the criminal process in order to prevent
the right to a fair trial from becoming illusory by sanctioning the
state's gathering of evidence in derogation of constitutional rights.
Just recently, the Court imposed stringent requirements upon law
enforcement officials at the interrogation64 and lineup6" phases of
the criminal process. The Court recognized that without the right
to counsel at the lineup, the defendant "is deprived of that right
of cross-examination which is an essential safeguard to his right to
confront the witnesses against him."66
A hearing on a motion to suppress evidence arising out of a
warrantless search, particularly in the case of a possessory crime,
is frequently the most critical stage of the proceedings for the
accused. In many instances, the issue of guilt will depend entirely
upon the resolution of the motion to suppress. If the exclusionary
rule is not to degenerate into an insubstantial device for the protec-
tion of fourth amendment rights, then it would seem that the full
panoply of rights incidental to cross-examination should be accorded
the defendant at the suppression hearing arising out of a warrant-
less search. In such a case there has been no prior judicial determina-
tion of probable cause, and the hearing on the motion to suppress
is really a post-factum judicial inquiry into the arresting officer's
state of mind immediately prior to the arrest and search. It is not
suggested here that the sixth amendment should require that the
informer himself must confront the accused and testify to his tip
to the police in order for the prosecution to establish a prima facie
case of probable cause. Hearsay has long been recognized as com-
petent evidence for the establishment of probable cause, 7 and a
rule requiring the prosecution to establish informer-probable cause
through the testimony of the informer himself would impose heavy
63Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965).
"Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
615 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). The Miranda and Wade cases have, in
effect, been overruled in the federal courts by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, title II, § 701, 82 Stat. 197.
66 388 U.S. at 235.
67 E.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) (warrant); Jones v. United




burdens on law enforcement. Rather, where probable cause is de-
pendent on the informer's tip and the officer testifies to the tip and
establishes a prima facie case of probable cause, it is suggested that
the sixth amendment should, contrary to McCray, then come into
play and permit the accused to cross-examine the officer concerning
the informer's identity. For in the event that the officer is unable
to name the informer, there would be serious, if not total, doubt
cast on the officer's testimony concerning the informer's tip and
reliability. 8 On the other hand, if the court, in order to protect the
accused's sixth amendment rights, should order the officer to identify
the informer, then the accused would be afforded an opportunity to
subpoena the informer and perhaps contradict the prosecution's
evidence of probable cause.
The Court's answer to McCray's claim of a sixth amendment
deprivation of the right of cross-examination was that "it would
follow from this argument that no witness on cross-examination
could ever constitutionally assert a testimonial privilege, including
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination .... .69 The
Court's conclusion, however, falsely assumes that all privileges are
of equal dignity. Most privileges, including the informer privilege,
are generally creatures of statute or judicial rule, and have been strictly
construed because they are in derogation of the common law policy
of full disclosure of all relevant facts in the interest of truth.70 The
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is of a totally
different nature and is not strictly construed.7' Thus, a witness should
be able to successfully invoke the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination vis-a-vis the accused's constitutional right of cross-
examination because the witness' constitutional privilege is of an
origin and dignity equal to that of the accused's right of cross-
examination.72 However, it does not follow from this that a witness
should be able to successfully invoke a statutory or evidential privi-
lege vis-a-vis the accused's constitutional right of cross-examination.
In dealing with the informer privilege, the Court failed to recognize
68 Recently in Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968), the Supreme Court found a
denial of the sixth amendment right of cross-examination when a witness to whom
the accused allegedly sold heroin, refused to reveal his name and address on cross-
examination during trial. The Court noted that "[p]rejudice ensues from a denial
of the opportunity to place the witness in his proper setting and put the weight of
his testimony and his credibility to a test . ..."
69 McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 314 (1967).
70 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2285, 2380 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
7 1 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964).
72 See, United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606 (2nd Cir. 1963).
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a hierarchy of interrelated privileges and rights within the witness-
accused complex.78
Although the Supreme Court has voiced strong preference for
police resort to arrest and search warrants,74 the net effect of the
Court's ruling in McCray on the sixth amendment issue might well
be the encouragement of warrantless arrests and searches.75 By
insulating the informer's identity from the light of cross-examina-
tion, the accused in most instances will be precluded from raising
any substantial questions of fact concerning the existence of prob-
able cause. Whether the police will utilize the informer privilege
to elevate mere suspicion to the level of probable cause on the basis
of a productive search, and thereby take it upon themselves to
become the arbiters of probable cause, as envisioned by Mr. Justice
Douglas in his dissent,76 remains to be seen.
2. The Informer Privilege and the Fourteenth Amendment
Having found no sixth amendment violation in McCray, the
Court then considered whether the Illinois rule of informer privilege
offended those fundamental principles of justice and fairness in-
herent in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.77
The due process claim was viewed by the Court as a request by the
accused for the creation of a judicial presumption of police perjury.7
8
The Court concluded that to accept such a contention would con-
stitute " 'a wholly unjustifiable encroachment . . . upon the con-
stitutional power of states to promulgate their own rules of evi-
dence . . . in their own state courts .... .. This conclusion, how-
ever, follows only if it is assumed that there is a reasonable rela-
tionship between the conditions for the sustainment of the privilege
and the constitutional prohibition against an unreasonable search
and seizure. It has been stated that the "Court's treatment of . . .
[the] fourteenth amendment claim as a request for the presumption
of police perjury seems inconsistent with its past implicit recogni-
73 Recently the Court demonstrated marked sensitivity in subordinating the confiden-
tiality generally accorded to grand jury testimony to the paramount right of the
accused to obtain all information helpful to his defense. In Dennis v. United States,
384 U.S. 855, 870 (1966), the Court held that the prosecution was duty bound to
produce for defendant's examination the grand jury testimony of government wit-
nesses, thereby abrogating the long established policy of secrecy surrounding grand
jury proceedings in federal courts. The Court noted the "growing realization that
disclosure, rather than suppression, of relevant materials ordinarily promotes the
proper administration of criminal justice."
74 Ventresca v. United States, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257 (1960).
75 See The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REv. 112, 196-200 (1967).
76 McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 314 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
77E.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
78 McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 312-13 (1967).
79 Id. at 313.
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tion of danger inherent in requiring a defendant to accept the un-
corroborated word of an arresting officer."'80
In the course of its disposition of the due process claim, the
Court went to some length to relegate to an evidentiary, as opposed
to a constitutional, rule the often cited language in Roviaro v. United
States"x that the invocation of the privilege is limited by funda-
mental principles of fairness. The McCray opinion disinherits
Roviaro of constitutional heritage by characterizing as dictum its
discussion of the limitations on the informer privilege in the con-
text of search or seizure.8 Of course, once the right to disclosure
was stripped of its constitutional underpinnings implied in Roviaro,
then indeed the Court was compelled to hold that there was no
constitutional basis for imposing an absolute rule of disclosure in
cases of a warrantless search predicated upon an informer's tip.
The net effect of the Court's rejection of McCray's constitu-
tional claims and the relegation of Roviaro to an evidentiary status
is to leave the states a freer hand in formulating their own rules of
informer privilege. In fact, the Court in McCray hinged its decision
on Illinois' evidentiary rule as outlined in judicial decisions, which
precluded disclosure of the informer's identity where "the trial judge
is convinced, by evidence submitted in open court and subject to
cross-examination, that the officers did rely in good faith upon
credible information supplied by a reliable informant." 3
The difficult problem, unanswered by McCray, remains: to
what minimal extent must procedural safeguards be afforded the
8OThe Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REv. 112, 198 (1967). For a practical
criticism of the Court's reasoning at this point in the McCray decision, pointing out
that police "perjury" is fact and not fiction, see Younger, The Perjury Routine, 204
THE NATION 596-97 (1967).
81 353 U.S. 53 (1957). See text accompanying note 27, supra.
82 Prior to McCray, Roviaro was generally viewed as a constitutional decision applicable
to the states under the fourteenth amendment. For Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), made the fourth amendment applicable to the states, and Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23 (1963), held that the constitutional standards of reasonableness under
the fourth amendment are applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment.
Roviaro involved the actions of federal officers in a federal prosecution. The state-
ment in Roviaro that the informer privilege is limited by fundamental principles of
fairness and must give way when essential to a fair determination of the cause
would be applicable to the states so long as Roviaro was a constitutional decision.
Several courts, prior to McCray, seemed to impute to Roviaro a constitutional basis.
See, e.g., Costello v. United States, 298 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1962) ; United States ex
rel. Coffey v. Fay, 234 F. Supp. 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) ; Priestly v. Superior Court,
50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958). Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in
McCray viewed Roviaro as a constitutional decision:
In Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 61, we held that where a
search without a warrant is made on the basis of communications of an
informer and the Government claims the police had "probable cause," dis-
closure of the identity of the informant is normally required. In no other
way can the defense show an absence of "probable cause." By reason of
Mapp v. Ohio .. . that rule is now applicable to the States.
386 U.S. at 315.
See 46 CALIF. L. REV. 467, 468 (1958) ; 28 U. PITT. L. REV. 477, 479 (1967).
8 3 McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 305 (1967).
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aggrieved before the privilege can be sustained? For instance, if a
statute or judicial rule of evidence sanctioned an absolute or un-
conditional privilege, that is, the sustainment of the privilege with-
out the necessity of an evidentiary showing by the prosecution of
any such factor as conditioned the Illinois rule of privilege (such
as the officer's credibility), then the police would indeed become
the absolute arbiters of probable cause and the person aggrieved by
the search would be virtually deprived of his day in court on his
fourth amendment rights.84 For these reasons fundamental principles
of fairness and due process should come into play in such a situation
and abrogate the privilege. McCray seems to imply that an uncondi-
tional privilege would run afoul of minimal constitutional pro-
tections; for in sustaining the invocation of the privilege the Court
emphasized the substantial factual showing, in open court, of those
factors necessary to the proper invocation of the privilege in Illinois:
The arresting officers in this case testified, in open court, fully
and in precise detail as to what the informer told them and as to
why they had reason to believe his information was trustworthy.
Each officer was under oath. Each was subjected to searching cross-
examination. The judge was obviously satisfied that each was telling
the truth, and for this reason he exercised the discretion conferred
upon him by the established law of Illinois to respect the informer's
privilege. 85
Yet, in regard to the minimal procedural safeguards necessary
for the invocation of the informer privilege, the line of demarcation
between the state's right to promulgate its own rules of evidence
and the accused's rights inherent in due process and fundamental
84 In McCray, the Court did allude to a California statute, CAL. EVID. CODE § 1042(c)
(West 1966), vesting discretion in the trial judge to uphold the privilege upon an
evidentiary showing "in open court . . . that such information was received from a
reliable informant . . " The Court cited the California act as an example of a statute
consistent with the evidentiary rule of Illinois. But, since the California statute
makes no provision for an evidentiary showing of "good faith reliance" by the police
officer or credibility of the informant, as to the tip at issue, as required in Illinois,
it arguably falls short of the procedural safeguards present in McCray. One can con-
ceive of situations where the prosecution might be able to establish the informer's
prior reliability, but the officer's testimony as to the particular tip in question may
be a complete fabrication; or, the informer, though shown to have been previously
reliable, may have lied to the police officer, who accepted the information as true,
made a warrantless search, and actually discovered contraband. In both of these
situations, it would seem that disclosure of the informer's identity would be required
in Illinois but not in California. The only safeguard in both rules is the broad discre-
tion of the trial judge. If McCray, therefore, postulates as a condition of constitutional
immunity the procedural and evidential framework present in the Illinois rule of
informer privilege, then a California-type rule would be constitutionally infirm.
The California statute was enacted to nullify the effect of the holding of the
California Supreme Court in Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39
(1958). See text accompanying note 30 supra. The constitutionality of the statute
has recently been upheld in Martin v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 351, 353, 424
P.2d 935, 937 (1967), the court stating that the Supreme Court's ruling in McCray
was "controlling on the facts before us." The extent of the evidentiary finding in
Martin of the police officer's credibility, if indeed there was any such finding, is not
apparent from the opinion. The Court in Martin appears to assume that the Illinois
rule is no different from the California statute.
85 McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 313 (1967).
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fairness remains distinctly clouded. It is submitted that, even though
the Supreme Court in McCray chose not to abrogate the informer
privilege on sixth amendment grounds, nevertheless the Court should
at least have delineated explicitly the minimal constitutional stand-
ards necessary for the invocation of the privilege, rather than merely
implying that an unconditional privilege would be constitutionally
infirm. Without such delineation, it can be anticipated that state
and federal opinions in this area will continue to fall into the morass
of confusion.
3. The Conditions for Disclosure of the Informer's Identity in
the Warrantless Search
Under McCray, the disclosure of an informer's identity is not a
matter of constitutional right. On the other hand, the judicial deter-
mination of whether or not to compel disclosure is not a matter
resting exclusively within the unfettered discretion of the trial court.
The real problem of the McCray case concerns the circumstances
under which disclosure should be ordered. In sustaining the trial
judge's exercise of discretion in upholding the claim of informer
privilege by the state, the Supreme Court predicated its ruling on
Illinois' evidentiary rule that the identity of the informer need not
be disclosed "if the trial judge is convinced, by evidence submitted
in open court and subject to cross-examination, that the officers did
rely in good faith upon credible information supplied by a reliable
informant."86 At first glance, the Court would appear to be stating
that the factors of good faith reliance by police officers, credibility
of informer-information, and informer reliability are pertinent to
a resolution of the issue of disclosure. However, as indicated pre-
viously, credibility of the tip and informer reliability are factors
essential to the issue of probable cause. Absent a proper showing of
such factors, probable cause is lacking and the evidence should be
suppressed. The problem of whether the prosecution should be
ordered to disclose the informer's identity or suffer the suppression
of evidence if it elects to disobey the order should never arise in
such a case, since the problem of disclosure presupposes a prima
facie showing of probable cause and a demand for disclosure by the
accused after a prima facie case has been established. What seems
to be crucial to the problem of disclosure, therefore, is the good faith
or credibility of the police officer in testifying to the facts underlying
the search. For instance, if the officer's testimony is vague, incon-
sistent, or otherwise questionable on the facts and circumstances
relating to the arrest and search, the informer's tip, or informer re-
8 Id. at 305.
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liability, or if the officer obviously testifies falsely to a particular
fact in issue, disclosure of the informer's identity might be ordered.
The Court in McCray intimated the propriety of disclosure in such
circumstances when it stated:
If the magistrate doubts the credibility of the affiant, he may require
that the informant be identified or even produced. It seems to us
that the same approach is equally sufficient where the search was
without a warrant, that is to say, that it should rest entirely with the
judge who hears the motion to suppress to decide whether he needs
such disclosure as to the informant in order to decide whether the
officer is a believable witness. 87
Where the officer's credibility is thus put in issue, it is reasonable
to order disclosure in order to afford the accused the opportunity of
testing, among other things, whether in fact the informer exists,
what precisely he told the officers, and under what circumstances the
tip was given. If the officer is unable to name the informer, or
if the prosecution discloses the identity of the informer and the
informer contradicts the officer's testimony concerning the tip, there
would be serious, if not total, doubt cast on the officer's testimony
concerning probable cause. In short, with disclosure in the case
where the officer's credibility is suspect, the aggrieved is afforded
an opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing consistent with the
exclusionary rule.sS
The prosecution, upon an order of disclosure, can of course
elect to withhold the identity of the informers" but not at the ex-
pense of the accused's fourth amendment rights. Upon an order of
disclosure and the prosecution's election to withhold the informer's
identity, the court should suppress the evidence obtained as a result
of the search and seizure in issue.90 When the prosecution elects to
obey the order and disclose the informer's identity, it must provide
the accused with sufficient information - such as name, last known
address, and physical description of the informant -to enable the
accused to locate him."' If, after a diligent search, the accused is
unable to locate and compel the presence of the informer in court,
87 McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 307-08 (1967), quoting Chief Justice Weintraub's
discussion of the disclosure issue in State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377, 388, 201 A.2d 39,
45 (1964).
88 See Comment, Informer's Word as the Basis for Probable Cause in the Federal
Courts, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 840, 851 (1965).
89 United States v. Tucker, 380 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1967).
9 0 E.g., Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958); People v.
Gutierrez, 171 Cal. App. 2d 728, 341 P.2d 54 (1959) ; Drouin v. State, 222 Md.
271, 160 A.2d 85 (1960).
918 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2374 (McNaughton rev. 1961); People v. Diaz, 174
Cal. App. 2d 799, 345 P.2d 370 (1959) ; People v. Mays, 174 Cal. App. 2d 465, 344
P.2d 840 (1959) ; People v. Taylor, 159 Cal. App. 2d 752, 324 P.2d 715 (1958).
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then the court should grant the motion to suppress, since by virtue of
the order of disclosure, the court obviously has not been clearly con-
vinced by the prosecution's evidence of the constitutional propriety
of the search and seizure. 2 There is the further consideration, rooted
in fundamental fairness, that the unavailability of the informer
under these circumstances has precluded the accused from a full
evidentiary hearing on his fourth amendment claim.
Disclosure of the informer's identity not being a matter of
constitutional right under McCray, a court could adopt an alternative
procedure to an order of disclosure in open court: when a demand
for disclosure is made by the accused and the court is not convinced
of the officer's credibility, and sufficient corroborative or independ-
ent evidence is lacking, the court could order that the informer be
produced in the privacy of the court's chambers, and in the absence
of counsel, accused, and witnesses, the court could conduct an in
camera hearing into the facts and circumstances surrounding the
alleged tip, the informer's prior reliability, and the contents of the
alleged tip. A record of the in camera proceedings could be kept
and sealed with the court for purposes of appellate review of its
final determination of the disclosure and suppression issues. Al-
though such procedure has been utilized by at least one court,93 it
would appear that the alleged advantage in not jeopardizing the
future use of the informer by revealing his identity to the accused
might be overbalanced by the deprivation to the accused of a detailed
cross-examination of the officer with reference to the informer's
identity, and the further deprivation of an examination of the
informer with reference to probable cause and the officer's credi-
bility. Although such deprivations would not amount to sixth amend-
ment violations under McCray, the shortcomings of such procedure
should not be minimized, particularly since an in camera hearing
would be a procedure resulting from some initial reservations by
the court of the officer's credibility.
In summary, when the issue of disclosure is raised, unless the
court is convinced of the officer's credibility, disclosure of the in-
former's identity should be ordered. What must not be forgotten
is that in the absence of disclosure the accused is severely hampered
92 See cases cited note 57 supra.
93 United States v. Day, 384 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1967). In LaFave, supra note 5, at 368,
it is noted that this practice is being encouraged by some trial judges in Illinois. Yet,
in People v. Freeman, 34 Ill. 2d 362, 215 N.E.2d 206 (1966), after defendant was
denied the name of the informer, his request for such an in camera hearing was also
denied, and the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the judge's decision, apparently




in, if not precluded from, effectively litigating his fourth amendment
right. Unless the law of informer privilege is cautiously applied,
there is danger that the exclusionary rule will be reduced to a nullity.
B. Disclosure and the Search Pursuant to Warrant
The fundamental problem in the search pursuant to warrant
is whether the aggrieved is ever entitled to the disclosure of the
identity of the informer referred to in the affidavit. The question
was at least implicitly before the Supreme Court in Rugendorf v.
United States,94 and the Court was able to sidestep a direct con-
frontation of the problem. Before trial, the defendant filed a motion
for the names of the informers referred to in the affidavit, on the
basis of which a search warrant was issued, and he challenged not
only the legal sufficiency of the affidavit but also its veracity. The
motion was denied. The Supreme Court held that the search was
valid because the alleged factual inaccuracies of the affidavit were
"of only peripheral relevancy to the showing of probable cause, and,
not being within the personal knowledge of the affiant, did not go
to the integrity of the affidavit."95 The Court then concluded that
since there was substantial basis for crediting the informer-hearsay
declarations in the affidavit, the informer's identity was properly
withheld, challenge to the veracity of the affidavit having failed to
show that "the affiant was in bad faith or that he made any misrepre-
sentations to the Commissioner in securing the warrant.' 96 Neverthe-
less, the Court seems to have implied that if an affidavit does set forth
allegations of an informer's communication which include matters
within the personal knowledge of the affiant and essential to prob-
able cause, disclosure might be compelled upon a preliminary show-
ing by the aggrieved that the affiant acted in bad faith or made
misrepresentations in obtaining the warrant. But, the defendant
should support his motion to disclose with something more than mere
suspicion that the facts of the affidavit are untrue.97
The Ccurt's approach in Rugendorf is strikingly similar to the
approach in McCray with reference to good faith and credibility.
From the standpoint of the aggrieved, however, the Rugendorf ruling
is of little comfort, since in most cases it will be virtually impossible
to show that the affiant acted in bad faith or misrepresented the
informer's allegations to the judge or commissioner, unless testimony
9376 U.S. 528 (1964).
9 5 Id. at 532.
9 6 Id. at 533.
97 United States v. Warrington, 17 F.R.D. 25 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
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from the informer himself is obtained. 8 However, assuming that
the aggrieved can establish a prima facie case of bad faith or mis-
representation by the affiant, disclosure seems to be in order, since
otherwise there is great danger not only that the constitutional re-
quirement of an oath or affirmation for a warrant is being abused,99
but also that the judicial procedure for the issuance of a warrant, as
well as the search and seizure process itself, is being utilized by the
affiant to perpetrate a sham upon the aggrieved and the court;1"0
disclosure therefore will preserve the constitutional mandate from
invidious abuse, and protect the court and the aggrieved from fraud.
In order to preserve strict constitutional adherence to the fourth
amendment by law enforcement officials, a vigorous argument can
be proffered that a person aggrieved by a search and seizure pur-
suant to warrant should be entitled to disclosure of the informer's
identity under the same circumstances as in a warrantless search,
even in the absence of a showing of bad faith or misrepresentation
on the part of the affiant, in order to contest via an evidentiary
hearing the underlying allegations of the affidavit. Otherwise, by
simply reciting the magical phraseology of informer-probable cause
in the affidavit, law enforcement officials might be able to effectively
foreclose the aggrieved from his day in court on probable cause.
Under federal rule 41(c), no testimony is taken upon the issuance
of a search warrant, the rule providing that the warrant shall issue
only on affidavit.1"1 At first glance, it does not seem unreasonable
to urge that one aggrieved by a search pursuant to warrant should
be afforded the same procedural remedy as one aggrieved by a
warrantless search. In the latter case, the party aggrieved is afforded
the opportunity of contesting the sworn testimony of law enforce-
98 If, however, the informer initially contacts an officer and the officer in turn com-
municates the informer's message to the affiant, the aggrieved might conceivably be
able to show through the testimony of the initial contact that the statement in the
affidavit, allegedly recounting the informer's message to the initial contact and its
relay by the initial contact to the affiant, is false, and thereby establish a prima facie
case of bad faith or misrepresentation by the affiant. On the other hand, if the
affidavit sets forth probable cause independently of the informer's tip to the initial
contact, and the independent probable cause is not shown by the aggrieved to be
the product of misrepresentation or bad faith, then the informer's tip, even though
misrepresented in bad faith by the affiant, is not really essential to probable cause
at all. The difficult case on disclosure, within the context of "bad faith-misrepresen-
tation," appears to be the case involving a communication from the informer to the
police with little or no other evidence of probable cause existing. In such a situation if
the aggrieved can establish a prima facie case of bad faith or misrepresentation by
the affiant, disclosure seems to be in order under Rugendorf. See United States v.
Pearce, 275 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1960).
99 U. S. CONST. amend. IV.
100 See King v. United States, 282 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1960).
101 FED. R. GRIM. P. 41(c).
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ment officials by an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress,
and might under some circumstances demand disclosure. Why
should not a party aggrieved by a search pursuant to warrant be
accorded the same opportunities?
Several cases have held that in the case of a search pursuant
to warrant the aggrieved on a motion to suppress may attack the
factual accuracy or contents of an affidavit by an evidentiary hear-
ing; 10 2 but these cases did not concern themselves with the right of
disclosure of the informer's identity as antecedent to the evidentiary
hearing. A few cases, however, have held that the aggrieved is en-
titled to disclosure of the identity of the informer referred to in an
affidavit and that, in the absence of such disclosure, the evidence
should be suppressed.' 13 Notwithstanding a vigorous argument and
a few cases to the contrary, it would appear that a rule permitting
the aggrieved to demand the disclosure of an informer's identity
in order to contest the allegations of the affidavit relating to the
informer's credibility and reliability is of doubtful judicial per-
suasion. In the absence of a showing of bad faith or misrepresenta-
tion by the affiant, to allow such disclosure is, in effect, to repudiate
the rule that in a search pursuant to warrant probable cause must
be determined by the affidavit itself, nothing more and nothing
less."' The reasons for confining the inquiry to the four corners of
the affidavit are manifold. In the first place, to afford the accused
the right to contest the veracity of the affidavit would undoubtedly
discourage resort to search warrants by law enforcement officials.
If the allegations of an affidavit are subject to contradiction and
impeachment to the same extent as the testimony of a law enforce-
ment official on a motion to suppress involving a warrantless search.
the factors presently motivating the procurement of warrants
(rendering the officer's belief immune from evidentiary contradiction
and legally validating the officer's subsequent search and seizure
through prior independent judicial judgment) might be destroyed.
In the second place, if the aggrieved is granted the right to testi-
monially impeach the veracity of an otherwise sufficient affidavit,
102 E.g., United States v. Freeman, 358 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1966); King v. United
States, 282 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1960) ; United States v. Poppitt, 227 F. Supp. 73 (D.
Del. 1964) ; Lerner v. United States, 151 A.2d 184 (D.C. Mun. Ct. 1959) ; People
v. Alfinito, 16 N.Y.2d 181, 211 N.E.2d 644, 264 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1965).
103 United States v. Pearce, 275 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1960) ; Baker v. State, 150 So. 2d
729 (Fla. App. 1963).
104 E.g., Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); Paldo v. United States,
55 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1932); United States v. Freeman, 165 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.
Ind. 1958) ; United States v. Casino, 286 F. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
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should not the prosecuting attorney be given the right to rebut the
aggrieved's evidence? The net effect of such procedure might well
be to render nugatory the recognized implications in rule 41 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, both as to the legality of the
searching officer's actions and the prima facie validity of the judicial
officer's determination of probable cause. Finally, it should be
remembered that the warrant is issued by an independent judicial
officer and, contrary to the case of a warrantless search, his decision
on the issue of probable cause presumably entails a weighing of the
aggrieved's right of privacy. Moreover, if the magistrate doubts the
veracity of the allegations in the affidavit concerning the informer,
he can require the identification and production of the informer
prior to the issuance of a warrant. °5 Since a warrant is issued
only on the basis of an affidavit filed with the court,'0 6 a supplemen-
tal affidavit setting forth the additional facts and circumstances as
provided by the produced informer which confirm the veracity of
the tip could then be filed as a matter of record prior to the issuance
of the warrant. The aggrieved under such a procedure is not without
remedy; the basis of the judicial officer's action in issuing the warrant
is a matter of record and subject to contest by the aggrieved on a
hearing concerning the sufficiency, as opposed to the veracity, of
the affidavit.
So long as the procedure for issuance of warrants is not proven
to be frequently abused,' 0 7 it would seem that for the above reasons
a motion for disclosure in order to contest the credibility and reli-
ability of the informer should have no place in the case of a search
pursuant to warrant. The only purpose of disclosure would be to
afford the aggrieved the opportunity to contest the veracity, as op-
posed to the sufficiency, of the affidavit, and fundamental principles
of policy seem to militate against opening up the affidavit to the
onslaught of factual contradiction and impeachment common to the
105 E.g., State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377, 201 A.2d 39, 45 (1964), quoted with approval
in McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 307-08 (1967) ; People v. Keener, 55 Cal. 2d
714, 361 P.2d 587, 12 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1961).
106 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c), (f).
107 For an analysis of the warrant procurement procedure in practice, pointing out that
magistrates perfunctorily issue warrants requested by prosecutors, see Miller &
Tiffany, Prosecutor Dominance of the Warrant Decision: A Study of Current
Practices, 1964 WASH. U.L.Q. 1. See also LaFave & Remington, Controlling the
Police: The Judge's Role in Mlaking and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions,
63 MIcH. L. REv. 987, 991-95 (1965), pointing out that in many instances, judicial
control of the warrant process is only a "fiction."
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motion to suppress arising out of the warrantless search. 108 In the
case of bad faith or misrepresentation by the affiant, however, there
is present an essential abuse of the search and seizure process ab
initio, as well as a possible fraud upon the court, and the policy of
"affidavit-conclusiveness" should take second place to the only ef-
fective remedy calculated to preserve the integrity of the fourth
amendment and the judicial process.
CONCLUSION
The essence of the fourth amendment prohibition against un-
reasonable searches and seizures is the indefeasible right of personal
privacy in the individual. To protect this right the exclusionary rule
was adopted; to implement this rule the motion to suppress was
provided. True, the effect of the exclusionary rule might well be that
the criminal goes free, but "it is the law that sets him free," and
"[n]othing can destroy a government more quickly than ... its dis-
regard of the charter of its own existence."' 10 9
The net effect of McCray, however, is the subordination of
individual privacy to society's interest in effective law enforcement.
For by relegating to an evidentiary, as opposed to a constitutional,
status the demand of an accused for disclosure of the informer's
identity during cross-examination on the motion to suppress, the
Court has helped to insulate from cross-examination the very source
of ostensible probable cause; accordingly, the accused's day in court
on his fourth amendment rights has been drastically curtailed. Far
from discouraging abusive police practices, McCray can only en-
courage warrantless searches allegedly predicated on a tip from the
so-called previously reliable informer. Thus, the policeman becomes
108 In People v. Keener, 55 Cal. 2d 714, 722, 361 P.2d 587, 591, 12 Cal. Rptr. 859,
863 (1961), the court stated as follows:
If a search is made pursuant to a warrant valid on its face and the only
objection is that it was based on information given to a police officer by an
unnamed informant, there is substantial protection against unlawful search
and the necessity of applying the exclusionary rule in order to remove the
incentive to engage in unlawful searches is not present. The warrant, of
course, is issued by a magistrate, not by a police officer, and will be issued
only when the magistrate is satisfied by the supporting affidavit that there is
probable cause. He may, if he sees fit, require disclosure of the identity of the
informant before issuing the warrant or require that the informant be
brought to him. The requirement that an affidavit be presented to the
magistrate and his control over the issuance of the warrant diminish the
danger of illegal action, and it does not appear that there has been frequent
abuse of the search warrant procedure. One of the purposes of the adoption
of the exclusionary rule was to further the use of warrants, and it obviously
is not desirable to place unnecessary burdens upon their use. . . . It follows
from what we have said that where a search is made pursuant to warrant
valid on its face, the prosecution is not required to reveal the identity of
the informer in order to establish the legality of the search and the admis-
sibility of the evidence obtained as a result of it.
1 09 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
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the arbiter of probable cause and the right of privacy is truly a right
without a remedy. Implicit in McCray is the threat that the constitu-
tional right of privacy might be relegated to a status inferior to that
of a common law rule of institutional efficiency. A free society can
endure without an informer privilege, but hardly without a mean-
ingful constitutional right of privacy.
NOTES
LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON MIRANDA
INTRODUCTION*
O NE may note, either with alarm or satisfaction, that the Supreme
Court has, in recent years, displayed increasing concern for
protecting and expanding the constitutional rights of persons sus-
pected of crime. One of the more controversial decisions reflecting
this concern is Miranda v. Arizona,' which is designed to regulate
the interplay between the police and the accused in those situations
in which the police seek admissions or confessions. A majority of the
Court having become disenchanted with the voluntariness test for
determining the admissibility of confessions,' the Miranda opinion
contains a carefully delineated set of prophylactic rules for dealing
with future confessions.' In moving beyond the factual situations
*This note was at press prior to the enactment of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 197, title II, § 701 of which in effect overrules
Miranda in the federal courts.
1384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda was only one of four cases consolidated in the deci-
sion. The other cases involved were Vignera v. New York, Westover v. United
States, and California v. Stewart.
2The voluntariness test was derived from the common law rule that a confession
must be trustworthy before it can be admitted into evidence, and was given consti-
tutional status by the Supreme Court. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287
(1936). The determination of voluntariness was a subjective process, involving a
weighing of the circumstances of pressure against the defendant's power of resist-
ance, to determine whether his will was overborne. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S.
156, 185 (1953). For a discussion of the factors considered under this "totality of
the circumstances" test, see Miller and Kessel, The Confession Confusion, 49 MARQ.
L. REV. 715 (1966) ; Ritz, Twenty-five Years of State Criminal Confession Cases in
the U.S. Supreme Court, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 35, 202 (1962); Comment, The
Coerced Confession Cases in Search of a Rationale, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 313 (1964).
For other developments in the area of confessions prior to Miranda, see Enker &
Elsen, Counsel For the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escohedo v. Illinois,
49 MINN. L. REV. 47 (1964) ; Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal
Detection, Detention and Trial. 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 657 (1966). See also MODEL
CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966).
3Miranda is not retroactive. In Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), the
Court said its new confession rules apply only to trials which began after June 13,
1966, the date of the Miranda decision. The Court did state that the state courts
were free to apply Miranda to a broader range of cases. Id. at 733. In spite of the
Court's generosity, no state has felt compelled to deviate from Johnson, and only a
few courts considered the problem of retroactivity in any detail. For opinions con-
taining a spirited discussion of the issue, see People v. Rollins, 423 P.2d 221, 56
Cal. Rptr. 293 (1967); State v. Rye, 148 N.W.2d 632 (Iowa 1967); People v.
McQueen, 18 N.Y.2d 337, 221 N.E.2d 550, 274 N.Y.S.2d 886 (Ct. App. 1966).
Most courts simply stated that Miranda was not to be applied retroactively, citing
lohnson as authority. Perhaps the meek obedience of the state courts is summed up
y the words of one judge who stated:
I confess to occasional difficulty in conforming my own views with those
of the Supreme Court, in this area of the law; and now that I have found
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before it, the Court promised to exclude from evidence all confes-
sions or admissions unless, prior to custodial interrogation, the ac-
cused is advised of his fifth and sixth amendment rights and ade-
quately waives them.
Despite its black-letter style, Miranda has proved to be only a
skeletal framework within which the courts must exercise their own
discretion as to how the issues should be resolved.' In resolving
subsequent factual situations, the various state and federal courts
have been far from harmonious in their opinions as to how Miranda
should be interpreted. The purpose of this Note is to discuss and
analyze the major issues arising from Miranda and the possible
legal limitations which may be placed thereon as the courts strive
to obtain a proper balance between the rights of the individual and
the public. Included for discussion are the broad issues of custodial
interrogation, advisement, and waiver.
Although these are probably the most important of the issues
raised by Miranda, they by no means circumscribe the areas covered
by Miranda. Other areas relevant to a Miranda situation have, due
to space limitations, been omitted. However, it is felt desirable here
to identify some of these issues as they are all potential limitations
on the scope and effect of Miranda. One such area is the applica-
tion of the so-called "fruits" doctrine to the Miranda situation. Is
evidence derived from information obtained during an illegal interro-
gation admissible into evidence, or is it the fruits of illegality, and
a decision of that tribunal to which I can easily accommodate, I am unwill-
ing to take a contrary position.
People v. McQueen, 18 N.Y.2d 337, 348, 221 N.E.2d 550, 555, 274 N.Y.S.2d 886,
894 (Ct. App. 1966) (concurring opinion).
In spite of the unanimous feeling that Miranda is not to be given retroactive applica-
tion, the majority of the courts, both state and federal, have held that if the defend-
ant can obtain a reversal of his original conviction, even if on a technicality, he will
have the benefit of Miranda at the retrial, even though it was not available to him
on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Brock, 101 Ariz. 168, 416 P.2d 601 (1966) ; People
v. Doherty, 429 P.2d 177, 59 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1967) ; Creech v. Commonwealth, 412
SW.2d 245 (Ky. 1967) ; People v. Vignera, 18 N.Y.2d 723, 220 N.E.2d 801, 274
N.Y.S.2d 161 (Ct. App. 1966) ; State v. Gray, 268 N.C. 69, 150 S.E.2d 1 (1966) ;
State v. Shoffner, 31 Wis. 2d 412, 143 N.W.2d 458 (1966). Federal cases include
Gibson v. United States, 363 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1966) ; United States v. Pinto, 259
F. Supp. 729 (D.N.J. 1966). On the other hand, a few courts see no difference
between a trial and retrial insofar as application of Miranda is concerned. See
Jenkins v. State, 230 A.2d 262 (Del. 1967) ; People v. Worley, 35 Ill. 2d 574, 221
N.E.2d 267 (1966) ; State v. Vigliano, 47 N.J. 504, 221 A.2d 733 (1966) ; People
v. La Belle, 53 Misc. 2d 111, 277 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Rensselaer County Ct. 1967). See
also Comment, The Applicability of Miranda to Retrials, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 316
(1967). For a searching analysis of the Constitution as a chronological limitation,
see Loewy, The Old Order Changeth -But For Whom?, 1 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1
(1967).
4As Justice Harlan said, "the fine points of this scheme are far less clear than the
Court admits." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 505 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
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thus inadmissible?' May evidence, inadmissible as direct evidence
of guilt because of noncompliance with Miranda, be admitted into
evidence on a question other than guilt? The main concern would
be whether such evidence could be used to impeach the defendant's
credibility.6 Another issue, one of remedy, is, in what tribunals and
at what type of hearing may the defendant raise a Miranda objec-
tion?' Also, does the "standing" rule apply to Miranda violations?
That is, if evidence is obtained from A in violation of A's Miranda
right, does B have a right to object to its admission in a prosecution
against B?'
5 In Miranda, near the close of the opinion, the Court said: "But unless and until
such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence
obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him." 384 U.S. at 479
(emphasis added). See id. at 500 (Clark, J., dissenting opinion).
By using such broad language, the Court made implicit reference to the "fruits" or"primary taint" doctrine, first expressed in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920): "The essence of a provision forbidding the acqui-
sition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not
be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all." The "fruits" doctrine
extends to all evidence, whether it be direct or indirect products of the illegality, or
whether it is verbal statements or more tangible evidence. Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-86 '(1963). See Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A
Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REv. 483, 519-32 (1963).
Subsequent to Miranda, the "fruits" doctrine has been applied in a number of inter-
rogation cases to exclude the evidence obtained. United States v. Harrison, 265 F.
Supp. 660, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (policy slips); People v. Dannic, 52 Misc. 2d
1012, 277 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (testimony of witnesses excluded because
identity learned through illegal interrogation) ; People v. Glover, 52 Misc. 2d 520,
526, 276 N.Y.S.2d 461, 468 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (dictum) (marijuana); People v.
Reason, 52 Misc. 2d 425, 276 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (stolen goods); cf.
United States v. Davis, 265 F. Supp. 358 '(W.D. Pa. 1967) (illegally obtained state-
ments not part of reasonable cause to search); People v. Spencer, 424 P.2d 715,
57 Cal. Rptr. 163 (1967) (judicial confession excluded because of prior improper
admission of extra-judicial confession). Contra, Brown v. United States, 375 F.2d
310 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See generally George, The Fruits of Miranda: Scope of the
Exclusionary Rule, 39 U. COLO. L. REV. 478 (1967); Jones Fruit of the Poisonous
Tree, 9 So. TEx. L.J. 17 (1967) ; Note, Fruits of the Illegally Ohtained Confession,
4 WILLAME'rrE L.J. 269 (1966).
6 In addition to the impeachment issue, Mr. Justice White has listed other indirect
uses of such evidence, the legality of which has not been settled: to secure an indict-
ment; to convince other witnesses to testify; to support parole revocation; to furnish
guidance at the sentencing stage. 1 BNA QRIM. L. REP. 2281 (1967). The Miranda
opinion, however, does contain a reference to impeachment uses:
In fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are
often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in
the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implica-
tion. These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the
word and may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver
required for any other statement.
384 U.S. at 477.
Most courts have held that the use of inadmissible statements for impeachment
purposes is prohibited by Miranda. State v. Brewton, 422 P.2d 581 (Ore.), cert.
denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967) ; Gaertner v. State, 35 Wis. 2d 159, 150 N.W.2d 370
'(1967). See 19 S.C.L. REV. 281 (1967).
7 Cf. Note, The Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule in Civil Cases, 43
DENVER L.J. 511 (1966).
8 This issue closely parallels the "standing" requirement in search and seizure cases.
In that area, only California refused to recognize a requirement that only the person
subjected to the unlawful search has the right to object to the use at trial of the
evidence seized. People v. Martin, 45 Cal.2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955). However, in
a recent decision the California Supreme Court reversed its position when dealing
with a Miranda violation. In holding that the "standing" requirement is applicable,
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Another area in which Miranda may have application is that
relating to the police practices of encouragement (or its illegal
counterpart, entrapment) 9 and the use of informants.'0 Will Miranda
the court's justification was that the privilege against self-incrimination is not
violated until the evidence is offered into evidence in a trial of the person from
whom it was taken. However, if the evidence is coerced from a person, the court
indicated that the standing requirement is inapplicable. People v. Varnum, 427 P.2d
772, 775-76, 59 Cal. Rptr. 108, 112 (1967). For a discussion of this case, see
14 How. L.J. 196 (1968).
9 Entrapment has been defined as "the conception and planning of an offense by an
officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpe-
trated it except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer." Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435, 454 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring opinion).
In the past, the Court's treatment of entrapment has been based on statutory con-
struction. Id. at 448-50; Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958). But
see Banks v. United States, 249 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1957). Only recently did the
Court analyze this practice in constitutional jargon. In Lewis v. United States, 385
U.S. 206 (1966), the Court upheld a narcotics conviction, rejecting the contention
that the fourth amendment had been violated. However, the Court cautioned that
each case must be considered on its facts, implying that police deception may at
times be constitutionally offensive. For a discussion of this case. and the constitu-
tional status of "encouragement," see Rotenberg, The Police Detector Practice of
Encouragement: Lewis v. United States and Beyond, 4 HOUSTON L. REV. 609
(1967).
Two main arguments can be advanced against a nexus of the privilege against
self-incrimination and the practice of encouragement. First, it can be argued that no
compulsion is present, and because the fifth amendment requires its presence, it is
not applicable. In discussing the argument, one would have to reassess the Miranda
requirement of custody. Second, the Court distinguishes between communicative and
noncommunicative evidence, holding that the privilege is applicable only as to the
former. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 '(1966). Thus it must be shown that
the evidence obtained from police encouragement is "an accused's communications,
whatever form they might take." Id. at 763-74. It is clear that verbalizations resulting
from encouragement are communicative. However, the physical actions of the defend-
ant may not fit the "communicative" test. In a recent decision, the Court held that
a person's privilege against self-incrimination is not applicable to a police line-up
in which the accused is required to perform acts and utter words for purposes of
identification. In so doing, the Court implied that "communicative" was equivalent
to the disclosure of knowledge. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967)
(held that defendant had right to counsel during line-up). Accord, Gilbert v. Cali-
fornia, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
At least one court has predicted that Miranda will apply in full force to
"encouragement." People v. Johnson, 52 Misc. 2d 1087, 1091-92, 278 N.Y.S.2d 80,
85 (City Ct. 1967) (dictum). See Note, The Defense of Entrapment. A Plea for
Constitutional Standards, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 63, 72 (1967). For a detailed discus-
sion of this police practice, see Cowen, The Entrapment Doctrine in the Federal
Courts, and Some State Court Comparisons, 49 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 447 (1959) ;
Orfield, The Defense of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 1967 DUKE L.J. 39
(1967); Williams, The Defense of Entrapment and Related Prohlems in Criminal
Prosecution, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 399 '(1959); Note, The Serpent Beguiled Me and
I Did Eat - The Constitutional Status of the Entrapment Defense, 74 YALE L.J. 942
(1965); Note, Entrapment, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1333 (1960).
10 If compulsion is a prerequisite to the application of the fifth amendment, then it
would appear that Miranda will not apply to the government's use of a secret
informant to gain evidence. This was the answer supplied by the Supreme Court
in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303-04 (1966). The fifth amendment was
held not to apply because of the absence of any compulsion, either legal or factual.
In other words, a misplaced confidence that the informer would not reveal the con-
versation is no defense. Cf. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966); Lewis
v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
The Court did say that although "the use of secret informers is not per se uncon-
stitutional" such informer is subject to all relevant constitutional restrictions. 385
U.S. at 311. Thus the Court left itself leeway for future cases in which the facts
might be more shocking. The Court has held that the use of a government informer
in the post-indictment stage may violate the defendant's right to the assistance of
counsel. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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have any limiting effect on these devices? Miranda may also forbode
that some of the Court's rules in other, nonconfession cases are
subject to revision. For example, in light of the Court's concern, as
expressed in Miranda, for a truly knowledgeable waiver of constitu-
tional rights, will it now require that a person be advised of his right
to refuse a request for a warrantless search, before it will hold that
a person has truly "consented" to the search and thus validated it?"
I. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO THE APPLICATION OF MIRANDA
The threshold inquiry in the discussion of Miranda centers
around a determination of when Miranda applies; that is, at what
point in time is a person's privilege against self-incrimination jeop-
ardized? If it is decided that, in a particular case, Miranda does not
apply, there need be no advisement and an accompanying waiver
for the person has no rights which may be violated. The resolution
of this issue entails a variety of potential limitations on the scope
and effect of Miranda, and will be a breeding ground for consid-
erable litigation in the years to come.
The Supreme Court indicated that a person is entitled to the
Miranda safeguards when he is subjected to "custodial interroga-
tion," defined by the Court as "questioning initiated by law enforce-
ment officers after a person has been taken into custody or other-
wise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."' 2
In a footnote to the sentence the Court added: "This is what we
meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an investigation which had
focused on an accused.' 
1
1
The Court's definition reveals three significant limitations on the
prospective application of Miranda: 1) a person must be in custody
11 Unless a search is conducted pursuant to a search warrant or incidental to a lawful
arrest, the police must obtain the person's consent in order to conduct a search which
will not be vitiated by the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable search
and seizures. Judging from the Court's concern for a knowledgeable and intelligent
waiver of rights, the Miranda rationale may henceforth require that before a consent
search is conducted, the person must be advised: 1) that he has the right to refuse
a warrantless search and no legal stigma will be attached to his refusal to consent;
2) that if he does consent, any seizable evidence which is revealed by the search may
be used in evidence against him. If the person thereafter consents, the search will bh
valid. Some post-Miranda courts have so held. United States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d
740, 744 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268, 269 (E.D.
Pa. 1966). Contra, Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158, 164 (1st Cir. 1967);
State v. McCarty, 199 Kan. 116, 427 P.2d 616, 619-20 (1967) ; State v. Forney,
181 Neb. 757, 150 N.W.2d 915 (1967); Weeks v. State, 417 S.W.2d 716, 719
(Tex. Crim. App. 1967). For a good discussion, see Note, Consent Searches: A
Reappraisal After Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 130 (1967). See gen-
erally LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law . . . Has Not ... Run
Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255. The multiple problems involved in proving consent
were discussed in Note, Effective Consent to Search and Seizure, 113 U. PA. L. REV.
260 (1964).




or otherwise effectively detained, 4 and 2) subjected to questioning
3) by law enforcement officers. A fourth limitation which was not
discussed in Miranda is, for what crime must the person be suspected
of committing? Future litigation of the application of Miranda to
a particular fact situation will revolve around these four potential
conditions precedent.
Before discussing these limiting factors and the various alterna-
tives available to the courts within each, it might be profitable to
note some general language used by the Court in discussing the
application of the fifth amendment privilege to pre-trial situations.
Although general statements are never too helpful, they may give
some indication of the direction which the Supreme Court will take
in the years ahead. The privilege "has always been 'as broad as the
mischief against which it seeks to guard.' "15 Further, "our accusa-
tory system of criminal justice demands that the government seeking
to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its own
independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of
compelling it from his own mouth.''16 The Court also said that the
privilege against self-incrimination "serves to protect persons in all
settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any signifi-
cant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves."17 In
light of the Court's increasing concern for protecting and enhanc-
ing individual rights, and because the privilege "has consistently
been accorded a liberal construction,"' 8 it is clear that the Court will
expand the scope of Miranda when necessary to prevent abuses
resulting from strait-jacketed interpretations.
A. Custody or Effective Detention.
The Supreme Court, realizing that the fifth amendment only
protects a person from being compelled to incriminate himself,'"
required that the person's freedom of movement be curtailed in
some significant way before that person could have the benefit of
Miranda. Thus, custody or effective detention is, for the present,
14 "Effective detention" has been coined to refer to the Court's language: "or other-
wise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 444.
15 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 459-60 (1966).
16 Id. at 460.
17 Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
13 Id. at 461.
19 The fifth amendment reads in part: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself. ... U. S. CONST. amend. V.
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a condition precedent to the application of Miranda.20  However,
the precise moment when a person's freedom has been sufficiently
restrained was left largely unresolved by Miranda. The Court did
say that a person is entitled to the benefit of Miranda when he is
deprived of his freedom of movement in a significant way,2' which
is to say that the investigation has focused on him.22 Another indi-
cation of the scope of Miranda is what the Court has deemed to be
permissible investigation to which Miranda does not apply:
Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of
police officers in investigating crime .... When an individual is in
custody on probable cause, the police may, of course, seek out
evidence in the field to be used at trial against him. Such investi-
gation may include inquiry of persons not under restraint. General
on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other
general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not
affected by our holding. 23
Awaiting further elucidation from the Supreme Court, state and
lower federal courts must determine for themselves the situations
which can be deemed compelling for purposes of applying Miranda.
The courts are already in hopeless conflict with one another in re-
solving this issue. The presence of a police-dominated atmosphere,
the formalizing of an arrest, the existence of probable cause to arrest
- these and other considerations have emerged as potential limita-
tions on Miranda.
20 It may be questioned whether custody or effective detention is the exclusive indicator
of compulsion. For example, compulsion may be present in "interviews" with persons
suspected of white-collar crimes such as tax fraud, even though the person is
technically free to leave. When a person is being investigated for possible tax evasion,
tax officials will "interview" him. Successful cooperation usually depends upon the
cooperation" of the taxpayer. Thus, the taxpayer's privilege against self-incrimination
is in serious jeopardy, though he may refuse to cooperate. However, the courts usually
have found that this situation does not fall within the Miranda arena, it being
limited to custodial situations. See cases collected in Frohmann v. United States,
380 F.2d 832, 835-36 (8th Cir. 1967). See also United States v. Gower, 271 F.
Supp. 655, 659-61 (M.D. Pa. 1967) (court looked for, and found, stage where
investigation clearly focused on defendant). For a good discussion advocating the
application of Miranda to criminal tax investigations, see Lipton, Constitutional
Rights in Criminal Tax Investigations, 53 A.B.A.J. 517 (1967).
Recently, the Supreme Court handed down its first post-Miranda decision
interpreting Miranda. The facts involved questioning by a revenue agent of a man
in prison serving a sentence for a non-tax crime. The Court held this to be custodial
interrogation warranting the application of Miranda. Though the Court apparently
erased any supposed distinction, for purposes of Miranda, between the IRS classifi-
cations of "civil" and "criminal" investigative stages, the opinion shed little light
on the "custody" issue, as the defendant's presence in prison was obviously custodial.
Mathis v. United States, 88 S.Ct. 1503 (1968).
21 384 U.S. at 444.
22 Id. n.4.
2 384 U.S. at 477. For cases involving general on the scene questioning, see Sciberras
v. United States, 380 F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1967) ; United States v. Essex, 275 F.Supp.
393 (E.D. Tenn. 1967) ; United States v. Delamarra, 275 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1967)
State v. Phinis, 199 Kan. 472, 430 P.2d 251 (1967).
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1. The Place of Questioning.
A perusal of the post-Miranda cases indicates that the place
where the questioning occurs has emerged as a significant limitation
on the application of Miranda. That is, several courts believe that
the questioning must have been conducted in the station house or in
some other "police-dominated atmosphere."24
The emergence of "place" as a limitation is attributable to
the Miranda opinion, containing a lengthy discussion of the secret
interrogation process which is conducted in an atmosphere which
"carries its own badge of intimidation."2 Because the factual situa-
tions in Miranda involved station-house interrogations, the Court
discussed in detail the various physical and psychological pressures
outlined in the police manuals and texts.26 The Court then con-
cluded that such interrogations were justifiably within the ambit of
the fifth and sixth amendment protections.
It is obvious that interrogations conducted within the confines
of the police station are governed by Miranda, but are these the
only situations in which Miranda is applicable? Practical considera-
tions suggest that Miranda is much broader in scope. The long dis-
cussion of the nature of secret interrogations was undoubtedly to
justify expanding the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination
to include pre-trial situations in which a person may be compelled
to incriminate himself. The Court could best accomplish this by
dramatizing the potential coerciveness in the factual situations be-
fore it. Since ours is a case-by-case system, and because the Court
avoids rendering advisory opinions, it could not be expected that
interrogation practices outside the police station would be discussed.
Nevertheless, the Court, by using language which encompasses far
more than station-house interrogations, has indicated its willingness
to extend the protection of Miranda to a far greater latitude of
situations. A broad interpretation receives further justification from
what the Court perceives as permissible questioning; that is, general
questioning of persons not under restraint.2"
Although the place of interrogation may at times be considered,
the relevant determination should be, at what point in time does a
24 See, e.g., Evans v. United States, 377 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1967) ; United States v.
Littlejohn, 260 F.Supp. 278, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 1966) ; Gaudio v. State, 1 Md. App.
455, 468, 230 A.2d 700, 708 (1967); People v. Gilbert, 8 Mich. App. 393, 154
N.W.2d 800 (1967) ; cf. State v. Norlega, 6 Ariz. App. 428, 433 P.2d 281 (1967).
Also, it is apparent from a recent Supreme Court decision that at least three Justices
would support the limiting of Miranda to these situations. Mathis v. United States,
88 S.Ct. 1503 (1968) (White, Harlan, and Stewart, dissenting).
25 384 U.S. at 457.
2
6 Id. at 448-55.
27 Id. at 477-78.
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person feel "compelled" to answer inquiries? Surely, if a person is
confronted by a police officer who identifies himself, usually by
displaying his badge, and if that person is in fact not free to leave
of his own volition, he may feel compelled to answer questions.
The fact of custody is, by its very nature, compulsive.28 By consider-
ing the place of interrogation controlling, the police would be en-
couraged to circumvent Miranda by conducting all interrogation
outside the police station.
29
2. The Person Under Arrest or Detained on Probable Cause.
If the place of interrogation is not considered controlling, the
next logical limitation is to restrict Miranda to those cases in which
the person was under arrest or in which the evidence gives the police
probable cause to arrest. The only significance of an arrest would
be to show that the person's freedom of action was clearly restrained.
In this context, the lawfulness of the arrest, or whether it was with
or without a warrant, is irrelevant.30 A person detained on reason-
able or probable cause is in the same predicament as one who has
been arrested, and the Miranda safeguards should apply. As con-
cerns the fifth and sixth amendment safeguards, the plight of the
accused is no different than for one under arrest, except that no
verbalizing of "you are under arrest" has taken place.31 Although
there is nothing magical about these words, some courts appear to
worship their existence.32 Thus, some courts have grafted a limita-
tion on Miranda which the Supreme Court never anticipated.
Compulsion, not arrest, triggers the constitutional safeguards
provided in Miranda. Although the two terms may be related, they
are not synonymous. If the Supreme Court had wished to limit
Miranda to arrest situations, it would have been a simple matter to
frame its custody limitation in those words. If interrogation becomes
custodial only after the fact of arrest, the Miranda opinion may well
28 People v. Allen, 50 Misc. 2d 897, 904, 272 N.Y.S.2d 249, 255 (Sup. Ct. 1966),
rei/d, 28 App. Div. 2d 724, 281 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1967). See People v. Glover, 52
Misc. 2d 520, 523, 276 N.Y.S.2d 461, 465 (Sup. Ct 1966). The possibility that,
in fact, a given person may not feel compelled to answer questions should be of little
importance. Miranda is designed to insure that the average person, when confronted
with custodial interrogation, will be able to exercise an intelligent choice. Just as
the Court said, 384 U.S. at 471-72, that it will not inquire in a particular case
whether in fact, a person had previous knowledge of his rights, so also the Court
cannot be expected to consider whether in a given case, the defendant in fact did not
feel compelled.
29People v. Allen, 50 Misc. 2d 897, 901, 272 N.Y.S.2d 249, 253 (Sup. Ct. 1966),
rev'd, 28 App. Div. 2d 724, 281 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1967).
30 It makes no difference to the defendant why or how he was arrested. The fact of
arrest places him in compelling circumstances.
31 True, there will be more compulsion if a person is formally placed under arrest, but
there is sufficient compulsion absent arrest.
32 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 259 F.Supp. 496, 497 (D. Mass. 1966) ; People v.
Nieto, 55 Cal. Rptr. 546, 549 (Ct. App. 1966) (dictum), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 911
(1967). See 18 W. REs. L. REV. 1777 (1967).
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become a verbal exercise in futility because the police need only
delay "arrest" until after interrogation is concluded.
33
Some courts, skirting analysis, have recited that in a particular
case, Miranda does not apply for there was no arrest, merely a
"detention, '"" or an "accosting. ' 35 Duffy v. State 6 is representative
of the cases seemingly substituting semantics for analysis. An officer
saw three persons run from the scene of a robbery, in which the
victim had been stabbed. Two of them, whom the officer recognized,
were later apprehended. From them he gleaned the name of the
third and the officer proceeded to where the defendant was sleep-
ing. The officer observed the knife used in the robbery, for it was
only partially hidden under the mattress. He then roused the de-
fendant, but instead of saying "you are under arrest" he elicited
inculpatory statements in response to his questions. The defendant
was then "arrested." In admitting the statements into evidence, the
court said:
[T]he exclusionary principles enunciated in . . .Miranda ... are
not applicable to a confession gleaned from a suspect who is merely
accosted by the police, but deal instead with the safeguards which
must be provided for an accused who is in police custody.B7
In another case, Miranda was held inapplicable because the de-
fendant was not arrested, merely detained, even though marijuana
had been found on his ship and he was confined thereon. His free-
dom was so severely restricted that when it was necessary for him
to go to the restroom, he had an official escort. The last period of
interrogation was conducted by an official who had an arrest war-
rant in his possession. 8 Other cases with similar situations and hold-
ings include: the stopping of the defendant's car, with probable
cause;3 9 the taking of the defendant to an official's office for ques-
tioning;40 questioning on the street after the officers had probable
cause to arrest the defendant for robbery. 1
33 See State v. Tellez, 6 Ariz. App. 251, 255, 431 P.2d 691, 695 (1967); People v.
Allen, 50 Misc. 2d 897, 901-02, 272 N.Y.S.2d 249, 253 (Sup. Ct. 1966), relid,
28 App. Div. 2d 724, 281 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1967).
34 Brown v. United States, 365 F.2d 976, 979 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ; United States v.
Davis, 259 F. Supp. 496, 497 (D. Mass. 1966) ; People v. Nieto, 55 Cal. Rptr. 546,
549 (Ct. App. 1966) '(dictum), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 911 (1967).
35 Dixon v. State, 1 Md. App. 623, 626, 232 A.2d 538, 540 (1967) ; Duffy v. State,
243 Md. 425, 431, 221 A.2d 653, 656 (1966).
36 243 Md. 425, 221 A.2d 653 (1966).
37 Id. at 431, 221 A.2d at 656.
38 United States v. Davis, 259 F. Supp. 496, 497-98 (D. Mass. 1966).
3 9 United States v. Littlejohn, 260 F.Supp. 278, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
40 United States v. Appell, 259 F. Supp. 156, 157 (D. Mass. 1966).
41 People v. Kenny, 53 Misc. 2d 527, 530, 279 N.Y.S.2d 198, 202 (Sup. Ct. 1966)
(the court found significant the absence of a police dominated atmosphere; accord,
Evans v. United States, 377 F.2d 535, 536 (5th Cir. 1967).
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Other courts look to the reality of the defendant's situation.
In People v. Allen,42 the defendant was interrogated in his home
by officers who had been told by a woman that the defendant had
forcibly raped her. In a well-articulated opinion, the judge ruled
that the statements were inadmissible.4 3  In so holding, he held
irrelevant the absence of formal arrest, station-house interrogation,
and an interrogation atmosphere and environment. 44 Unfortunately,
this decision was reversed on appeal in a rather terse and shallow
memorandum opinion.45 Other courts have shared the views of the
trial judge in the Allen case.46 It is submitted that this is the correct
view. When the police have probable cause to suspect the detained
person of committing a crime, it must be assumed that at some point
during the confrontation they will perform their duty and formally
arrest the person.47 In the meantime, the person's freedom of move-
ment has been curtailed. 8
4 50 Misc. 2d 897, 272 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1966), rev'd, 28 App. Div. 2d 724,
281 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1967). For a discussion of this case, see 33 BROOKLYN L. REV.
347 (1967).
43 50 Misc. 2d at 900, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
44 Id. at 900, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 252. See People v. Vaiza, 244 Cal. App. 2d 121, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 733, 737 (1966) (questioning while defendant was in hospital bed).
45People v. Allen, 28 App. Div. 2d 724, 281 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1967) (the court used
"voluntariness" language).
"United States v. Harrison, 265 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); People v. Arnold,
426 P.2d 515, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967); People v. Golwitzer, 52 Misc. 2d 925,
277 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1966); People v. Glover, 52 Misc. 2d 520, 276 N.Y.S.2d
461 (Sup. Ct.. 1966).
47 Who would be bold enough to suggest that an officer will walk away from one whom
he has probable cause to arrest?
48 It is possible that instead of approaching the question of custody from the standpoint
of analyzing the evidence possessed by the police, courts will establish some kind
of "totality of the circumstances" test. Under this test, the court would objectively
weigh all the facts and circumstances to determine whether the accused was in fact
free to leave. In making this determination, the court would consider the information
possessed by the officer, the nature of the questions asked, any expressed intention
on the part of the officer to detain, the situation as it would appear to a reasonable
person, and any other relevant circumstances. It is also likely that some courts may
decide to use a subjective standard which would examine the accused's state of mind
to ascertain whether he felt that his freedom of movement was restrained. The court
may also inquire into the officer's state of mind to determine the existence of an
intention to detain. The courts using the subjective test would be looking for the
effect of the facts and circumstances on the minds of the respective parties.
The California Supreme Court has apparently adopted a modification of the
subjective and objective tests: "We hold that custody occurs if the suspect is
physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way or is led to
believe, as a reasonable person, that he is so deprived." People v. Arnold, 426 P.2d
515, 521, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115, 121 (1967). This test deserves some comment. The
reference to "physically deprived" would seem to connote an arrest or its equivalent.
Thus, the fact that a person is a suspect may not be sufficient. One court, in applying
this test, has so held. People v. Hazel, 60 Cal. Rptr. 437, 441 n.3 (Ct. App. 1967).
If the person is not placed under arrest or taken to the police station, "custody"
apparently depends upon what the officer said to the suspect or upon the officer's
demeanor, and what compelling effect these words or actions would have on a
reasonable person. The fact that the officer had probable cause to arrest the accused
and would not have permitted him to leave would be irrelevant unless the officer's
subjective views had been communicated to the accused. However, the California
court gave some indication that it would still look to all the relevant circumstances
before determining the existence of custody. 426 P.2d at 522, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
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3. The Person Detained on Police Suspicions.
The discussion up to now has been limited to situations in
which the person's freedom of movement has been clearly curtailed.
Thus, the custody requirement has been satisfied. However, much
police activity centers around the "suspect." For purposes of dis-
cussion, if the police feel that a person is involved in the commis-
sion of a crime, but there is insufficient evidence to make an arrest,
that person is a "suspect." In the search for a test of "custody," the
question arises whether the fact that a person is a suspect, without
more, qualifies that person for the Miranda safeguards. The Supreme
Court has, by implication, recognized this possibility.49
Custody normally signifies some kind of restraint on the person
involved. However, when dealing with a suspect, physical restraint
may never be imposed unless the person either attempts to leave or
gives the police probable cause for arresting him. Thus, if ques-
tioning of a suspect is sufficient to invoke the safeguards of Miranda,
restraint or detention must be presumed from the presence of police
suspicions. The validity of presuming restraint is aided by the
Miranda opinion in which the Court, after laying out its definition
of custodial interrogation, said: "This is what we meant in Escobedo
when we spoke of an investigation which had focused on an ac-
cused."" ° Later in the opinion, the Court said:
We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of
in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime
contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine
the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he
would not otherwise do so freely.51
It was this language which induced one court to find "custody"
when an officer approached the defendants after his suspicion had
been aroused by seeing them get into a taxi, carrying a phonograph
and a portable television set.52 That court remarked: "The man-
dated warnings apply to persons merely suspected as well as to per-
sons actually accused .... .
In another case, "4 a policeman approached the defendant, whom
the officer suspected of living in an apartment in which marijuana
had earlier been found. In holding subsequent statements inadmissi-
ble because of noncompliance with Miranda, the court said:
[W]hatever else Miranda may have intended "custody" to mean,
4 9 See Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 711 n.7 (1967) (dictum). See also Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 488 n.59 (1966).
50 384 U.S. at 444 n.4.
51 Id. at 467.
52 People v. Reason, 52 Misc. 2d 425, 276 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
53 Id. at 430, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 202. But see People v. Singleton, 63 Cal. Rptr. 324 (Ct.
App. 1967).
54 People v. Glover, 52 Misc. 2d 520, 276 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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this much is apparent- police questioning of a person, wherever
detained, upon whom suspicion has already focused, appears ruled
to be "custodial interrogation.' "
5
Other courts have found custodial interrogation when officers ques-
tioned the defendant about his possible involvement in narcotics
violations,"6 when officers entered an apartment wherein they sus-
pected a heroin operation,57 and when the police were possessed of
sufficient facts to arouse in them a suspicion that a mother may have
murdered one of her children.5"
The official policy of the Denver Police Department"9 appears
to be that if a person be suspected of having committed a crime,
the officer must, prior to any questioning, advise the suspect of his
rights, and secure a waiver. The place of interrogation is irrelevant.
For example, the Miranda procedure would be followed if a detec-
tive proceeded to a person's home to question him, his only sus-
picion being that the person has a criminal record which reveals a
method of operation similar to that used in the commission of the
crime the detective is investigating. As with most policies, this is
subject to occasional abuse by individual officers.6"
There is another method of approaching the question whether
the fact of being a suspect is sufficient. If the person is "deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way," 1 he is entitled to
55 Id. at 525, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
5
6 United States v. Harrison, 265 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
57 People v. Terrell, 53 Misc. 2d 32, 277 N.Y.S.2d 926 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
58 People v. Golwitzer, 52 Misc. 2d 925, 277 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1966). See
People v. Beasley, 58 Cal. Rptr. 485, 491 (Ct. App. 1967). Some courts have not
been so benevolent, most of them holding that a situation involving a suspect was
either on the scene or routine questioning. See Williams v. United States, 381 F.2d
20, 22 (9th Cir. 1967) ; United States v. Manni, 270 F. Supp. 103, 106 (D. Mass.
1967) ; United States v. Kuntz, 265 F. Supp. 543, 547 (N.D.N.Y. 1967); United
States v. Appell, 259 F. Supp. 156, 158 (D. Mass. 1966) ; People v. Hazel, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 437, 440 (Ct. App. 1967) ; White v. United States, 222 A.2d 843, 845 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1966) ; Gaudio v. State, 1 Md. App. 455, 459, 230 A.2d 700, 703 (1967) ;
People v. Johnson, 50 Misc. 2d 1009, 1011-12, 271 N.Y.S.2d 814, 817 (Sup. Ct.
1966). Of course general on the scene questioning is permissible, Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966), but a Miranda situation may develop because
of the answers given in response. If such answers cause the investigation to focus
on the accused, then from that point on the questioning would become custodial in
nature and the person would have to be advised of his rights, and a waiver secured,
before the interrogation proceeds. People v. Glover, 52 Misc. 2d 520, 524-25, 276
N.Y.S.2d 461, 466 (Sup. Ct. 1966). See State v. Tellez, 6 Ariz. App. 251, 256,
431 P.2d 691, 696 (1967) (recognized the "focus" rule, but equated it with
probable cause).
59 As related in an interview with Lloyd Jamerson, Division Chief, Detective Division,
Denver Police Department, in Denver, Colorado, Sept. 5, 1967. The department
policy is based on an interpretation of Miranda.
60 One example may be given from observations made while riding on patrol. A woman
had her purse snatched from her on the streets, and she gave a general description
of the two culprits to the officers investigating the incident. Nearby, two suspects
fitting the same general description were picked up and brought to the scene for
identification. One of the officers practiced deception in an effort to induce the
suspects to confess. This proved fruitless, and the suspects were eventually released.
At no time were the suspects advised of their rights.
61 Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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the Miranda protections. The key word is "significant." Presumably
the Court did not intend to equate it with "physical," or it would
have so stated. Therefore, if the requisite detention need not be
physical, yet must be more than general questioning in a non-
accusatory manner,62 it may be plausibly argued that a suspect is
deemed to be significantly restrained, independent of any physical
or formal pressures. Thus, regardless of the conduct of the police,
if they intend to question a suspect, Miranda would be applicable.
If the Supreme Court were to determine that all suspects are
placed in a situation sufficiently compelling to justify clothing them
with the Miranda safeguards, the question arises whether the police
suspicions need be reasonable. If, in retrospect, the Court determines
that the suspicion was ill-founded and unreasonable, is Miranda
nevertheless applicable? To resolve this, one need only look to the
relative positions of the characters. The effect of the situation on
the suspect remains the same, regardless of the reasonableness of
the suspicion. Likewise, reasonableness plays no part in determin-
ing the conduct of the interrogators. They are still focusing in on
the suspect, attempting to substantiate or disprove their suspicions.
Thus, the logical conclusion would be that reasonableness plays no
part in determining the applicability of Miranda.
By applying the Miranda proscriptions to suspects, a common
police practice known as "field interrogation" would be forced to
undergo radical changes. Broadly speaking, this practice consists of
stopping and questioning a person whom the officer suspects, but
has insufficient grounds for making a legal arrest.63  It is often
codified in a "stop-and-frisk" statute which gives the officer the
right to stop a person whom he suspects of committing a crime, and
to demand of him an explanation of his actions.64 The Supreme
Court has ruled on some of the issues relating to stopping and ques-
62Id. at 477-78.
63 See Tiffany, Field Interrogation: Administrative, Judicial and Legislative Approaches,
43 DENVER L.J. 389 (1966).
64 See, e.g., N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 180-a (1964). The statute also allows the officer
to frisk the persons for weapons, if he believes his safety is in danger. See Tiffany,
supra note 63, at 425-36. On the constitutional status of this statute, see Kuh,
Reflections on New York's "Stop-and-Frisk" Law and Its Claimed Unconstitutionality,
56 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 32 (1965) ; Note, Police Power to Stop, Frisk, and Question
Suspicious Persons, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 848 (1965); Note, The Law of Arrest:
Constitutionality of Detention and Frisk Acts, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 641 (1964).
It should be noted that the American Law Institute, although not fully complying
with Miranda, does require that a person be advised of his fifth amendment rights
prior to questioning. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 2.01(2)
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966). Cf. City v. Forrest, 35 U.S.L.W. 2443 (Cleve. Mun. Ct.,
Ohio, Jan. 4, 1967) (statute making it an offense to give unsatisfactory account
of oneself unconstitutional, citing Miranda).
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tioning suspicious persons,"5 but the Court has yet to evaluate this
police practice in light of Miranda.6 6
The foregoing discussion raises another interesting issue. Is the
non-suspect ever entitled to the benefit of Miranda? The issue would
arise in the situation where the police were questioning an uncoopera-
tive witness who, during the course of interrogation, confessed his
own guilt. One must bear in mind that the Supreme Court has ex-
plicitly excluded general questioning in the fact-finding process from
the Miranda arena. This appears to eliminate in-the-field questioning
of witnesses. But what about the witness who is taken from the
field to the station house for questioning? Does physical custody
plus questioning equal the requisite compulsion for purposes of the
fifth amendment? One can only speculate as to the Supreme Court's
feeling on this issue, but it could justifiably be said to be within
the protection of Miranda.
67
B. The Requirement of Questioning.
1. Acquisition of Verbal Evidence.
Strictly speaking, the suspect in custody need not be advised of
his right to remain silent and to seek the assistance of counsel until
the police intend to question him. If the police are prepared to
observe a vow of silence in their dealings with the person there
would seem to be no need for the advisement of rights. This means
complete silence. Even the simplest of questions are forbidden
without a proper advisement and waiver." For example, the re-
sponse to the general inquiry "Do you know what else you are under
arrest for?" has been held inadmissible."
The general statement that there must be some form of ques-
tioning may be too broad. If Miranda is to be limited to instances
where questioning is present, other non-interrogative police practices
may accomplish the same result - securing verbal evidence - with-
out the necessity for first complying with Miranda. To accomplish
65 Terry v. Ohio, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968); Sibron v. New York, 88 S.Ct. 1889 (1968).
For a discussion of the state of the law prior to these decisions see Tiffany, supra
note 63, at 398-411.
66 Terry v. Ohio, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968) ; Sibron v. New York, 88 S.Ct. 1889 (1968).
The Supreme Court defined the circumstances under which a stop and frisk would
be a reasonable search under the fourth amendment in these two cases; however,
Miranda was not the basis of the decisions.
67 See generally, LaFave, Detention for Investigation by the Police: An Analysis of
Current Practices, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 331. Cf. Reich, Police Questioning of Law
Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L. REV. 1161 (1966).
68However, one court has held that Miranda could not be interpreted to exclude res
gestae statements, even though made in response to questions after the accused was
taken into custody. Hill v. State, 420 S.W.2d 408, 410-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
6 9 State v. Shoffner, 31 Wis. 2d 412, 143 N.W.2d 458, 468 (1966) (dictum). See
State v. La Femier, 155 N.W.2d 93, 99 (Wis. 1967) (whether defendant would
submit to a lie detector test).
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the intent and purpose of Miranda, should not Miranda be appli-
cable to any situation in which verbal evidence is acquired by some
affirmative action, or unfair inaction, on the part of the police?
Such non-verbal conduct may take the form of showing the suspect
a piece of tangible evidence. Thus, the showing of a hat by an offi-
cer and the defendant's statement of ownership were both excluded
by one court.7" The police conduct may also take the form of decep-
tion. The police may tell the suspect that a witness who is certain
he can identify him will arrive shortly, when in fact there is no
witness, or the witness remembers nothing. The police may follow
this up with the statement that it will go easier on the suspect if
he confesses now. Although technically there is no questioning,
there is an attempt to secure verbal evidence and the Court could
hold that custody plus deception equals compulsion and a violation
of the suspect's rights.7 ' Verbal statements may also be obtained
through unethical police inaction, such as incommunicado detention.
Miranda contains a statement to the effect that incommunicado
incarceration without questioning negates a waiver of rights. 72 Thus,
limiting Miranda to situations involving a question and answer ses-
sion may prove inadequate protection to the suspect.
2. Volunteered Statements.
The existence of questioning is also important in the classifica-
tion of what the Court calls "volunteered" statements. These state-
ments may be admitted into evidence without the necessity of proving
an advisement and a waiver. To use the Court's language:
Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any com-
pelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. The funda-
mental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is
not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit
of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated. There
is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police
station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person
who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he
desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred
by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by
our holding today.
73
One court has aptly described the admissibility of volunteered
statements in poetic style:
Once an utterance falls from the lips with extemporaneous
naturalness, there is no way to declare it non-existent. To order the
nullification of such a statement would be like ordering one to
re-attach an apple to a limb from which it had fallen, not because
70 State v. Ross, 269 N.C. 739, 153 S.E.2d 469, 472 (1967).
7 1 See People v. Watkins, 55 Misc. 2d 168, 284 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Buffalo City Ct. 1967).
72 384 U.S. at 476.
73 Id. at 478 (emphasis added).
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of the limb shaking or tree climbing, but in consequence of the
fruit's ripeness. . . .74
To compel policemen not to listen to volunteered statements
while investigating a homicide, is to put stoppers in their ears and
require them to snap handcuffs on their wrists.75
In one sense, an answer given to routine or other questioning
while the person is not in custody or effective detention may be said
to fall under the classification of "volunteered statements," in that
it is admissible without the advice and consent. However, it would
be more correct to say, not that the statement was volunteered, but
that it was not the product of compulsion.
Truly "volunteered" statements are those not the product of
any questioning. Of these, there are two classifications: those made
while not in custody, and those volunteered while in custody. Volun-
teered statements while not in custody may be donated in two types
of situations. First, as the Court indicated, the person may phone
the police or walk into the station and blurt out a confession.7 6 To
illustrate this, in one case the defendant walked into the police
station and, approaching the officer on duty, stated that he had
stolen a car. Initially, the officer did not believe him so the defend-
ant took the officer outside to view the car. The court correctly
held the statement to be volunteered.77
In the second noncustodial situation, the statement may be
volunteered at the scene of an investigation. This has occurred when
an officer, investigating a homicide, asked a person if he knew who
shot the deceased. The witness said the defendant shot him and the
defendant, standing nearby, said, "yes, I shot him."7 8
If from the time the statement was volunteered, the defendant
was no longer free to leave, then the Miranda rules would have
to be complied with before eliciting further information from the
defendant. This would occur if the statement was an acknowledg-
ment of guilt or otherwise focused suspicion on him.
By making the fifth amendment applicable to pre-trial situa-
tions, the inception of the duty of advising a person of his rights
under that amendment arises when the person is under compulsion,
74 Commonwealth v. Eperjesi, 423 Pa. 455, 224 A.2d 216, 220 (1966).
75 1d. at 221.
76 384 U.S. at 478. See Newhouse v. State, 420 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967);
Taylor v. State, 420 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967) (dictum).
77 Lung v. State, 420 P.2d 158 (Okla. Crim. App. 1966) ; accord, Taylor v. District
Court, 418 P.2d 112 (Okla. Crim. App. 1966). If, however, the police question the
defendant, Miranda may be applicable even though he voluntarily appeared at the
station to make a statement. People v. Bryant, 87 II. App. 2d 238, 231 N.E.2d 4
(1967).
78 State v. Oxentine, 270 N.C. 412, 415, 154 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1967). See State v.
Rudd, 49 N.J. 310. 230 A.2d 129 (1967) (dictum) (statement blurted out when
defendant was notified of relative's murder). See also People v. Mercer, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 861, 864 (Ct. App. 1967).
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which generally exists when two factors are present: custody and
questioning. Therefore, a person in custody may volunteer a state-
ment if it is not in response to a question and it may be used as
evidence. 79  This may occur when the person is initially placed in
custody,80 in the police car while on the way to the station,81 or while
within the police station."' It has also been held that a question and
answer which are merely repetitious of the volunteered statement
are not subject to suppression.83 If, however, the volunteered state-
ment was offered after other incriminating facts had been elicited
via unlawful interrogation, the later statement is most likely the
product or "fruit" of the prior illegality and thus inadmissible.8 4
Although this situation was present in at least one post-Miranda
case,85 no court has yet decided this issue in light of Miranda.86
C. The Exclusionary Rule and the Non-police Officer.
In spite of the increasing recognition given by the Supreme
Court to individual rights, one pressing problem has been largely,
if not wholly, neglected. It is axiomatic that a person has certain
rights which protect him from unwarranted police practices. If a
confession is obtained by the police in violation of Miranda, the
defendant may have it excluded from evidence. But it is said that
if a private person has obtained the confession without compliance
with Miranda, the defendant has no right to its exclusion in the
absence of a showing that the third party was the government's
agent.8 7 This state-private dichotomy apparently extends to all ex-
clusionary rules.
88
79 In the future, the Court may require that a person be advised of his rights the
moment he is placed in custody, but this has not yet been mandated.
80 Stone v. United States, 385 F.2d 713, 716-17 (10th Cir. 1967); Pitman v. United
States, 380 F.2d 368, 370 (9th Cir. 1967) ; Lamb v. Peyton, 273 F. Supp. 242, 246
(W.D. Va. 1967) ; People v. Jones, 244 Cal. App. 2d 378, 52 Cal. Rptr. 924, 926
(1966); Carwell v. State, 2 Md. App. 45, 50, 232 A.2d 903, 906 (1967). See
Balley v. People, 160 Colo. 309, 419 P.2d 446 (1966) (dictum).
81 Bivens v. State, 242 Ark. 362, 413 S.W.2d 653, 656 (1967); In re Orr, 38 Ill.
2d 417, 231 N.E.2d 424, 427 (1967).
8 2 People v. Kenny, 53 Misc. 2d 527, 279 N.Y.S.2d 198 (Sup. Ct. 1966); State v.
Hill, 422 P.2d 675 (Ore. 1966) ; cf. People v. Petker, 62 Cal. Rptr. 215 (Ct. App.
1967) (confession in response to question by parent in presence of officer).
83 United States v. Cruz, 265 F. Supp. 15 (W.D. Tex. 1967).
84 See discussion of "fruits," supra note 5.
85 People v. Kenny, 53 Misc. 2d 527, 279 N.Y.S.2d 198 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
86See Commonwealth v. White, 232 N.E.2d 235 (Mass. 1967) (defendant admitted
guilt to friends after police had garnered two inadmissible confessions from him).
87 See Yates v. United States, 384 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1967) ; People v. Wright, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 781 (Ct. App. 1967); State v. Masters, 154 N.W.2d 133 (Ia. 1967); Common-
wealth v. White, 232 N.E.2d 335 (Mass. 1967) ; State v. O'Kelly, 181 Neb. 618,
150 N.W.2d 117 (1967) ; Skinner v. State, 432 P.2d 675 (Nev. 1967) ; Schaumberg
v. State, 432 P.2d 500 (Nev. 1967) ; People v. Frank, 52 Misc. 2d 266, 275 N.Y.S.2d
570 (Sup. Ct. 1966); People v. Williams, 53 Misc. 2d 1086, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 251
(Syracuse City Ct. 1967).
88 See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (search and seizure).
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The Supreme Court authority for this distinction is Burdeau v.
McDowell,89 decided in 1921. McDowell had brought an action in
replevin for the return of property unlawfully seized from him by
a private person. He alleged that if the property was subsequently
used against him in a criminal proceeding, his fourth and fifth
amendment rights would be violated. The Court proceeded, with
comparable ease, to hold that no constitutional right had been vio-
lated. The two-step analysis was: 1) the fourth amendment pro-
tects one only against governmental action, as it was intended as
a restraint only upon the activities of a sovereign authority; 2) the
government was not involved in the seizure of McDowell's prop-
erty. ° Two distinguished Justices, Holmes and Brandeis, dissented.
The argument of the dissenters sounded of due process: "Respect
for law will not be advanced by resort, in its enforcement, to means
which shock the common-man's sense of decency and fair play."'"
The Burdeau case has not been overruled, but its present va-
lidity, in light of recent court decisions concerning individual rights,
may be in doubt. If subsequently overruled, reliance would prob-
ably be placed on the due process clause. However, one difficulty
is at once confronted: the Constitution reads that no "State" shall
deprive a person of liberty without due process of law. 2 Thus the
question in confession cases is whether the act of the judge in ad-
mitting into evidence the confession, elicited by a private person
in a manner illegal if done by a police officer, is state action. By
analogizing to Shelley v. Kraemer,13 an affirmative answer could
be reached. In that case, the state court had enforced a restrictive
covenant in a deed which forbade the sale of the property to a
Negro. The Supreme Court held that in so doing, the state court
had acted in violation of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. In reaching this result, the Court necessarily
had to find "state" action.94 The action by the court in enforcing
the covenant was held sufficient state activity to apply the fourteenth
amendment. 95 The analogy is clear. 'When a court admits a con-
fession, regardless of whether it was obtained by a government agent
or a private person, the act of admitting it constitutes state action
89 id.
901d. at 475. The fifth amendment contention was dismissed, the Court saying the
privilege protects a person only from extorted confessions and compulsory court
testimony.
91 Id. at 477.
92 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
93 334 U.S. 1 (1948).




to which the fourteenth amendment applies. The practical justifica-
tion for such a ruling has been stated as follows:
Any searches or statements to be taken can be more effectively
accomplished by the professional policemen trained to do these
things. I [sic] seems ludricous [sic] to say that a District Attorney
in prosecuting a Defendant cannot use evidence obtained by a
policeman in derogation of a Defendant's constitutional rights
but can use the same evidence obtained by a private person in
derogation of a Defendant's constitutional rights which in turn is
handed over to a policeman who then hands it over to a District
Attorney.9
6
Assuming that the action of a court in admitting a confession
is state action,97 special problems are presented in subjecting the
average citizen to the mandates of Miranda. The man on the street
neither knows, nor can be expected to know, the precise require-
ments of Miranda. On the other hand, there is a class of "private"
persons on whom we may justifiably impose the duty of knowing
and utilizing proper criminal procedure in their relations with sus-
pects. This class is composed of security guards, store detectives,
and others with like vocations. 8 These persons frequently encounter
persons suspected of crimes and often obtain evidence from them.
A security guard is primarily employed to detect and detain shop-
lifters and other violators. In view of the rights to be protected,
it would seem justifiable to subject them to the same duty as is
imposed on other law enforcement officials.
Concerning the duties of private persons under Miranda, two
alternatives are available. First, it could be said that no confession
or admission, whether it be obtained by a police officer or by any
other person, is admissible at trial unless, prior to custodial interro-
96 People v. Williams, 53 Misc. 2d 1086, 1091, 281 N.Y.S.2d 251, 256 (Syracuse City
Ct. 1967).
97 Even if the Supreme Court refused to hold that this, by itself, is state action, there
is another class of persons, albeit less than the whole of society, whose acts may be
termed "acts of the state." By statute, many states have authorized merchants and
their employees or agents to detain persons suspected of shoplifting or larceny, and
to question and/or search them for the purpose of ascertaining guilt or innocence.
Typical of these statutes is that of Colorado, which states that if a person is
suspected of committing shoplifting or concealing unpurchased goods,
the merchant or any employee thereof or any peace or police officer,
acting in good faith and upon probable cause based upon reasonable
grounds therefore, may question such person in a reasonable manner for
the purpose of ascertaining whether or not such person is guilty of shop-
lifting . . . . Such questioning . . . shall not render such [person) civilly
liable for slander, false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution
or unlawful detention.
COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-5-31 (1963). See also N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 218
(McKinney Supp. 1967). For a discussion of similar statutes, see 58 MicH, L. REV.
429 (1960).
Thus, by statute, the state has authorized merchants to conduct interrogations
of suspects. A fortiori, there is state action and the merchants must conform their
actions with due process. Cf. Hajdu v. State, 189 So.2d 230, 233 (Fla. 1966)
Thacker v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 702, 704, 221 S.W.2d 682, 683 (1949).
98 Others may have this duty imposed on them by statute. See COLo. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-5-31 (1963); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 218 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
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gation, the person obtaining it advised the detained person of his
rights and secured from him an effective waiver. This would un-
doubtedly result in eliminating from evidence all confessions ob-
tained by the average citizen. Nevertheless, it may be justified by
a concern for preserving the rights and dignity of the individual.
It is also an unnecessary, and often dangerous, practice for the citizen
to play the role of a policeman. 9 If a citizen apprehends an offender
he has done his part, and should leave the questioning to the trained
policeman. The situation is different when a security guard is in-
volved. He is usually given some training by his employer, and this
could easily include instruction in criminal procedure.
If the Supreme Court is unwilling to extend Miranda's rules to
all citizens, a compromise may be suggested, although it is subject
to criticism that it would create different standards of due process
depending on the identity of the interrogator. Under this alterna-
tive, all citizens would be subject to the 'voluntariness" test.' °0 If
a confession obtained by a citizen is found to be involuntary, it would
be excluded from evidence. This is the present rule,'0 ' derived from
the common law and directed at the exclusion of untrustworthy
evidence. From the general citizenry, a certain group would be re-
quired to comply with Miranda in its full strength. In addition to
law enforcement officials, this group would also include those per-
sons commonly referred to as security guards or store detectives.10 2
To avoid using a label to describe those persons who, in addition
to law enforcement officials, would be subject to compliance with
Miranda, the following test is proposed: a person must fully com-
ply with the constitutional safeguards if as part of his duties of
employment, he is required to protect persons and/or property and
to detect and apprehend violators of the law. 03 This group may be,
and is, broadened by statutes which authorize others to apprehend
and interrogate persons suspected of crime. Such authorization effec-
tively makes such persons agents of the government.0 4
9 9
See People v. Frank, 52 Misc. 2d 266, 275 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Sup. Ct. 1966); People
v. Williams, 53 Misc. 2d 1086, 1090-91, 281 N.Y.S.2d 251, 256 (Syracuse City Ct.
1967).
100 For a discussion of the "voluntariness" test, see note 2 supra.
101 See Commonwealth v. White, 232 N.E.2d 335 (Mass. 1967); Schaumberg v. State,
432 P.2d 500 (Nev. 1967).
102See People v. Ryff, 28 App. Div. 2d 1112, 284 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1967) (evidence
inadmissible where store detective questioned defendant and police officer merely
stood by).
103 One court has made an interesting comment: "Private businesses employ security
officers to protect persons and property on their premises, whose guns are just as
menacing and whose badges just as shiny as those hired by public agencies, whatever
their function may be." People v. Wright, 57 Cal. Rptr. 781, 782 (Ct. App. 1967).
It should be noted that the court added the requirement that for Miranda to apply
the person must be employed by a government agency whose "primary mission is
to enforce the law." Id.
104 See note 97 supra.
1968
DENVER LA W1 JOURNAL
D. What Offenses?
An important question for future litigation is whether Miranda
applies to all crimes; if not, to what crimes does it apply? The
Court's answer will largely determine the effectiveness of Miranda.
The only limitation evidenced in Miranda, other than the fact that
all the cases involved felonies, 10 is that during custodial interroga-
tion, there are "restraints society must observe consistent with the
Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime."' ' This
is consistent with the language of the fifth amendment,10 ' and would
seem to include all crimes, regardless of their distinctive label. How-
ever, in the federal courts there has developed a class of crimes
denoted "petty offenses,"' 0 8 to which the Supreme Court has held
that certain constitutional rights do not apply.'
This distinction, and its present validity as it relates to whether
a person is afforded the constitutional guarantees in a criminal case,
is in need of reconsideration. The distinction receives little support
in historical fact. ° And only recently, in In re Gault,"' the Court
said:
[O]ur Constitution guarantees that no person shall be 'compelled'
to be a witness against himself when he is threatened with depriva-
tion of his liberty - a command which this Court has broadly
applied and generously implemented in accordance with the teach-
ings of the history of the privilege and its great office in mankind's
battle for freedom.
11 2
In an earlier circuit case, the court commented on the degree of depri-
vation required: "ET]he Constitution draws no distinction between
loss of liberty for a short period and such loss for a long one.
'"" 3
In light of the fact that no person may be deprived of his lib-
erty without due process of law,' 4 which now includes the fifth
105 One court has relied on this factual limitation to exclude from Miranda's application
all misdemeanors. State v. Angelo, 251 La. 250, 203 So.2d 710 (1967).
106 384 U.S. at 439 (emphasis added).
107 U. S. CONST. amend. V: "'No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself ...." (emphasis added).
10 See 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1964), in which, after defining felonies and misdemeanors,
it is stated: "Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment
for a period of six months or a fine of not more than $500, or both, is a petty
offense."
10gDistrict of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624 (1937) (no right to jury).
Contra, District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930). For a critical discussion
of the "petty offense" distinction, see Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers, 26 U.
CHI. L. REv. 245 (1959).
11o See Kaye, supra note 109, at 257-77.
11 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
112 Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
113 Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (held that a misdemeanant
has a right to counsel). As to the right of counsel in misdemeanor cases see Note,
The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 48 CAL. L. REV. 501 (1960).
114 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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amendment privilege against self-incrimination,"' a workable test
for the application of Miranda could be devised: a person is entitled
to the safeguards enumerated in Miranda if the law which he is
suspected of violating provides for imprisonment for any period of
time, however short." 6 If the statutory punishment is a fine, the
person still may not be imprisoned for inability to pay the fine im-
posed, if a Miranda violation contributed to his conviction.
In applying this test, special mention need be made only of its
application to traffic offenses. Some courts seem reluctant to extend
Miranda to this type of offense."17 Aside from the "deprivation of
liberty" argument, the courts holding Miranda inapplicable have said
that a traffic offense is not a crime." 8 One court stated that al-
though the questioning was "custodial," Miranda did not apply
because a state statute provided that a traffic violation was not a
crime and the punishment therefore was not to be termed "criminal"
punishment."' Query: may a state deprive a person of his constitu-
tional rights merely by attaching a label to the punishment it im-
poses? In light of the Gault ° case, it would seem that the answer
is no. In speaking of delinquency proceedings, the following lan-
guage of the Court is relevant:
[Juvenile proceedings to determine "delinquency" which may lead
to commitment to a state institution, must be regarded as "criminal"
for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination. To hold
otherwise would be to disregard substance because of the feeble
enticement of the "civil" label-of-convenience which has been
attached to juvenile proceedings .... It is incarceration against one's
will whether it is called "criminal" or "civil."' 2'
115 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
116 See Conway, Is Criminal or Civil Procedure Proper for Enforcement of Traffic Laws?
-Part I, 1959 Wis. L. REv. 418, 434 (1959) ; accord, Note, Initial Imprisonment
For the Violation of City Ordinances, 31 IND. L.J. 486 (1956). Some courts have,
in the area of traffic offenses, distinguished between those offenses which provide
for a term of imprisonment and those which do not, holding that Miranda has no
application to the latter. State v. Zucconi, 93 N.J. Super. 380, 226 A.2d 16 (1967) ;
Commonwealth v. Renner, 1 BNA CRIM. L. REP. 2344 (Mercer County Ct., Pa.
1967). This distinction leaves itself open to criticism that perhaps situations exist
where the mere levy of a substantial fine would justify procedural safeguards. The
argument may run along these lines: unless the safeguards surrounding a criminal
trial are available in a case in which a defendant may be subject to a heavy fine,
the defendant is deprived of his property without due process of law, as proscribed
by the fourteenth amendment. See Conway, Is Criminal or Civil Procedure Proper
for Enforcement of Traffic Laws?-Part II, 1960 Wis. L. REV. 3, 15 (1960).
117See, e.g., People v. Bliss, 53 Misc. 2d 472, 474-75, 278 N.Y.S.2d 732, 735-36
(Allegany County Ct. 1967) (court applied "voluntariness" test) ; City of Columbus
v. Hayes, 9 Ohio App. 2d 38, 222 N.E.2d 829, 830 (1967). Cf. State v. Angelo,
251 La. 250, 203 So. 2d 410 (1967); People v. Letterio, 16 N.Y.2d 307, 213
N.E.2d 670, 266 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 911 (1966).
118 In Colorado, a traffic offense is a crime. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-5-2 (1963).
119People v. Bliss, 53 Misc. 2d 472, 474-76, 278 N.Y.S.2d 732, 735-37 (Allegany
County Ct. 1967).
120In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
12
1 Id. at 49. See In re Narcotic Control Comm'n, 1 BNA CuM. L. REP. 2307 (N.Y




Most courts have indicated that, assuming the presence of "custody,"
Miranda will apply to traffic violations.'
II. THE ADVISEMENT
Once a suspect is to be subjected to custodial interrogation, the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is activated.2 3
The government may not thereafter secure evidence against him "by
the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth.
''
124
However, like all constitutional rights, the suspect may make an
intelligent waiver of the fifth amendment protection.' 2 Inasmuch
as a person cannot make an intelligent choice to speak unless he is
aware that a choice exists, 2 6 the Supreme Court has said that "the
accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights
'
127
prior to any questioning.
Although the person may in fact be aware of his rights, the
advisement is an "absolute prerequisite to interrogation.'1 28  The
Court "will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the de-
fendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given.' '129
Thus, if no advisement was administered or if it was incomplete,'
30
a proclaimed awareness by the suspect will not suffice. There is a
conclusive presumption that the person who is not completely ad-
vised of his rights is unaware of them.'
For an advisement to comply with Miranda, it must be (1)
adequate in scope, and (2) communicated in a manner as to insure
awareness. The scope of the advisement is four fold. In the words
af the Court:
[Hie must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that
he has the right to remain silent .... 132
12 2 See People v. Nieto, 55 Cal. Rptr. 546, 549 (Ct. App. 1966) (dictum), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 911 (1967); People v. Schwartz, 53 Misc. 2d 635, 637, 279 N.Y.S.2d
477, 480 (Dist. Ct. 1967); State v. Meunier, 126 Vt. 176, 224 A.2d 922 (1966).
But see State v. Tellez, 6 Ariz. App. 251, 255-56, 431 P.2d 691, 695-96 (1967)
(applicability of Miranda depends upon the seriousness of the traffic offense or
whether arrest was made) ; cf. Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Stud), in
Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REv. 483, 515 (1963).
123 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966).
1
2
4 Id. at 460.
125 Id. at 475.
128 Id. at 468.
127 Id. at 467. An additional reason for advising the person of his rights is to overcome
the "inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere." Id. at 468.
1
28 Id. at 471.
12 id. at 468.
130 See People v. Powell, 429 P.2d 137, 59 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1967) (dictum).
131 See United States v. Miller, 261 F. Supp. 442, 446 (D. Del. 1966). But see State
v. Persinger, 433 P.2d 867 (Wash. 1967).
132 384 U.S. at 467-68. See United States v. Mullings, 364 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1966)
(advising person he has right not to say anything he feels may incriminate him, held
insufficient) ; But see Keegan v. United States, 385 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1967) ("You
don't have to say anything without the presence of an attorney," held sufficient).
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The warning of the right to remain silent must be accom-
paied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used
against the individual in court.' 3 3
[He] must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult
with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interroga-
tion.1
8 4
[I]t is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to
consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent, a lawyer will
be appointed to represent him.
13 5
It will be noticed that the Court has used the words "clear and un-
equivocal." Ritualistic compliance in terminology which the person
cannot understand will be insufficient. "The purpose.. . is to enable
a suspect to intelligently rationalize, for a man unable to understand
the warning or the consequences must also be unable to understand
what he does in waiving the privilege.' 3 6 Thus, advising the per-
son in a half hearted manner, conveying an indifference which sug-
gests to the defendant that the speaker does not really mean what
he is saying, may be fatal to the prosecution's case."' The same
result will occur if other psychological techniques are utilized to
hinder the accused's free exercise of his rights.
No particular wording for the advisement is necessary and the
Court will look to substance, not form. 3 8 There is also no require-
ment that the advisement be in writing,3 9 but such a procedure
would facilitate the burden of proving that the person was, in fact,
adequately advised.
The Denver Police Department, after several modifications,
currently administers a form which states:
You have a right to remain silent.
Anything you say can be used as evidence against you in court.
You have a right to talk to a lawyer before questioning and have
him present during questioning.
If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before
questioning.
Do you understand each of these rights I have read to you?140
When the person indicates that he understands his rights and the
advising officer is convinced that he does, the person signs the form,
indicating his comprehension. If there is doubt that the person
133 384 U.S. at 469.
134 Id. at 471.
1
35 Id. at 473.
136 People v. Dumas, 51 Misc. 2d 929, 936, 274 N.Y.S.2d 764, 774 (Sup. Ct. 1966);
accord, Coyote v. United States, 380 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1967) (sufficiency
depends upon age, background and intelligence of suspect).
137 The issue may not arise if the defendant can read and is allowed to read his rights
on a printed form. See Bell v. United States, 382 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1967).
1
38 See Tucker v. United States, 375 F.2d 363, 369 (8th Cir. 1967).
139 Cf. People v. Hansard, 245 Cal. App. 2d 691, 53 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1966).
140 Denver Police Department, Form 369, June, 1967.
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understands, the advisement procedure will be repeated. This form
appears to be sufficient, except for one particular -the advice on
the rights of the indigent. It is misleading as it implies the person
will be supplied with an attorney without any need of a request.
The present language should be supplemented by the addition of
"if you wish one."
The procedure to be followed in advising the person of his
rights was clearly articulated in Miranda and courts have had little
difficulty in applying it. Perhaps the issue most encountered is
whether a confession must be excluded if the person was not ad-
vised of the indigent's right to appointed counsel. There was lan-
guage in Miranda which suggested that if, in fact, the person was
not indigent, an advisement incomplete in this respect was harmless
error,14 ' and the courts are in unanimous agreement.' 42 However, if
the person was indigent, nonadvisement is reversible error. 43
As the advisement as it is presently administered poses no sub-
stantial difficulty in application, future litigation will undoubtedly
focus on the addition of rights heretofore unrequired as part of the
advisement. Although the Court's four-part advisement contem-
plates informing the suspect of the totality of his rights, it is not all-
encompassing. The majority opinion contains an additional right
which the Court did not specifically require as part of the advise-
ment. The Court mentioned that although a person may initially
waive his rights, he is not thereby later estopped from asserting
them, during the course of the interrogation.' 44 The Court stated:
"If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or
during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interroga-
tion must cease.' '1 45 Thus the individual should be advised that he
may terminate questioning at any time, even though he originally
waives his rights.
The need for such an advisement is evident, since the Court
has emphasized that a waiver must be knowingly made, 4 ' and since
many persons may reasonably believe that once they have waived
141 384 U.S. at 473 n.42.
142 See, e.g., United States v. Lubitsch, 266 F. Supp. 294, 297-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
United States v. Hecht, 259 F. Supp 581, 583 (W.D. Pa. 1966); O'Neal v. State,
115 Ga. App. 100, 101, 153 S.E.2d 663, 664 (1967); Commonwealth v. Wilbur,
231 N.E.2d 919, 923 (Mass. 1967); State v. Gray, 268 N.C. 69, 83, 150 S.E.2d
1, 11 (1966). However, to speak in terms of "indigency" is superficially simple.
A crucial question is, by what standards does one determine who is, in fact, an
"indigent"?
143 People v. Trumpour, 61 Cal. Rptr. 899 (Ct. App. 1967) ; Robinson v. State, 1 Md.
App. 522, 231 A.2d 920 (1967).
144 384 U.S. at 475-77. For a discussion of the language which may be used to indicate
a desire to terminate questioning, see Brooks v. State, 229 A.2d 833, 836 (Del.
1967).
145 384 U.S. at 473-74 (emphasis added).
'14 d. at 473-75.
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their rights they are no longer able to retract the waiver and claim
the privilege. The danger becomes more apparent when one realizes
that the effect of the waiver varies, depending on whether it is given
during trial or at the pre-trial stage. During the trial, an initial
waiver prevents a person from refusing to answer questions con-
cerning subjects already broached by his preceding testimony.'47
The Court has presumed that every person is unaware of his right
to remain silent and of the effect of waiving it. The same rationale
should apply to informing the person of the tentative nature of
his waiver.'48
III. WAIVER
After the person has been meaningfully advised of his fifth and
sixth amendment rights, one more procedural step must be taken
before any questioning may commence. The person must knowingly
and intelligently waive his right to remain silent and his right to the
assistance of counsel.' 49 In the words of the Court:
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear.
If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or
during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation
must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise
his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person
invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion,
subtle or otherwise. . . . If the individual states that he wants an
attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.
At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer
with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent
questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he
indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must
respect his decision to remain silent.'5 0
The question of waiver may prove to be the most difficult and
most litigated of the Miranda issues. Its resolution requires the
court to consider the defendant - his age, intelligence, education
47 See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951). See also Miranda v. United
States, 384 U.S. 436, 476 n.45 (1966).
148 The FBI appears to have included it in its advisement form. See Elsen and Rosett,
Protections for the Suspect Under Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUm. L. REV. 645,
653 n.36 (1967).
Another requirement that may be forthcoming is that a person be advised of
the nature of the crime involved. See United States v. Washington, 341 F.2d 277
(3d Cir. 1965). In many cases, the seriousness of the offense would be relevant
to the defendant's decision whether or not to speak. Compliance with such a
requirement, however, may be difficult in those situations in which the exact nature
of the crime has not been determined. See People v. Lara, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 586 (1967) (no advice needed as to elements of crime, possible defenses, or
penalty for no crime had yet been charged). One might also ponder whether the
advisement should include the statement that the fact of silence or claim of privilege
cannot be revealed at trial. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966). See
Note, Tacit Criminal Admissions in Light of the Expanding Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 52 CORNELL L. REV. 335 (1967).
149 384 U.S. at 473-75.
150 id. at 473-74 (emphasis added).
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and background. Also to be considered is the atmosphere in which
the defendant was placed - the demeanor of the interrogation, and
the presence, if any, of physical force, threats, psychological coercion,
trickery, promises, inducements, lengthy interrogation, or incommuni-
cado detention. Add to this the testimony as to the rights advise-
ment form and the reply of the defendant subsequent to the advise-
ment, and the complexity of the resolution of the waiver issue be-
comes only more apparent. The limitations on Miranda which will
develop in the area of waiver will depend on the significance, or
lack of it, attached by the courts to each of the above factors.
A. A Knowing and Intelligent Waiver.
The initial inquiry in determining "waiver" is, was the advise-
ment given in a manner which the defendant could understand?
By definition, a waiver is "an intentional relinquishment or abandon-
ment of a known right .... "1" A man who is unable to understand
the advisement or the consequences of speaking must also be unable
to understand what he is doing when he makes a waiver. He must
make the waiver with complete knowledge, cognition, and aware-
ness of what he is doing when he makes his decision.
A related facet of this is whether the person has the mental
competence or the educational background to make an intelligent
waiver. 152 Certainly there are situations in which even the mentally
dwarfed could make a valid waiver if the advisement procedure was
characterized by painstaking simplicity.'" However, courts should
carefully scrutinize the facts, including the evidence which may be
offered by the defense, before making a finding of waiver. The
government should probably not be required to prove mental com-
petency unless it is placed in issue by defense counsel."'
Mental instability or insanity will permit a finding of non-
waiver.1 5' As one court said:
Confessions should not be allowed to be used simply because
it is possible that the defendant confessed during a period of mental
competence where there is a probability that the defendant was
insane. 156
For example, a person suffering from a form of paranoia or schizo-
151 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (emphasis added).
152 In pre-Miranda cases, these factors were regarded as significant in deciding the sub-
sequent admissibility of statements. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449
(1957); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
1
5 3 See Elrod v. State, 202 So. 2d 539, 541-42 (Ala. 1967) (waiver by an illiterate).
554 See People v. Dumas, 51 Misc. 2d 929, 938, 274 N.Y.S.2d 764, 775 (Sup. Ct.
1966).
155 See People v. Golwitzer, 52 Misc. 2d 925, 277 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1966); cf.
People v. Baksys, 26 App. Div. 2d 648, 272 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1966) (epileptic
seizure).
156 People v. Golwitzer, 52 Misc. 2d 925, 929, 277 N.Y.S.2d 209, 213 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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phrenia may have a distorted picture of the interrogation process,
and the practical consequences of waiving his rights. His psycho-
logical imbalance negates the requirement that he comprehend what
he is doing.
Also, the defendant may not be competent to waive his rights
if he was under the influence of alcohol' 157 or drugs.5s to such an
extent that his reflexes were uncertain or his thinking unclear. The
effect of drugs or liquors may so insensitize the accused's cognitive
process that he loses awareness of what he is doing, and what the
result of his decision will be. This would necessarily be a question
of fact, and a difficult one. It is interesting to note that in Denver,
the police will attempt to secure a waiver from those who are to be
charged with driving under the influence. This would seem to place
the police in a paradoxical situation if a statement is obtained: on
the one hand, they will argue that the defendant was sober enough
to make an intelligent, knowing and voluntary waiver; on the other,
he was too intoxicated to drive. Depending on the court's definition
of intoxication for purposes of waiver, these two contentions may
be internally consistent.'5 "
A special problem is also presented when the situation involves
waiver by a juvenile of his rights.' 6° The younger the accused, the
less developed are his intellectual capacities and capabilities. Al-
though it has been doubted whether a juvenile can ever make an
effective waiver,' the Supreme Court in the Gault decision. 2 gave
no indication of this. 1 3 The Court did outline some of the issues
when it said:
We appreciate that special problems may arise with respect to waiver
of the privilege by or on behalf of children, and that there may well
be some differences in technique - but not in principle - depend-
ing upon the age of the child and the presence and competence of
parents. The participation of counsel will, of course, assist the
police, juvenile courts and appellate tribunals in administering the
157 See State v. Clark, 102 Ariz. 550, 434 P.2d 636 (1967) (court held significant the
fact that defendant could tell a clever lie) ; cf. Ballay v. People, 160 Colo. 309, 419
P.2d 446 (1966) ; Peters v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. App. 1966).
158 Cf. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); People v. Waack, 100 Cal. App. 2d
253, 223 P.2d 486 (1950); People v. Townsend, 11 IIl. 2d 30, 141 N.E.2d 729
(1957).
'
59 See Logner v. North Carolina, 260 F.Supp. 970, 977 (D.N.C. 1966) (held that
defendant's waiver, after being arrested for driving under the influence, was inef-
fectual ).
160Miranda applies to juveniles. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967). The Court said
that "admissions and confessions of juveniles require special caution," but the same
was true under the traditional voluntariness test. Id. at 45. See, e.g., Gallegos v.
Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948). See also
People v. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 253 (Ct. App. 1967).
161 See In re Rust, 53 Misc. 2d 51, 59, 278 N.Y.S.2d 333, 341 (Fam. Ct. 1967).
162 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
163 But see Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
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privilege. If counsel was not present for some permissible reason
when an admission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to
assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that
it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product
of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.'
64
Although there may be situations in which a juvenile by himself
may be able to make an effective waiver,1 65 the safer and more de-
sirable practice would be to have at least one of his parents present.
Although presence of counsel may be required if the juvenile's par-
ents are unavailable, no one seemingly has the right to force an
attorney on a juvenile.
The practice in Denver seems both sufficient and desirable, and
reflects compliance with the Colorado Children's Code. 6 ' Juveniles
are never interrogated without a parent, guardian, or legal custodian
being present, for, by statute, this is a condition to the admissibility
of any subsequent statement.'6 7 Both the juvenile and the parent
are given the same advisement as would an adult suspect. 6 ' Then
the juvenile and his parent are left alone to discuss the situation.
If the juvenile decides to waive his rights, and the parent approves
of that decision, they each sign the form, indicating their respective
consent and approval.
1 69
B. The Express or Affirmative Waiver.
After a person has been advised of his rights, and assuming
that he understands them, he must still make an affirmative or ex-
press waiver.' 7 ° It is not clear what language will permit a finding
of waiver, but the Court has marked the boundaries. The clearly
permissible is a statement by the defendant that he is willing to talk
to the officer and does not want an attorney.' 7 ' The clearly im-
permissible is a finding of waiver from the defendant's silence.
1 72
164 387 U.S. at 55 (dictum).
165 See People v. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 253, (Ct. App. 1967) ; cf. State v. Gullings,
244 Ore. 173, 416 P.2d 311 (1966) ; State v. Casey, 244 Ore. 168, 416 P.2d 665
(1966).
166 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-1-1 et seq. (Supp. 1967).
1
67 Id. § 22-2-2 '(3) (c).
168 See text accompanying note 140, supra.
169 The waiver form in Denver is in the following language:
THESE RIGHTS HAVE BEEN READ TO US. WE HAVE TALKED
TOGETHER ABOUT THESE RIGHTS AND THIS SITUATION. WE
UNDERSTAND THESE RIGHTS.
I know what I am doing, I now wish to voluntarily talk to you.
Juvenile: ........................
I approve of my .......... decision to talk to you.
A dult: ..........................
2





Of course, any express "claim" of privilege by the person will pre-
vent questioning.'
In Denver, the waiver, as expressed on the form, states: "Know-
ing my rights and knowing what I am doing, I now wish to volun-
tarily talk to you."'7 4 This raises the interesting problem of whether
the express waiver of the right to remain silent necessarily includes
a waiver of the right to counsel. This is probably a valid waiver,
because the person has indicated he wishes to talk even though he
has been advised that he may consult with an attorney before saying
anything.'75
However, a waiver of the right to counsel in no way implies a
waiver of the right to remain silent. A disclaimer of the need for
an attorney is perfectly consistent with a desire to remain silent.
In the only decision on point, however, the court found a waiver.17
The court seemed to be looking for an affirmative "claim" of the
fifth amendment right, as it found significant the fact that despite
his earlier denials of guilt, he in no way indicated a disinclination
to continue the question and answer session.' 
7
A statement by the defendant that he would talk but would not
sign a statement has been held not to constitute a waiver.' 78 The
court felt that he must have misunderstood the advisement, for the
declaration reasonably indicated that he was not willing to make a
statement that could be used against him.179 A statement by the
defendant that he was aware of his legal rights has also been said
to be inadequate as a waiver, 8 0 as was the statement: "all right."'1
8'
But a declaration by the defendant that he wished to waive his
"rights" has been held sufficient.' It is safe to assume that the
173 But see Farley v. United States, 381 F.2d 357, 359 (5th Cir. 1967). In that case, the
defendant told the interrogator to see his attorney. Although finding that defendant
had claimed his privilege, the court sanctioned one question and answer for it had
only a "remote bearing" on his guilt.
174 Denver Police Department, Form 369, June, 1967.
17 Keegan v. United States, 385 F.2d 260, 264 (9th Cir. 1967). See United States v.
Hayes, 385 F.2d 375, 377 (4th Cir. 1967) (boiler-plate clauses). However, one
cannot be overcautious in view of the premium placed on an affirmative waiver by
the Court. The advisable procedure would be to include a statement that "I do not
wish to talk to an attorney or have one present during questioning." Cf. Brisbon v.
State, 201 So.2d 832, 833-34 (Fla. 1967).
176 Tucker v. United States, 375 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1967).
177 Id. at 369.
178 People v. Thiel, 26 App. Div. 2d 897, 274 N.Y.S.2d 417, 418 (1966).
179 Id.
180 People v. Powell, 429 P.2d 137, 59 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1967) (dictum). But see People
v. Sainz, 61 Cal. Rptr. 196, 199 (Ct. App. 1967) (dictum) (reply of "yes" he under-
stood his rights, was said to be waiver); State v. Brown, 250 La. 1125, 1140, 202
So. 2d 274, 279 (1967) ("I know all that," held waiver).
181 United States v. Low, 257 F. Supp. 606, 614 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
182 United States v. Theriault, 268 F. Supp. 314 (W.D. Ark. 1967).
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waiver need not take a precise legal form, 8 ' but it should encom-
pass a waiver of both the right of counsel and of silence.
C. Waiver and the Right to Counsel.
When an attorney is requested by the defendant, several situa-
tions may develop which call for careful attention before finding a
subsequent waiver. For example, a troublesome question is pre-
sented when the defendant has given a statement after indicating
a desire to see an attorney but before the attorney is present. In such
a situation, a waiver could be found but only if the person clearly
articulates his change of mind and his desire to talk to the police.'
Miranda states:
If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation
must cease until an attorney is present.... If the individual cannot
obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking
to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent.185
If a statement is obtained, the circumstances should be suspect. 8
However, just as the person is not estopped to invoke his privilege
after an initial waiver,' 87 so the person may expressly retract his
earlier claim of privilege and talk to the police.' 88
The circumstances should also be carefully scrutinized before
making a finding of waiver when a statement is made after a re-
tained or appointed attorney has said that his client will answer no
questions. The Court did say that questioning may be permissible
even after the defendant indicates a desire to remain silent, if his
attorney is present. 8 0 However, "the exercise of those rights must
be fully honored."' 9 °
What if a statement is obtained in the absence of retained or
appointed counsel? Even though, as one court has said, "the de-
fendant himself is the final arbiter of the conduct of his defense,"' 1
183 Brisbon v. State, 201 So. 2d 832, 834 (Fla. 1967); State v. Yough, 49 N.J. 587,
596-97, 231 A.2d 598, 603 (1967).
184 Cf. United States v. Slaughter, 366 F.2d 833, 843, 846 (4th Cir. 1966) (dictum).
Compare State v. Rosenberger, 240 Ore. 376, 409 P.2d 684 (1966) with People v.
Stockman, 63 Cal. 2d 494, 407 P.2d 277, 47 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1965).
185 384 U.S. at 474.
186 However, one court found a waiver when the defendant changed his mind about
retaining an attorney after the officer told him that he wished to conduct the investi-
gation in private and without any publicity. State v. LaFernier, 155 N.W.2d 93 (Wis.
1967).
187 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966).
188 See Narro v. United States, 370 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1966); State v. Sanford, 421
P.2d 988 (Ore. 1966) (dictum). If, however, the attorney arrives and is denied
access to his client, there is a violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 465 n.35 (1966).
189 384 U.S. at 474 n.44. The Denver Police follow this procedure but rarely, if ever,
does the attorney allow the defendant to say anything.
190 Id. at 467.
191 People v. Baker, 28 App. Div. 2d 24, 26, 281 N.Y.S.2d 161, 163 (1967).
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a finding of waiver should rarely, if ever, be made unless the de-
fendant volunteers to talk to the police without any prodding on
their part, and, unless it appears that the accused deliberately and
understandingly chose to forego his rights. 192  Nevertheless, one
court has found a waiver in a situation in which an attorney brought
his client, wanted for murder, into the police station to surrender,
informing the authorities that his client would not say anything.' 5 '
After the attorney left the station, the "inquisition" began with
various detectives asking questions which the defendant refused to
answer. Later, after the defendant was taken to his cell, a detective
went to see him. The defendant asked why a crowd had gathered
outside the station. The detective informed the defendant that they
were waiting to "see" him, and, sensing the situation, asked the
defendant if there was anything he would like to "get off his chest."
Whereupon, the defendant began to answer questions.' It is sub-
mitted that the court, in finding a waiver, was in error.' 95
D. The Voluntary Waiver.
Even though the person has articulated an express waiver, made
only after a knowledge and understanding of his rights, other fac-
tors must be considered before a finding of "waiver" may be made.
These factors may be grouped under a "voluntariness" label, making
it reminiscent of the pre-Miranda test for the admissibility of con-
fessions. Although admissibility is no longer governed solely by
the question of the confession's voluntariness, the determination of
whether the circumstances indicate that the person was able to make
an unfettered and voluntary exercise of his rights will remain an
important question for the trial court. Proof of any of these factual
criteria strongly militates against the validity of the waiver.
The Court said that notwithstanding police testimony or other
evidentiary corroborations, "the fact of lengthy interrogation ... be-
fore a statement is made is strong evidence that the accused did not
192 One court has indicated it may exercise its federal supervisory powers to exclude a
statement made by one who is not in custody but who is known to have counsel,
retained or appointed, unless he executes an understanding waiver. United States v.
Smith, 379 F.2d 628, 633-34 (7th Cir. 1967) (dictum).
193 People v. Baker, 28 App. Div. 2d 24, 26, 281 N.Y.S.2d 161, 163 (1967).
194 Chief Jamerson of the Detective Division, Denver Police Department, indicates that
often, after his attorney has left, a defendant will send word from the jail that he
wants to talk to a detective. He also indicated that there may be situations when the
detectives will "offer" the defendant another opportunity to waive his rights after
the attorney has gone. Until the court rules otherwise, he feels his department is not
bound by even a written directive from the attorney that his client will not submit
to any questioning. Interview with Lloyd Jamerson, Division Chief, Detective Divi-
sion, Denver Police Department, in Denver, Colorado, Sept. 5, 1967.
195 Even if the defendant had the capacity to make an affirmative waiver, the record
showed only that the defendant answered inquiries. Miranda reveals that a valid




validly waive his rights."' 96 This is consistent with earlier language
in Miranda that an express disclaimer of one's rights "followed
closely by a statement could constitute a waiver.""' It indicates the
Court's belief that if the person has actually waived his rights, he
will make a statement in short order. The longer the time span, the
less trustworthy the statement will be. Thus, it would seem incum-
bent upon the interrogators to work swiftly. This would also seem
to dispel any doubts that, in a series of interrogations, a waiver must
be secured before each interview.198 By requiring the evidence sought
to be used to closely follow an express waiver, the Court seemingly
has required that the advisement be repeated and a waiver secured
each time the defendant is interrogated. 99
Incommunicado incarceration without questioning is also strong
evidence of nonwaiver.'0° This reflects the Court's belief that a
period of isolation will have an adverse effect on the willpower
of the accused which interferes with his ability to subsequently make
a valid waiver. The police would seemingly encounter no difficulty
here if they have provided the defendant with adequate food and
sanitary facilities during the interim, and have permitted him free
access to friends and relatives.
201
Another prerequisite to a voluntary waiver is a finding that the
police have practiced no deception on the defendant: "[A]ny evi-
dence that the accused was threatened, tricked or cajoled into a
waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily
waive his privilege. "2°2 Notice that the Court said any evidence of
the forbidden tactics will invalidate the waiver. Presumably this
means any credible evidence, but it need not satisfy any other evi-
dentiary standard. Thus, if the person confesses only after the police
state that if he cooperated it would go easier on him, and if he did
not, he would go to jail, there would be a finding of involuntary
waiver.201 In fact, any physical violence, threats, psychological pres-
sure or coercion, promises, inducements, artifice, deception, or fraud
196 Id. at 476 (emphasis added).
197Id. at 475.
198 See Davis v. State, 204 So. 2d 490, 495 (Ala. 1967).
199 This is the interpretation of the Denver Police Department. One defendant has been
given as many as eight advisements during the course of the investigation. But see
State v. Jones, 198 Kan. 30, 35, 422 P.2d 888, 892 (1967) (dictum).
2
00 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).
201 However, detention simpliciter may be an independent violation of the McNabb-
Mallory rule. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
202 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966) (emphasis added). Notice the use
of the words, "any evidence." Presumably the Court is referring to any "credible"
evidence.
203 See United States v. Low, 257 F. Supp. 606 (W.D. Pa. 1966) ; cf. State v. LaFernier,
155 N.W.2d 93, 99 (Wis. 1967).
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on the part of the interrogators will invalidate a subsequent waiver.
The concern of the Court is to insure that a knowing and intelligent
waiver can be made in an environment that will permit and honor
nonwaiver.
E. Successive Interrogations: The Westover Situation.
A special waiver problem may be presented when the defendant
is subjected to interrogation on more than one occasion. This will
occur if the accused does not receive the advisement and execute a
waiver before the first interrogation, but is interrogated a second
time only after apparent compliance with Miranda. The question is
whether the waiver preceding the second interrogation is valid, in
view of the prior illegal police conduct.
This was the situation presented in Westover v. United States,2 °4
decided with Miranda. The defendant had been arrested by local
authorities who questioned him for several hours, although the de-
fendant made no confession. After having been in custody for four-
teen hours, the defendant was then interrogated by special agents
of the FBI about his involvement in other offenses. Two hours
later, the defendant confessed. Both interrogations were conducted
in the same police station, and defendant was apprised of his rights
only once, that being just prior to the second interrogation.
In holding the confession inadmissible, the Court said that al-
though the interrogations were conducted by two distinct law en-
forcement agencies and different crimes were involved, the impact
on the defendant was that of a continuous period of interrogation." 5
The defendant was precluded from making an intelligent waiver
because the advisement occurred only after intensive questioning;
thus, the federal authorities would have been the "beneficiaries" of
the earlier, illegal questioning. The Court was not without advice
for law enforcement officials:
A different case would be presented if an accused were taken into
custody by the second authority, removed both in time and place
from his original surroundings, and then adequately advised of his
rights and given an opportunity to exercise them. 206
After Westover, this much is certain: it is irrelevant that the
crimes involved are different; there need be no confession given at
the first interrogation; prior to the second interrogation, the de-
fendant should be removed both in time and place from his original
surroundings. It is apparent that procedurally, the issue falls under
the heading of "waiver." Thus, on the issue of waiver, the timeli-
204 384 U.S. 436, 494 (1966).
205 Id. at 496. As one court said, the belated waiving was "window dressing" to a great
extent. United States v. McCann, I BNA CRIM. L. REP. 2263 (N.D.N.Y. 1967).
206 384 U.S. at 496.
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ness of the advisement may be as important as the administering of
the advisement itself.
207
Although Westover involved interrogation by two distinct law
enforcement agencies, it seems clear that the Westover rationale
would apply in a situation where a series of interrogations is con-
ducted by the same authority.2 8 However, a valid waiver would be
more difficult to obtain because the defendant could probably not
be entirely removed from his "original surroundings. ' 20 9 In one case,
a second confession, after proper advisement and obtaining a waiver,
was excluded even though three days had elapsed and the scene of
the interrogation was changed from a schoolhouse to the police
station.
2 10
If a confession is made prior to the second confrontation, a
subsequent waiver will be more difficult to prove.2  In such a situa-
tion, the second confession would clearly be the "fruits" of the
first.212 Simply removing the person in time and place may not be
sufficient. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Bayer,218 has said:
Of course, after an accused has once let the cat out of the bag, by
confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter
free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having
confessed. He can never get the cat back in the bag. The secret is out
for good. In such a sense, a later confession always may be looked
upon as fruit of the first.214
Nevertheless, the Court in Bayer held a second confession admis-
sible, because it was given six months after the first, and was "volun-
tary" in the traditional sense.211 In a later case, 216 however, the
Court held a second confession inadmissible, because the relation
of the confessions was "so close that one must say the facts of one
control the character of the other.
2 17
Illustrative of this situation is an incident observed while riding
patrol with the Denver police. A man was arrested in a bar for
carrying a concealed weapon. Before being taken to the station,
and prior to being advised of his rights, he was subjected to interro-
207 See Tucker v. United States, 375 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1967).
208See In re Knox, 53 Misc. 2d 889, 280 N.Y.S.2d 65 (Fam. Ct. 1967).
209 His interrogators may be different but they would represent the same authority.
Also, the interrogation will probably have been conducted within the same building,
if not in the identical room.
21
0 In re Knox, 53 Misc. 2d 889, 280 N.Y.S.2d 65 (Fam. Ct. 1967).
211 Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355, 361 (8th Cir. 1967).
212 Cf. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
213 331 U.S. 532 (1947).
2 14 Id. at 540.
215 Id. at 541.
216 Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).




gation in the squad car. After several inculpatory admissions were
elicited, the man was taken to the police station. Before being
booked, he repeated his confession, after being advised of his rights
and signing a written waiver. Clearly, neither confession will be
admissible in court for the second was tainted and infected by the
poison of the first confession.218
Another way of expressing the applicable principle is that the
second confession is inadmissible unless the prosecution can prove
that the causative link between the two confessions had been severed.
It is suggested that this may be accomplished by removing the de-
fendant as far from the time and place of his original surroundings
as is reasonably possible 219 and, after advising the person of his
rights, telling him: "Nothing that you may have said or confessed
to prior to this time to any law enforcement official may be used
against you in any way unless they first told you of your right to
remain silent and to talk to an attorney and have him present dur-
ing questioning, and you then agreed to talk to them. Do you under-
stand?" If the person thereafter executes a waiver, subsequent state-
ments should be admissible. 2
F. Burden of Proof.
The burden of proving a waiver rests with the prosecution. 2'
The Court justifies this by saying that interrogations are usually con-
ducted in isolation and the state has the only means of making avail-
able corroborated evidence. If the defendant has no attorney present
during the interrogation, the government bears the "heavy burden"
of showing that he knowingly and intelligently waived his rights.222
It is thus obvious that there is no presumption of waiver; in fact,
a presumption of nonwaiver may be raised in favor of the accused.
It is not clear what quantum of proof is necessary to enable
the government to fulfill its "heavy burden." Most courts speak in
218 See Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355, 361 (8th Cir. 1967). But see Babson v.
State, 201 So, 2d 796 (Fla. 1967).
219 Space limitations may prove insurmountable. The police may also be unaware of
the existence of a prior, illegal interrogation. This will be particularly true in the
larger cities, because the interrogators may be different-the first being the arresting
officer and the second, a detective. In smaller communities, the arresting officer
usually follows the case through to the end.
220 Chief Jamerson of the Denver Police Department categorically states that after an
illegal confession has been obtained, there is nothing he can do that would permit
a subsequent confession to be admitted into evidence. Thus, he feels the taint of the
first confession is perpetually present. Interviw with Lloyd Jamerson, Division Chief,
Detective Division, Denver Police Department, in Denver, Colorado, Sept. 5, 1967.
221 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
222 Id. This would necessarily include the burden of proving that the advisement was
in fact administered and understood. See State v, Travis, 49 N.J. 428, 431, 231 A.2d
205, 207 (1967). See generally Warden, Miranda -Some History, Some Observa-
tions, and Some Questions, 20 VAND. L. REV. 39, 53-55 (1966).
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terms of "beyond a reasonable doubt '2 23 or "unmistakable clarity. ' 2 4
Whether these are expressions of a constitutional requirement or
merely the court's preference is not certain. Until the Supreme Court
clarifies its position, it is safe to assume only that the burden is
greater than "by a preponderance," the criterion for civil cases. If
an attorney is present, presumably the government would still have
the burden of proof, but it would be measured by more lenient
standards because the knowledge of the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation would be shared by the attorney.22 5 The burden
may also be lessened when the purported waiver took place in the
field, as opposed to the station house. 226 This is because the station
house is a more controlled environment, offering the police more
evidentiary techniques than in the more spontaneous situations oc-
curring on the street. On the other hand, an initial unwillingness to
talk may increase the burden of proving a subsequent waiver.22
The prosecution's heavy burden may necessitate proof other
than the oral testimony of the officer in charge of the interrogation.
Otherwise, a "swearing contest" may result between the officer and
the defendant, forcing the judge to determine the credibility of each.
This may not be the type of substantial proof Miranda dictates.2 8
Therefore, other techniques of proof will have to utilized. 229 Per-
haps the most common technique is the use of a printed advisement
form, setting forth the defendant's rights and a formal waiver. Both
the defendant and a witness would then sign it. The police could
also utilize tape recorders, video tapes and motion pictures. The
interrogation session could also be transcribed by a reporter or
stenographer. However, the cost of some of these devices may be
prohibitive, particularly for the smaller police departments.
No matter what techniques are utilized, the proof will never
be conclusive. Although they all pinpoint an occurrence at a cer-
tain time, none will reveal the events taking place prior to the alleged
223 See People v. Golwitzer, 52 Misc. 2d 925, 277 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1966);
People v. Keesler, 53 Misc. 2d 268, 270-71, 278 N.Y.S. 2d 423, 426 (Allegany
County Ct. 1967); People v. Johnson, 50 Misc. 2d 1009, 271 N.Y.S.2d 814
(Nassau County Ct. 1966).
224 Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355, 360 (8th Cir. 1967).
=For a good discussion of burden of proof, see State v. Yough, 49 N.J. 587, 596-601,
231 A.2d 598, 603-05 (1967).
228 See Kamisar, A Dissent From the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New"
Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REv. 59, 61
(1966).
227 See People v. Fioritto, 64 Cal. Rptr. 797, 800 (Ct. App. 1967).
228 However, the State may be aided by the greater credence given the officer's
testimony by the court. See Elsen and Rosett, Protections for the Suspect Under
Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 645, 658-59 (1967).
229 For a good discussion of the various techniques, see 19 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS,
Waiver of Rights Under the Miranda Decision §§ 44-50 (1967). See 1966 UTAH
L. REv. 687 (1966).
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waiver. They also may not show a subsequent retraction of waiver.
To allay any thoughts of police abuses would require a video tape
of the defendant from the time he was apprehended to when he
confessed. Even then, the tape may have been edited. However, in
the absence of proof by the defendant of circumstances apart from
the prosecution's evidence, a waiver will be provable with less than
a complete accounting of the time gap.
CONCLUSION
Although the preceding discussion has focused on some of the
potential legal limitations on Miranda, practical limitations may in
the final analysis be equally as significant in determining the scope
and effect of Miranda. Thus, some concluding comment on a few
practical limitations is justifiable.
The remedy provided in Miranda (i.e., exclusion of evidence)
becomes significant to the defendant only if he is prosecuted and
then only if the evidence is proffered against him. Thus, a person
aggrieved by unlawful police practices has no effective remedy un-
less the "ifs" are present. Even if a man is tried in court, the prose-
cution often has other sufficient evidence for a conviction and need
not utilize his confession. Thus, a wrong may have been committed
although the defendant has no remedy.
Miranda's potential effect is largely dependent on the impor-
tance of confessions to successful prosecution. There are undoubtedly
instances where the presence or absence of a confession is determina-
tive because of the lack of tangible evidence from other sources, but
there are differing opinions on the frequency of this type of situation.
Undoubtedly, Miranda will cause some shift from reliance on con-
fessions to more intensive field investigations and use of science and
technology in detecting and solving crimes. It is only in those in-
stances that the increased field investigation is unproductive that
Miranda can have any effect on the clearance rate. Of course,
Miranda may have more effect in smaller communities where addi-
tional funds to support a more complete scientific investigation are
probably unattainable. Even in larger cities, the latest scientific
equipment is often either in short supply or is nonexistent because
the police department's budget does not afford such a "luxury."
This prompts the final point of this Note: due process costs
money. Every decision of the Supreme Court that expands upon or
clarifies individual rights necessitates modifications in police or
court procedures which almost invariably involve a greater financial
burden for the courts and police to operate effectively under the new
decision. Several aspects of Miranda involve potentially greater
monetary burdens: assistance of state-provided counsel for the in-
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digent at an earlier stage in the prosecution; more sophisticated evi-
dentiary techniques to preserve proof of an advisement and waiver;
a greater portion of the officer's time to prepare the necessary docu-
ments and reports; more and better scientific equipment, technicians
and trained investigators. If additional money is forthcoming, the
individual may be able to enjoy the rights conferred under a liberal
or expansive interpretation of Miranda. However, without the neces-
sary money, both the courts and police may give Miranda a more
restrictive and narrow interpretation. This would impose severe
limitations on the rights of the individual. Miranda might, for
example, be limited to cases involving felonies, excluding all mis-
demeanors, not to mention traffic offenses. The definition of cus-
tody or effective detention may be severely restricted, perhaps lim-
ited to police station interrogations or those conducted in other
"police-dominated" atmospheres. The strict burden of proof of an
advisement and waiver may be relaxed. These and many other legal
issues may have their resolutions affected by the failure to properly
equip the law enforcement agencies and the courts to meet the
responsibilities thrust upon them by the Constitution, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court.
Ronald J. Miller
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ACTS OF DIAGNOSIS BY NURSES
AND THE COLORADO
PROFESSIONAL NURSING PRACTICE ACT
"The law hath not been dead, though it hath slept."
-William Shakespeare*
INTRODUCTION
p ATIENTS returning from cardiac surgery in Denver's Saint Luke's
Hospital are placed in a coronary intensive care unit. Also
placed in the unit are patients with serious rhythm disturbances.
Saint Luke's Hospital has claimed that the intensive care unit will
reduce the mortality from heart failure threatening these patients
by 50 percent.1 The success of the unit owes much to the skill of
the specially trained nurses who monitor the heartbeat of each pa-
tient, often without a doctor's supervision. The unit will undoubtedly
continue to be a valuable addition to Colorado's medical services,
until a nurse in the unit is convicted of violating the Colorado Pro-
fessional Nursing Practice Act:.2 The charge would be that the nurse
made an act of diagnosis.
The Nursing Practice Act states that the "practice of profes-
sional nursing.. . shall not be deemed to include acts of diagnosis
or prescription of therapeutic or corrective measures."3 The ques-
tion to be discussed in this Note is the meaning of "acts of diagnosis."
To provide a factual focus, the authors interviewed and observed
nurses in the city of Denver who have been given broad medical
responsibility. In addition, documents were received from Saint
Luke's Hospital outlining the duties of nurses in intensive care units.
The written standing orders of Saint Luke's intensive care unit
will be used as a factual point of reference for the discussion of
diagnosis. It is important to note that doctors have not been sta-
tioned in the unit on a full time basis. The unit is so designed that
the nurse on duty will continuously monitor the heartbeat and gen-
eral condition of the patient. If the nurse judges that the patient
is having a cardiac arrest she will initiate resuscitative measures.
If there is an arrest, the nurse is not to wait for a doctor's directions.
*MEASURE FOR MEASURE, Act II, Scene 2.
1 Intensive Care Unit Committee & Heart Station Committee, Operational Policies
Concerning Coronary Intensive Care Unit (memo received from Dr. Robert Liggett,
Medical Director of Education, Saint Luke's Hospital, Denver, Colorado, October 11,
1967) (hereinafter cited as Operational Policies].
2 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 97-1-1 to -29 (1963).
31d. § 97-1-2(1)(1963).
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The nurses in the intensive care unit of Saint Luke's Hospital
have the following standing orders:
Emergency: Respond promptly to alarm by going to bedside.
Check pulse (carotid or femoral) as well as cardio-
scope.
Be sure you aren't dealing with a false alarm.
Patient in true arrest (asystole or ventricular fibrilla-




Start External cardiac compression
If Ventricular Fibrillation use defibrillator if no physi-
cian is present.
If Cardiac Standstill give icc 1:1000 Epinephrin intra-
venously (in the tube of the running I.V. solution)
continuing external cardiac compression and ventilla-
tion.4
Viewed in one light, the question of whether nurses in the in-
tensive care unit may be violating the statutory prohibition of diag-
nosis is academic. None of the doctors or nurses interviewed were
aware of any prosecution of a nurse for diagnosing. However, inter-
views did reveal an uncertainty about the meaning of the law. Un-
easiness arose when a nursing procedure which appeared to be medi-
cally proper was analyzed in light of the statute. Several doctors
complained that this uncertainty hobbled the planning of new medi-
cal programs designed to relieve overburdened doctors by giving
more responsibility to nurses. Therefore, an inquiry into the mean-
ing of diagnosis is far from academic if uncertainty about the diag-
nosis prohibition is retarding new medical programs for the citizens
of Colorado.
I. STATUTORY REGULATION OF WHAT A NURSE CAN Do
Colorado is not the only state which prohibits nurses from
making acts of diagnosis; nineteen other states have similar pro-
visions.5 Furthermore, the prohibition of diagnosis is not an archaic
4 Operational Policies 2.
5
ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 18 9(3 4 ) (Supp. 1965);
ALASKA STAT. § 08.68.410(5) (1962);
ARIz. REV. STAT. § 32-1601(5)(d) (Supp. 1967);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1902 (Supp. 1966);
HAWAII REV. LAWS § 67-2(b)(Supp. 1965) ;
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-1413(e) (Supp. 1967);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91, § 35.35(1) (Smith-Hurd 1966);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1113(b) (1)(1964) ;
ME, REV, STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 2102(2) (D) (1964)
1MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 66-1222 (1) (Supp. 1967);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 632.010(5)(1957);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 326-A:2(I)(1966);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-158(3) (a) (Supp 1967);
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statutory provision; all of the states having the provision enacted
them after 1947. The prohibition is usually added as a caveat to
the statutory definition of the practice of professional nursing.
Most states have a definition of the practice of professional
nursing similar to the Colorado provision, which reads:
The "practice of professional nursing" shall mean the perform-
ance for compensation of any act in the observation or care of the
ill, injured, or infirm or in the maintenance of health or preserva-
tion of illness of others or in the supervision and teaching of other
personnel or the administration of medicines and treatments as
prescribed by a person licensed to practice medicine or dentistry
in this state, requiring substantial specialized judgment and skill
and based on knowledge am! applicaticn of the principles of
biological, physical and social sciences.,,
The Colorado statute then adds:
The foregoing shall not be deemed to include acts of diagnosis
or prescription of therapeutic or corrective measures.
7
The question of whether the acts of nurses in the coronary in-
tensive care units constitute acts of diagnosis could be answered if
there were a judicial construction of the prohibition by the Colorado
Supreme Court. However, the Colorado court has not been called
upon to explain the statute's prohibition. The courts of the 19 other
states prohibiting diagnosis are also silent.
II. THE VARIED MEANINGS OF DIAGNOSIS
Attempts to understand the prohibition are not completely
frustrated because the word "diagnosis" as it appears in other Colo-
rado statutes has been defined both by statute and judicial construc-
tion. Colorado chiropodists are allowed to diagnose ailments of
the human toe, foot, and leg 8 and the statute allowing diagnosis
says, "Diagnosis shall be held to mean ascertaining a disease or
ailment by its symptoms.'' °
In Hurley v. People'° the Colorado Supreme Court held that a
man who was conducting a school for healing was not guilty of the
unauthorized practice of medicine. Although he discussed disease
in general terms, he made no examination of the ailments of any
N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-12-01(2)(Supp. 1967);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 678.015(1967);
S.D. CODE § 27.0902(2) (Supp. 1960);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-31-4(5)(Supp. 1967);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1552(2) (B) (1967)
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.88.030(1961).
6
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 97-1-2(1)(1963).
7Id.
8Id. § 91-2-2.
9Id. § 91-2-2(2) (c).
1099 Colo. 510, 63 P.2d 1227 (1936).
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individual. The court said, "Clearly, as we conceive, the first and
primary concern of the medical practitioner is to ascertain what
afflicts his ailing patient- to make diagnosis; he then determines
what will remedy the ills of the sufferer, which he proceeds to
administer.""
If the Colorado statutory and judicial definition of diagnosis
is used-that it is the ascertaining of a disease or ailment by its
symptoms - then a strong argument can be made that nurses in the
intensive care unit are not diagnosing. Under the statute, diagnosis
would be the determination of the disease based upon an evaluation
of symptoms. Diagnosis would be the selection of one disease from
a possibility of diseases suggested by the symptoms. On the other
hand, diagnosis would not be a judgment of whether a symptom
is present or a judgment of the seriousness of the symptom. When
the nurse judges that the patient exhibits ventricular fibrillation she
is merely observing a symptom, not diagnosing the disease suggested.
In determining that the patient is suffering a true cardiac arrest she
is exercising judgment as to the seriousness of the symptom, but
she is not ascertaining the nature of the disease.
It also can be argued that the diagnosis of the patient has al-
ready been made when the doctor assigns the patient to the inten-
sive care unit. The doctor has determined that the patient is suffer-
ing from a particular heart disease and that the medication called
for in the nurse's standing order is always appropriate to ease the
symptoms the patient is likely to exhibit. The nurse's responsibility
is not to determine the particular disease nor is she called upon to
decide what medication will ease the symptoms. Her responsibility
is to judge the gravity of the symptom and to act under the direc-
tion of her standing orders.
However, this argument in favor of the legality of nursing
duties in the intensive care unit seems to be rebutted by a 1963 letter
from the Colorado Attorney General to the Colorado State Board
of Nursing:
In reply to your inquiry as to whether professional nurses
may legally make a tentative diagnosis and then use a standing
order signed by a doctor in the treatment of the particular condi-
tion involved, I wish to advise that acts of diagnosis are expressly
excluded from the definition of the practice of professional nursing
as set forth in C.R.S. '53 (1960 Perm. Supp.), 97-2-2(1). As
we construe this section, a professional nurse is not authorized under
the law, as part of the practice of professional nursing, to make a
diagnosis.
Diagnosis is recognition of a disease from its symptoms. [case
cited from California] "Diagnosis means a summary of symptoms
with the conclusions arrived at therefrom; determination of the
11 Id. at 516, 63 P.2d at 1229.
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distinctive nature of disease." [Minnesota case cited] A nurse is
not permitted to make a diagnosis, tentative or otherwise.
In answer to your second question as to whether a nurse
following this procedure would be practicing medicine, C.R.S.
1953, 91-1-6(1)(a), includes "diagnosis" in the term "practice
of medicine." It would appear, therefore, that a nurse who made
a tentative diagnosis of a certain condition would be practicing
medicine.' 2
Unfortunately, the letter provides no factual focus whereby
one could distinguish between a nurse's judgment of symptoms and
the act of making "a tentative diagnosis of a certain condition."
The effect of the letter is not to clarify the distinction between
proper nursing judgments and acts of diagnosis but to warn nurses
that if they fail to make the right distinction they are subject to the
charge of practicing medicine.'"
A review of decisions by other state courts reveals two differ-
ent interpretations of the term diagnosis. Like the Colorado Supreme
Court, other courts have had no difficulty in arriving at a definition
of diagnosis. Almost all courts would agree that diagnosis is the
determination of a disease from its symptoms. Confusion arises
when the court applies the definition to the fact situation. Accord-
ing to the rationale of some courts, diagnosis only takes place when
the nurse attempts to determine the particular disease. The nurse
is properly allowed the responsibility of judging the gravity of
symptoms without engaging in diagnosis. In opposition to this view
are cases which hold that when a nurse evaluates a symptom and
judges that no serious disease is indicated, she is making an act of
diagnosis.
The rationale of the first case cited in the Attorney General's
letter would seem to give the nurse wide discretion in judging symp-
toms. In Maranville v. State Board of Equalization4 the court com-
mented that a lay technician who made x-ray pictures and analyzed
their meaning in reports to doctors and dentists was not making
acts of diagnosis. The court said, "He made no diagnoses from the
radiographs. But he did advise the professional men of his con-
clusions of conditions of anatomies as they appeared to him in the
pictures. He 'interpreted light shadows.' "'5 Although one would
like to know more facts about the "conclusions of conditions of
anatomies," the court in this case allowed the technician wide dis-
12 Letter from Duke W. Dunbar, Colorado Attorney General, to Mrs. Madolin M.
Dickinson, R.N., Director of Nursing Education and Licensing, Colorado State Board
of Nursing, Aug. 19, 1963.
13 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-1-6(1963) defines the practice of medicine in terms
which include the word diagnose. Section 91-1-29 makes the unauthorized practice
of medicine a misdemeanor.
1499 Cal. App. 2d 841, 222 P.2d 898 (1950).
15 2 2 2 P.2d at 898.
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cretion in evaluating conditions without judging him guilty of diag-
nosing. It would seem that this court would allow a nurse similar
discretion in evaluating symptoms as long as she does not attempt
to determine the disease suggested by the symptoms.
Contrary to the reasoning of this case is People v. Willis1" in
which an unlicensed chiropractor was convicted of treating the sick
without being licensed by the state. The chiropractor defended on
the ground that the chiropractic science does not recognize disease
and hence no chiropractor could make a diagnosis. The California
court rejected this argument by saying:
Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of any one trying to restore
to a normal condition a person who is abnormal without a prior
investigation and determination, in a general way at least, of the
character of the abnormality. Manifestly, there are no fixed limits
to a diagnosis. It may not amount to a scientific classification of
the ailment, but it may go no further than an observation of the
most obstrusive symptoms, and may be accurate or inaccurate, and
yet be within the contemplation of the statute. It seems like an
unjust aspersion on the character and intelligence of this respectable
body of practitioners to intimate that they attempt to restore "the
normal activity of the tissues" without any inquiry or investigation
as to what tissues are affected and in what manner their activity may
be abnormal.' 7
This case indicates the problem of using the word "diagnose"
in a variety of statutes designed to correct different abuses. Thus,
courts may be tempted to adopt a broad definition of the word in
a statute such as the Colorado statute which prohibits an unlicensed
person to hold himself out "as being able to diagnose, treat, pre-
scribe for, palliate or prevent any human disease .... .s On the
other hand, public policy may be better served by a strict definition
of the word diagnosis in the Professional Nursing Practice Act.
Another example of a broad judicial definition of diagnosis is
contained in Cooper v. National Motor Bearing Co. 9 A nurse em-
ployed by the company treated a puncture wound in an employee's
forehead caused by another employee who let a piece of metal slip
from his hand. The nurse swabbed the wound with an antiseptic
and put a bandage on it. The employee saw the nurse the next two
days and she applied more medication but did not probe the wound.
The nurse worked under standing orders signed by a doctor
who would accept patients injured beyond the scope of the nurse's
practice. The employees had to see the nurse first and could only
see the doctor upon the nurse's authorization. According to her
testimony, it was her duty to refer any condition or injury she was
1662 Cal. App. 717, 217 P. 771 (1923).
17 217 P. at 772.
'
8 CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-1-6(1) (b) (1963).
19 136 Cal. App. 2d 229, 288 P.2d 581 (1955).
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not familiar with, or not sure about, to the doctor for diagnosis.
The employee's wound healed except for a small red mark.
After two or three months the redness began to spread and started
to become puffy. However, the nurse waited 10 months before
referring the employee to the doctor. The injury was then diag-
nosed as skin cancer and skin grafts were required to cure it.
The court affirmed a judgment that the nurse was negligent
and said that evidence was sufficient to show that the nurse did not
properly probe the wound for foreign matter, and that she unrea-
sonably delayed in referring the employee to the doctor, despite indi-
cations that the wound was not properly healing.
The court then concluded that a nurse in evaluating the serious-
ness of a symptom is making an act of diagnosis:
A nurse in order to administer first aid properly and effectively
must make a sufficient diagnosis to enable her to apply the ap-
propriate remedy. Usually she receives some history of the accident
or illness from the patient, inspects a wound, and bases her choice
of treatment on the deductions thus made. She has been trained,
but to a lesser degree than a physician, in the recognition of the
symptoms of diseases and injuries. She should be able to diagnose,
according to appellant nurse's own testimony herein, sufficiently to
know whether it is a condition within her authority to treat as a
first aid case or whether it bears danger signs that should warn
her to send the patient to a physician. 20
The reasoning of the Cooper case is persuasive because the
nurse, in judging the gravity of symptoms, must base her judgment
upon the seriousness of the possible diseases suggested by the symp-
toms. Her analysis of the patient's complaint duplicates in a less
sophisticated degree the analysis of the doctor. Of course, the nurse's
treatment of the patient differs from the doctor's in that she cannot
prescribe the medicines that the doctor can. In looking at the facts
of the Cooper case, one can ask whether the diagnosis dividing line
can be drawn at the point where the nurse treats the patient. Did
the nurse diagnose when she applied the antiseptic? The answer
should be no, because the one important action by the nurse was
her decision that no doctor was needed. Even if she had applied no
medication, her decision that a doctor was not needed would be the
factor that determined the patient's future medical care. Thus, a
nurse may be guilty of making an act of diagnosis when she decides
that no serious disease or symptom is indicated. Or, the nurse in
the intensive care unit may be making a diagnosis when she deter-
mines that there is no false alarm and that the standing order should
be executed. It is this decision that duplicates the decision a doctor
would make in a similar situation.
20288 P.2d at 587.
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The uncertainty surrounding diagnosis is recognized by pro-
fessional nursing associations and authorities in this field of medi-
cal care.2 Their approach to the problem is keyed to the actual
day-to-day practice of nursing, which recognizes the fact that nurses
must observe symptoms and conditions and act on their observations.
They define diagnosis as the utilization of intelligence to interpret
known facts, and acting upon the decision reached from this interpre-
tation. The differentiation of a "doctor's diagnosis" and a "nursing
diagnosis" is based on the courses of action open to each profession
after the decision from the observation is made. Nurses cannot pre-
scribe therapeutic measures or positive treatment; this is the sole
function of the doctor. However, the nurse can act to avoid further
complication or aggravation of the patient's condition based on her
observation of the symptoms present. It should be noted here that
most of these authorities believe the emergency exception to the
diagnosis prohibition allows the nurse to do all she deems necessary
and proper, including that which is normally only action allowed
a doctor.
The observation by the authors of nursing practices in Denver
revealed that the above "professional" definition of diagnosis was
the standard used between doctors and nurses. But, to reiterate, the
actual practice of nursing under this definition does not correspond
to the law of the State of Colorado.
Ironically, an admission that nurses make some type of diag-
nosis was also made in a paper entitled Saint Luke's Hospital -
Legal Aspects of Coronary Care." The paper approvingly quoted
a 1965 statement by the Cardiac Nurse Consultant of the Colorado
Department of Public Health:
1. It would appear that defibrillation may fall in the same category
as closed chest cardiac massage inasmuch as they both involve a
potential diagnosis. However, in an emergency a nurse may be
expected to make a diagnosis. Furthermore, if the medical staff
of any institution gives written consent and it is accepted as part
of the hospital routine, I would feel that the nurse is protected.
2. With the latest monitoring equipment and with proper teaching,
a nurse can identify on the cardioscope the particular pattern
which indicates ventricular fibrillation.
3. Experimentation being carried out today in specified intensive
units for coronary care indicate that immediate application of
emergency procedures, when necessary, has resulted in reversing
the pattern of death from ventricular fibrillation.
23
21 M. LESNIK & B. ANDERSON, NURSING PRACTICE AND THE LAW, 265-66 (2d ed.
1962).
22 Compiled by Marianne Boettner, R.N., Dec. 20, 1965, from a lecture by Audrey
Jones, R.N., Dec. 16, 1965 (received from Dr. Robert Liggett, Medical Director of
Education, Saint Luke's Hospital, Denver, Colorado).
23 Id. at 2.
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The admission that the intensive care nurse will make a "poten-
tial diagnosis" is not the only point of interest in the statement;
the defense of nursing conduct is hinged on the emergency exception.
The major problem with this defense is that the statutory prohibi-
tion against the unlicensed practice of medicine limits the emergency
exception to the "gratuitous rendering of services in cases of emer-
gency."24 Since the intensive care ward nurse is a salaried employee
of the hospital, the probability of convincing a court to apply the
exception to her is almost nil. The inescapable conclusion is that
this defense is not available in this situation.
Furthermore, the treatment of a patient in the intensive care
unit is at best a planned emergency because the only unforeseen
element is the time of the cardiac arrest. The person to be stricken
by the emergency, the place of the emergency, and the nature of the
emergency have all been anticipated and prepared for. The plan
of the intensive care unit is that when the patient is stricken a nurse
will initiate resuscitative measures. It is anticipated that no doctor
will be in the unit to make the initial decisions.
The final question about the intensive care unit is the legality
of standing orders. As the authors of Nursing Practice and the Law
indicate in the following passage, the problem is based upon an
interpretation of the meaning of diagnosis:
Great confusion prevails as to the validity of standing orders.
In effect, standing orders presume to constitute medical direction
for the execution of medical acts in the physician's absence. To the
extent that they constitute instructions for cases already diagnosed,
such orders are valid. Although no specific statute or judicial
decision may be cited, it would appear that such standing orders
should be signed by the attending physician.
To the extent that standing orders provide positive measures
for cases to be diagnosed, such orders are invalid. A physician may
not delegate the authority to diagnose, to treat or to prescribe. A
standing order for treatment of a headache or a cold is illegal,
since it presupposes a prescription based upon a diagnosis.
25
It appears that there are three uncertainties about the legality
of intensive care units in Colorado: whether the nurse is making a
diagnosis, whether the emergency exception applies, and whether
standing orders are legal. The Colorado authorities and the judicial
authorities of other states give no reassuring answer to ease these
uncertainties.
III. OBSERVATION OF DECISIONS MADE BY DENVER NURSES
One can hope that questions about the legality of intensive care
units are academic. However, the observations by the authors of
24 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9i-1-6(3) (b) (1963).
2 N. LESNIK & B. ANDERSON, supra note 21, at 281.
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this Note revealed that the same charge of making acts of diagnosis
could be leveled against the activities of other nurses in Denver.
Time was spent with two nurses from the Visiting Nurse Serv-
ice of the City of Denver. Nurses in this organization visit families
and individuals who have medical problems yet who cannot afford
private physicians. One such visit illustrates the acts the nurse per-
forms and the decisions she makes.
The Visiting Nurse called on a family that had recently mi-
grated to Denver from a neighboring state. The mother and her
three children were at home; the father was at work. The children
were all under the age of six and the mother was expecting another
child in two months. The mother complained about the poor heat-
ing in the house and said that the house temperature went rather
low at night. Because of the cold, the family slept and played in
the living room. The children had colds the week before but one
was feeling much better. One child who had been sleeping on the
couch woke up during the visit and complained of a sore throat.
After some coaxing the nurse was able to get the child to open her
mouth and let the nurse make an examination. The nurse said there
was an inflammation but it did not look too serious. The nurse
then counseled the mother on the need to keep shoes and clothes
on the children and the need to take them to the neighborhood
health center for inoculations. The nurse also said that the mother
herself should be examined by a doctor. The mother admitted that
it might be good for the children to get their shots, but she did not
want to be lectured by a doctor. However, she said she would take
the children to the health center even though she herself hated
pregnancy examinations.
The nurse in this visit evaluated the health of the children and
determined that none were seriously ill. Unfortunately, a doctor
will not review her decision because the mother's fear of a doctor's
lectures will probably overcome her good intentions.
Later that day, the Visiting Nurse went ahead and made an
appointment for the mother at the neighborhood health center.
Observation of activities at this center revealed that some nurses
who have received special instruction in pediatrics give children
physical examinations. The nurse, free from the supervision of a
doctor, evaluates among other things the condition of the child's
heartbeat, reflexes, eyes, ears and throat. A history of the health
of the child is taken from the mother. Based on these indications
the nurse evaluates the health of the child. She may judge that the
child's health is satisfactory. She may judge that the child has a
health problem but that the immediate attention of a doctor is not
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needed. Finally, she may judge that the child is seriously ill and
that immediate medical attention is necessary.
Observations of the work of the Pediatric Nurse and the Visit-
ing Nurse demonstrate that the nurse must contemplate the possible
diseases indicated by the symptoms she observes. This is the basis
of her decision that the child is in good or poor health. However,
she does not attempt to ascertain a particular disease and hence her
actions would not come within a strict interpretation of the wording
of the Colorado statutory definition of diagnosis -ascertaining a
disease or ailment by its symptoms.
The most important aspect of the nurse's activity is her evalua-
tion of the person's condition. That conclusion temporarily deter-
mines whether there will or will not be future medical treatment.
However, this activity does not distinguish the Pediatric or Visiting
Nurse from other nurses with more traditional responsibilities. The
nurse on the hospital floor who thinks that a patient's complaints
do not merit a doctor's attention is making a similar evaluation or,
perhaps, diagnosis.
IV. THE NURSE'S STANDARD OF CARE
The Colorado nurse's legal problems are complicated further
by the civil liability imposed upon her for any acts of negligence
done in performance of her nursing duties. As noted above, if she
does an act determined later to be diagnosis, she has committed a
misdemeanor and is subject to a fine of up to $500.26 Furthermore,
she would probably have her license to practice professional nursing
revoked. 21 However, the duty of care imposed on nurses requires
them to do acts and to make decisions which some courts have held
to be acts of diagnosis.
This duty of care or standard of skill imposed on the nurse by
the law generally requires that the nurse exercise ordinary and rea-
sonable care to see that no unnecessary harm befalls her patient.
28
More specifically, a nurse must apply that same degree of skill,
learning, and care in treating the sick and wounded similarly suffer-
ing in the same or a similar community. 29 The problems with diag-
26 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 97-1-25(1),(2)(1963).
27 d. § 97-1-21.
28Oldis v. La Societe Francaise De Bienfaisance Mutuelle De Los Angeles, 130 Cal.
App. 2d 461, 279 P.2d 184 (1955); Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. App. 2d 486,
154 P.2d 687 (1944). This standard of care applies to both licensed professional
nurses and any unlicensed person who acts in a nursing capacity or undertakes to
render nursing services. Griffin v. Colusa County, 44 Cal. App. 2d 915, 113 P.2d 270
(1941) ; Christensen v. Des Moines Still College of Osteopathy & Surgery, 248 Iowa
810, 82 N.W.2d 741 (1957).
29 Cooper v. National Motor Bearing Co., 136 Cal. App. 2d 229, 288 P.2d 581 (1955);
Valentin v. La Societe Francaise De Bienfaisance Mutuelle De Los Angeles, 76 Cal.




nosis arise under this community-standard-of-care test because a
nurse has a duty to act upon her observations of symptoms and
reactions to the extent of her skill, knowledge, and authority.8"
There are numerous examples of imposition of liability upon
nurses for failure to act upon this observational duty, which has
been termed a "nursing diagnosis," or for failure to observe at all."1
The nurse making such a "nursing diagnosis" must employ reason-
able care in judging the seriousness of the symptoms to determine
what action must be taken. 2
Thus, the nurse in Colorado is caught in the middle of con-
flicting legal responsibilities. In performing her duties of observa-
tion of symptoms, she may be guilty of making a medical diagnosis.8 8
Yet, if she fails to do this duty, or does it incorrectly, she is subject
to liability under laws of negligence or malpractice. To allow such
an uncertain situation as this to exist in a day of expanding health
services and care is indefensible and must be corrected.
V. A CONSTITUTIONAL DEFENSE
The dilemma resulting from negligence law, which requires a
nurse to make judgments that border dangerously close to the nebu-
lous concept of diagnosis, opens the provision prohibiting diagnosis
to the constitutional attack of being void for vagueness. In describ-
ing this doctrine, the United States Supreme Court has said that a
criminal statute must be "sufficiently explicit to inform those who
are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable
to its penalties .... [Al statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application
violates the first essential of due process of law."'34 Since the viola-
tion of the diagnosis prohibition is a misdemeanor, the Court's lan-
guage has direct applicability to the nurse's situation in Colorado.
One type of statute that is particularly vulnerable to the charge
of unconstitutional vagueness is a statute that inhibits free speech.
30 Burns v. Bakelite Corp., 17 N.J. Super. 441, 86 A.2d 289 (1952).
31 See Cooper v. National Motor Bearing Co., 136 Cal. App. 2d 229. 288 P.2d 581
(1955) ; Valentin v. La Societe Francaise De Bienfaisance Mutuelle De Los Angeles,
76 Cal. App. 2d 1, 172 P.2d 359 (1946); Palmer v. Clarksdale Hosp., 213 Miss.
601, 57 So. 2d 473 (1952) ; Wismer v. Syracuse Memorial Hosp., 274 App. Div.
1074, 86 N.Y.S.2d 150 (1949).
32 Burns v. Bakelite Corp., 17 N.J. Super. 441, 86 A.2d 289 (1952). It should be
noted here that the normal nurse's malpractice insurance policy provides coverage
for negligence or malpractice in a nursing diagnosis, but does not cover malpractice in
a medical diagnosis. The latter is termed an illegal practice of medicine which is a
criminal act in most states. M. LESNIK & B. ANDERSON, supra note 21, at 290-91.
33 The uncertainty surrounding the definition of "diagnosis" might not apply to the
Colorado situation because of the Attorney General's opinion that nurses cannot make
even a tentative diagnosis. Letter from Duke W. Dunbar, supra note 12.
3 4 Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
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Mr. Justice Brennan has said that "stricter standards of permissible
statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potentially
inhibiting effect on speech; a man may the less be required to act
at his peril here, because the free dissemination of ideas may be the
loser."35 The doctrine that a statute is unconstitutional because of
indefiniteness has been developed to create an "insulating buffer
zone of added protection" for the Bill of Rights freedoms. 6
The dilemma of the Colorado nurse who must chart a course
of action between a vague criminal statute and the responsibilities
imposed by negligence law is even more intolerable than the dilemma
of a person whose free speech is infringed by a vague statutory
prohibition. People do not pay damages for failing to exercise the
right of free speech. People also do not lose their license to prac-
tice their chosen profession by acting in accordance with their first
amendment rights. Therefore, to apply the void-for-vagueness doc-
trine to the nurse's situation would be more than just, and possibly
the strongest defense to an action brought under the diagnosis
prohibition.
VI. A LEGAL RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM
While the void-for-vagueness defense would be applicable to
the nurse's situation, it is by no means the best solution to the prob-
lem. The diagnostic prohibition for nurses and nondoctors does
have a very legitimate reason for being -it protects the general
public from medical frauds by assuring that only licensed physicians
are allowed to diagnose and prescribe remedies for their physical
and mental ills. Complete elimination of the prohibition could
easily do more harm than good to all groups involved. Therefore,
a more workable solution is called for and fortunately is available.
Since the Colorado courts have not interpreted this section of
the Nurses Practice Act, any case brought under it would allow
them to adopt a definition of diagnosis which would insure ade-
quate protection of the nurses', the doctors', and the public's inter-
ests. It is the opinion of the authors that the professional definition
of diagnosis,37 the one used in actual nursing practice, provides the
best answer to the problem.
By defining diagnosis as the utilization of intelligence to in-
terpret known facts, the "nurse's diagnosis" is specifically included
as permissible conduct. Protection of the public and physicians would
come from the limitation on the nurse's action by the statutory pro-
35 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959).
36 Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV.
67 (1967).
37 See text following note 21 supra.
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hibition against her prescription of therapeutic or corrective meas-
ures. 38 The nurse's allowable area of action on her decision from
her "nursing diagnosis" could now be characterized as the preven-
tion of undue injury to the patient or aggravation of the patient's
condition.
Under this interpretation of diagnosis, the test for a nurse's lia-
bility for malpractice would be: Should the nurse have taken a course
of action - from those courses available to her - different from
that which she did adopt, based on her observations of the patient's
symptoms and reactions?39 This test has two major advantages over
previous definitions on nursing malpractice. First, it includes the
community-standards test common to malpractice law,40 but allows
for judicial raising of the standard to protect the public from the
possibility of outmoded and harmful nursing practices. Second, it
provides a means of separating the questions of whether the nurse's
actions constituted the illegal practice of medicine or the negligent
practice of nursing, for the test for the former would now be: Was
the course of action adopted by the nurse available to her under the
prescription of therapeutic or corrective measures prohibition? This
is particularly important in light of present nurses' malpractice in-
surance practices.
4 '
One of the main shortcomings of this proposed solution is the
fact it relies upon a suit against a nurse involving the diagnosis
prohibition of the Act. If no suit is instituted, the present uncertain
situation must stand uncorrected. While nurses have not been prose-
cuted under the present state of the law, there is obviously no guar-
antee that a situation could arise in the future which would warrant
such a suit. Thus, the final recourse may have to be with the state
legislature and a change of the language of the statute itself.
VII. A NECESSARY STATUTORY CHANGE?
The language of the diagnosis prohibition prevents the nurse
from making any act of diagnosis, and has been interpreted to mean
just that by the Attorney General.42 However, it is arguably possible
to reach the proposed solution of the nurse's dilemma under this
prohibition without changing the wording of the statute.
3 8 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 97-1-2(1) (1963).
39 This test has been followed but not specifically enunciated in Burns v. Bakelite
Corp., 17 N.J. Super. 441, 86 A.2d 289 (1952), and in Cooper v. National Motor
Bearing Co., 136 Cal. App. 2d 229, 288 P.2d 581 (1955).
40 Although the community-standards doctrine is currently being questioned and in some
cases overruled as applied to physicians and surgeons, the authors feel the test still
has validity when applied to professional nursing. See Brune v. Belinkoff, 235
N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1968).
41 See note 32 supra.
42 Letter from Duke W. Dunbar, supra note 12.
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Using the proposed definition of diagnosis,43 it can be argued
that the prohibition actually prevents the nurse from doing anything
at all under her duty to observe symptoms and reactions. This would
eliminate one of the nurse's major functions and place the intoler-
able burden on the physicians of constantly checking all their pa-
tients. Since this is entirely unworkable, the question becomes one
of interpreting the statute to make all of its sections and language
effective and operative. Because it is inconceivable that the legisla-
ture intended this result when the statute was enacted, the solution
outlined above would be available to a judge interpreting the statute.
This method of instituting the necessary change is unsure at
best. There is no question that amendment of the statute would be
a far more effective and safe method of controlling the changes to
be made. The simplest way to do this would be to reword the statute
to say, "the practice of professional nursing ... shall not be deemed
to include the prescription of therapeutic or corrective measures from
any act of diagnosis," and then define diagnosis in the statutes to
mean the utilization of intelligence to interpret known facts. If
necessary, specific courses of action available to the nurse, based
upon the degree of skill, training, and knowledge the particular
type of nurse has acquired, could be enumerated for further protec-
tion of the public. Further refinements could be worked out by the
courts as the need for them arises.
CONCLUSION
The City of Denver's nurses are involved in a number of pro-
grams which arguably violate the Attorney General's interpretation
of the statute. The value of these programs is great, and the dis-
service done to the public if they were discontinued by a suit under
the diagnostic prohibition would be greater. We live in a time of
rapidly expanding health and medical services - both public and
private. Many areas do not have enough physicians to handle the
increased workload, so the burden is being shifted down to the next
best trained group -the nurses. The Denver projects discussed in
this Note are good examples of this expansion of nurse's responsi-
bility to free the physicians for more important tasks.
The authors believe that the nurses involved with these proj-
ects do an excellent job and are an invaluable service to the people
of the city and state. It would be a public disgrace to halt these proj-
ects under the diagnostic prohibition - an outmoded, although well
intentioned law. The projects will continue as before without a
change in the law, but the uncertainty it causes does not contribute
43 See text following note 21 supra.
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to the effectiveness of the programs. We feel that the adoption of
the changes in the law which were suggested in this Note would
remove the uncertainty surrounding these projects and allow for





G. G. Alan Vaughan
RIPPEY V.
DENVER UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK
AND THE
TRUSTEE'S DUTY OF UNDIVIDED LOYALTY
INTRODUCTION
O N October 16, 1967, Judge William E. Doyle of the United
States District Court, District of Colorado, handed down his
decision in the case of Rip pey v. Denver United States National
Bank.' Although the case was marked by protracted legal maneuver-
ing and heated litigation, the decision was not appealed from the
trial court. Thus ended a bitterly contested legal battle over which
control of The Denver Post hung in the balance.
The dispute arose when the Denver United States National
Bank, trustee of the Agnes Reid Tammen Testamentary Trust, sold
a block of shares of its Denver Post stock in a lot large enough to
determine who would have controlling interest in the newspaper.
The trustee took into consideration the interests of a third person
not standing as a beneficiary of the trust -The Denver Post-
and in so doing sold the stock to a buyer who offered less than the
best possible price. The terms of the trust authorized the trustee to
consider what was best for the Post in making a sale. Nevertheless,
the court held that the trustee had clearly breached its duty of loy-
alty to the beneficiaries of the trust by so doing. The trustee was
surcharged over two and a half million dollars for the breach.
The Rippey case is now precedent and, considering the judicial
ability and respected position of the court, it is strong precedent at
that. The ruling that the trustee breached its duty of loyalty by
considering the interests of a third person, even though the trust
terms authorized weighing this factor, has had a profound effect
among Colorado trustees. Indeed, the implications for all fiduciaries
and trustees are unsettling.
The immediate result of the Rippey decision has been to prompt
fiduciaries to administer their trusts with more caution than before.
Frequently, this will mean that trustees will seek instructions from
a court prior to taking any action which might be questioned, where
before they would have acted on their own initiative. Such court
proceedings are in themselves costly. The long range result will
surely be to make the entire activity of trust administration more
1 273 F. Supp. 718 (D. Colo. 1967).
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conservative. This will not be a welcome result in an area of the
law where overly conservative management is traditional and deeply
ingrained. The pressures which already bear on trustees to make a
totally safe decision deny beneficiaries the fair return on the trust
capital which sound management could and should produce.2 In
fact, it may be fair to say that trust beneficiaries, as a whole, lose
more financially by overly cautious management than by reasonable
freedom of action in the administration of their trust.
3
The purpose of this Note, therefore, is to examine the sound-
ness of applying the time-honored rule of undivided loyalty to a
situation in which the trust terms authorized and even required
something less than one-sided loyalty to the trust beneficiaries. No
dispute is made with the factual determinations and the overall
result of the Rippey decision; nor is it the purpose of this article to
address the many additional points of trust law therein considered.
In order to supplement the discussion of the undivided loyalty
rule, this article will also consider some of the policies which give
rise to the strictness of the rule and will examine how other courts
have generally viewed the rule. Finally, this article proposes an
alternative construction of the undivided loyalty rule and suggests
that the solution to this perplexing problem in trust management
might come by way of legislative enactment.
No one quarrels with continuing stringent legal vigilance over
the fiduciary. Indeed, the very nature of the relationship demands
that high standards be maintained. However, these strict rules must
be carefully applied. The fiduciary in general and the trustee spe-
cifically play a prominant role in our society and the importance of
that role seems to be continuously growing. With this in mind, it
becomes apparent that the fiduciary must not be hampered by limi-
tations which are too severe to allow efficient trust administration,
thereby thwarting the intent of the settlor.
I. APPLICATION OF THE UNDIVIDED LOYALTY RULE
To consider the Doyle court's application of the undivided loy-
alty rule, the trustee's situation must be presented. The settlor em-
powered the trustee to sell any or all of the trust property, which
consisted of controlling shares of common stock in The Denver Post,
and provided that in exercising this power the trustee was to con-
2 See the Colorado Fiduciaries' Powers Act. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-8-1 to -8-8
(Supp. 1967), as an indication that the Colorado legislature recognizes this problem
and has attempted to encourage more progressive and sound management, in part by
allowing greater self-regulation by the trustees themselves.
3 See Niles, The Divided-Loyalty Rule, 91 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 734, 737-38 (1952).
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sider the best interests of The Denver Post.4 The Denver Post was
not a trust beneficiary. The settlor's intent appears to have been
to have this stock sold in a way which would ensure continuous
local control over the newspaper.6 The settlor, no doubt, thought
that local control would be in the best interest of the Post with re-
sulting benefit passed along to the beneficiaries of the trust.'
When the trustee felt it necessary to sell most of this stock,
local control was obviously one of the factors considered. As a re-
sult, the trustee found himself in a position of conflict of interest.
He could sell to an outsider for a greater sum or maintain local
control by selling for a lesser sum.7 The trustee chose the latter
alternative and the result was held by the court to be a breach of
its duty of undivided loyalty.
The court recognized that this was not a case of self-dealing
whereby the trustee obtained or was in a position to obtain benefit
from an unlawful utilization of his fiduciary relationship.' The
court did, however, after citing the general rule of a trustee's duty
of loyalty,9 state without equivocation:
It is, of course, obvious that a fiduciary cannot allow personal
motives to interfere with the discharge of its fiduciary duties. It
cannot favor the interests of third persons and subordinate the
interests of its beneficiaries as it did here and this duty is not modi-
fied by the provision of Article IV of the will which allows the
trustees to enter into stockholder agreements limiting the sale of
stock when such agreements would, in the sole judgment of the
trustee, "promote the best interest of said company or companies
[The Denver Post] and the beneficiaries in this Article named, and
procure the best price for said stock in the event of the sale
thereof."10
The court's pronouncement thus far seems clear; the duty of un-
4 The trust provision reads:
"1. To vote said stock and exercise all rights pertaining thereto, with
full control and dominion over the same, and to enter into any lawful
voting trust or agreement or agreements with other stockholders of said
company or companies (The Denver Post] ...which in the sole judgment
of the said Trustee will promote the best interest of the said company or
companies and beneficiaries in this Article named, and procure the best price
for said stock in the event of the sale thereof.
Rippey v. Denver United States Nat'l Bank, 273 F. Supp. 718, 724 (D. Colo. 1967).
While the power of sale appears here to be discretionary, its manner is prescribed.
See discussion note 36 infra.
5 Rippey v. Denver United States Nat'l Bank, 273 F. Supp. 718, 723, 732-33 (D. Colo.
1967).
6 This conclusion is drawn by this writer as a result of an examination of the file on
the Rippey case lodged in the United States District Court, District of Colorado.
7 Although the price obtained was less than that obtainable, it is arguably "reasonable"
nonetheless. See discussion note 39 infra.
6Rippey v. Denver United States Nat'l Bank, 273 F. Supp. 718, 735 (D. Colo. 1967).
"Conflict of interest" and "self-dealing" are distinguished in note 13 infra.
9 Rippey v. Denver United States Nat'l Bank, 273 F. Supp. 718, 737 (D. Colo. 1967).
10 1d. at 738 (emphasis added).
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divided loyalty cannot be modified by a trust term granting to the
trustee the power to consider the interests of third persons. But the
court continues:
While this provision allowed the trustee to consider the interests
of the Post, it did not empower it to disregard the interests of its
beneficiaries. In any kind of balancing of interests under this clause
the beneficiaries' interests must prevail."
There appears to be an internal inconsistency in this statement.
On the one hand, the trustee is given power by the settlor to con-
sider the interests of a third person. Indeed, by virtue of such a
term the trustee is under a duty to do so. 12 On the other hand, the
exercise of this power and the discharge of this duty will inevitably
result in a breach of the trustee's duty of loyalty to his beneficiary.
In other words, the Rippey case seems to stand for the unfamiliar
proposition that the trustee's duty of loyalty to the trust beneficiary
is absolute and cannot be modified by the terms of the trust. It is
submitted that this construction departs from prior, well-established
interpretations of the undivided loyalty rule.
II. CONSIDERATION OF INTERESTS OF THIRD PERSONS
There are literally hundreds of reported cases which consider
the question of self-dealing and conflict of interest within the con-
text of a trustee's duty of loyalty.'3  With few exceptions, these
cases, the commentators, and the law review writers fail to consider
the specific question of whether a settlor may validly provide that
a trustee is to consider the interests of third persons in the adminis-
tration of his trust. There is also no consideration of the trustee's
duty to carry out such trust terms.1
4
A trustee's duty of loyalty arises as a result of the creation of
the trust; it exists because of the fiduciary relationship.' 5 The settlor
need not expressly provide for it via trust terms. 16 In considering
11Id.
12 See text accompanying notes 30-33 infra.
13 A distinction must immediately be drawn between "self-dealing," whereby a trustee
profits or gains something by way of his fiduciary relationship or stands to do so,
as would be the case in a sale of his own property to the trust, and "conflict of
interest," whereby the trustee finds himself to be in the position of consideration of
interests other than the beneficiary's. Conflict of interest is the broader term encom-
passing self-dealing. The latter is the subject of greater judicial condemnation.
Fletcher, Divided Loyalty and Self-Dealing, 94 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 234 (1955);
Niles, The Divided-Loyalty Rule, 91 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 734 (1952).
"iThe authorities considered in notes 15-22 infra, illustrate how courts and authors
alike cite basic trust rules without drawing them together to properly conclude that
a settlor may include a term in the trust instrument allowing the trustee to consider
the interests of third parties without breaching his duty of undivided loyalty, the settlor
thereby modifying the trustee's duty of loyalty.
15 2 A. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 170, at 1193 (2d ed. 1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 170 (1959).
16 2 A. SCOTT, supra note 15.
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any alleged breach of this duty, courts uniformly proclaim what
writers on the subject also proclaim- the most fundamental duty
that a trustee owes to his beneficiary is the duty of undivided loy-
alty.'" The nature of the fiduciary relationship demands the duty
of loyalty because (1) the relationship lends itself to secret exploita-
tion of the trust res by the trustee; (2) human nature indicates that
where a conflict of interest exists the trustee may well favor his
own interest in a situation of self-dealing, or his judgment may be
biased adversely to the beneficiary's interest; and (3) the chance
of discovering such conflict is remote."8 Thus, the courts have
adopted an extremely strict attitude towards the trustee when any
conflict of interest is found.' 9 This attitude is clearly illustrated
by Mr. Justice Cardozo's now famous statement in the case of
Meinhard v. Salmon:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary
ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the
market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has
developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompro-
mising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when
petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "dis-
integrating erosion" of particular exceptions.... Only thus has the
level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that
trodden by the crowd.
20
Such an "unbending and inveterate" tradition of "uncompro-
mising rigidity" often prevents further inquiry into any given case.
As soon as any conflict of interest comes to the attention of the
courts, they generally refuse to hear any excuses or defenses, 21 and
the trustee is held liable for any loss to the trust estate regardless
of whether there is any direct causal relation between the breach
and the loss.
The duty of loyalty as generally viewed by the courts and com-
mentators is stated in the following manner: a trustee must adminis-
17 Vest v. BVison, 365 Mo. 1103, 293 S.W.2d 369 (1956); In re Hammer's Estate,
23 Milsc. 2d 362, 198 N.Y.S.2d 689 (Sur. Ct. 1960), rezid on other grounds, 16 App.
Div. 2d 111, 225 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1962); 3 G. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 543 (1960);
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959); 2 A. SCOTT, supra note 15;
Hoover, Basic Principles Underlying Duty of Loyalty, 5 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 7
(1956); Scott, The Fiduciary Principle. 37 CALIF. L. REV. 539 (1949); Scott, The
Trustee's Duty of Loyalty, 49 HARV. L. REV. 521 (1935-36).
18 Hoover. sup ra note 17, at 10.
191d. at 14.
20 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
21 For example, Hoover, supra note 17, lists over fifteen defenses, such as "good faith"
and "action benefiting the trust" which are summarily discarded once a conflict
of interest is shown. Another example is the "no further inquiry rule" of New York,
essentially synonymous with the point made by Mr. Hoover, except with this latter
rule, if a conflict of interest only as opposed to self-dealing is shown, the court
may consider other circumstances such as good faith. Niles, supra note 13.
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ter his trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary; he must exclude
all self-interest, as well as all consideration of the welfare of third
persons; he is prohibited from placing himself in a position in which
interests of his own or of others conflict or may possibly conflict
with the interest of the trust; he must at all times render a dis-
interested judgment in trust affairs.
22
Nowhere in this statement of the rule or in the cases is it stated
that the settlor is prohibited from modifying this duty of loyalty. 3
Quite to the contrary, the commentators and cases agree that the
settlor by the terms2" of his trust instrument may permit the trustee
to do what, in the absence of such a provision or a provision that
is illegal or contrary to public policy,25 would be a violation of the
2 Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., 220 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Brown v. McLana-
han, 148 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1945); Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. Humphrys,
97 F.2d 849 (6th Cir. 1938) ; Hardy v. Hardy, 217 Ark. 333, 230 S.W.2d 6 (1950) ;
Vokal's Estate, 121 Cal. App. 2d 25, 263 P.2d 64 (1953) ; Zottarelli v. Pacific
States Say. & Loan Co., 94 Cal. App. 2d 480, 211 P.2d 23 (1949) ; Glengary Consol.
Mining Co. v. Boehmer, 28 Colo. 1, 62 P. 832 (1900) ; Conway v. Emeny, 139 Conn.
612, 96 A.2d 221 (1953) ; Stiner v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 47 Hawaii 548, 393 P.2d
96 (1964) ; Anderson v. Bean, 272 Mass. 432, 172 N.E. 647 (1930) ; Detroit Trust
Co. v. Mason, 309 Mich. 281, 15 N.W.2d 475 (1944); Morrison v. Asher, 361
S.W.2d 844 (Mo. 1962) ; City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Cannon, 291 N.Y. 125,
51 N.E.2d 674 (1943); In re Hammer's Estate, 23 Misc. 2d 362, 198 N.Y.S.2d
689 (1960); Dombey v. Rindsfoos, 105 Ohio App. 335, 151 N.E.2d 563 (1958);
Muth v. Maxton, 68 Ohio L. Abs. 164, 119 N.E.2d 162 (1954) ; Bolton v. Stillwagon,
410 Pa. 618, 190 A.2d 105 (1963) ; In re Noonan's Estate, 163 Pa. Super. 70, 60
A.2d 374 (1948); 3 G. BOGERT, supra note 17; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 170 (1959); 2 A. SCOTT, supra note 15; Hoover, supra note 17; Scott,
The Fiduciary Principle, supra note 17; Scott, The Trustee's Duty of Loyalty, supra
note 17.
23 Some courts have taken a position closely aligned with that of the Rippey court. Their
reasoning is that while a lawful power may be granted to a trustee, he cannot exercise
it in a way that is detrimental to the beneficiary. For example, in Brown v. McLana-
han, 148 F.2d 703, 709 (4th Cir. 1945), the court stated, "The ... breach of trust
of one who occupies a fiduciary relation while in the exercise of a lawful power is
as fatal in equity to the resultant act or contract as the absence of the power." See
also Report of Subcommittee on the Outer Limits of Trustee Powers, 101 TRUSTS
AND ESTATES 953, 954 (1962).
24 Since the extent and nature of a trustee's powers and duties are determined by the
"terms of the trust," it would be well to define what is meant by the phrase. The
terms of the trust are the "manifestation of the intention of the settlor with respect to
the trust, expressed in a manner which admits of its proof in judicial proceedings,
whether expressed by written or spoken words or by other conduct." 2 A. SCOTT,
supra note 15, at § 164.1.
25 Wolfer v. National City Bank, 189 Misc. 711, 68 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. 1947),
held that it is not contrary to public policy to allow the settlor to provide that a trustee
may consider interests in conflict with the interests of the beneficiary, nor is it
contrary to public policy to give effect to such a provision in his trust administration.
Morris v. The Broadview, Inc., 328 II1. App. 267, 65 N.E.2d 605, 608 (1946), held
that it is in the public interest not to impair the freedom of contract unless clearly
contrary to public policy or law; a trust provision granting a trustee the power to
deal with trust certificates for the trust and to own them for his own account is not
contrary to public policy. The court stated, "[A]nyone competent to contract may
make such disposition of the legal title to his property as he pleases, may annex such
conditions and limitations to its enjoyment as he chooses, and may vest it in trustees
for the purpose of carrying out his intention." See also 2 A. SCOTT, supra note 15,




trustee's duty of loyalty.26 Thus, the cases hold that a settlor may
allow a trustee to self-deal.2 7 Indeed, some cases have gone so far
as to find an implied trust term allowing self-dealing.2" As noted,29
self-dealing is condemned to a greater degree than conflict of inter-
est, and a settlor's term allowing consideration of a third party's
interest creates a situation of the less rigid conflict of interest, not
of self-dealing.
A trust provision allowing limited self-dealing constitutes only
one aspect of the broader principle that the nature and extent of
the trustee's powers and duties3" are determined by the terms of
the trust; 3 ' and further, that the trustee is under a duty" to carry
out the terms of the trust and thereby manifest the intention and
purpose of the settlor, limited, of course, by illegality and public
policy. 3
2 8 Rosencrans v. Fry, 12 N.J. 88, 95 A.2d 905 (1953) ; In re Durston's Will, 297 N.Y.
64, 74 N.E.2d 310 (1947); Appeal of Burke, 378 Pa. 616, 108 A.2d 58 (1954);
Dallas Dome Wyoming Oil Fields Co. v. Brooder, 55 Wyo. 109, 97 P.2d 311 (1939);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170, comment s at 372 (1959); 2 A. SCOTT,
supra note 15, §§ 164, 170.9; Niles, supra note 13, at 736; Report of Subcommittee,
supra note 23; Scott, The Trustee's Duty of Loyalty, supra note 17.
27 Morris v. The Broadview, Inc., 328 I1. App. 267, 65 N.E.2d 605 (1946); Boston
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Lewis, 317 Mass. 137, 57 N.E.2d 638 (1944) ; Appeal
of Burke, 378 Pa. 616, 108 A.2d 58 (1954) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 170, comment t at 372 (1959).
28 In re Flagg's Estate, 365 Pa. 82, 73 A.2d 411 (1950). The court held that the
testator impliedly contemplated self-dealing, thus modifying an otherwise absolute
duty. The court thought it unimportant that authority to engage in self-dealing was
implied rather than explicit. Accord, Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Lewis, 317
Mass. 137, 57 N.E.2d 638 (1944).
29 See discussion note 13, supra.
30 A settlor may grant to a trustee the "power" to self-deal or to consider third party
interests. In so doing he modifies the trustee's "duty" of undivided loyalty towards
the beneficiary. Because the "duty" of loyalty is thus modified, an exercise by the
trustee of the above power (reasonably and in good faith, of course) cannot be a
breach of trust.
31 In re Schuster's Estate, 35 Ariz. 475, 281 P. 38 (1929) ; In re Hartzell's Will, 43 Ill.
App. 2d 118, 192 N.E.2d 697 (1963) ; Oak Investment Corp. v. Martin, 107 N.j.
Eq. 123, 151 A. 874 (1930) ; 2 A. ScOTT, supra note 15, § 164.1.
32 Conway v. Emeny, 139 Conn. 612, 96 A.2d 221, 225 (1953). The court stated:
"It was the duty of the trustees to conferm strictly to the directions which the
testatrix gave. . . . [The] obligation to obey the instructions of the donor of the trust
ir the cornerstone upon which all other duties rest." (emphasis added). In In re
Hughes' Will, 241 Wis. 257, 5 N.W.2d 791 (1942), it was pointed out that the
trustee represents both the settlor and the cestui and owes a "duty" to administer
the trust in accordance with the trust terms.
33 When the terms of a trust instrument are clear and unmistakable and capable of
being carried out, there is no doubt that it is the trustee's duty to follow such explicit
directions, which constitute the written expression of the trustor's intent. Reedy v.
Johnson's Estate, 200 Miss. 18, 26 So.2d 685 (1946); accord, Tait v. Anderson
Banking Co., 171 F. Supp. 3 (S.D. Ind. 1959) ; In re Ferrall's Estate, 41 Cal. 2d 166,
258 P.2d 1009 (1953) ; Walker v. Doak, 210 Cal. 30, 290 P. 290 (1930) ; Union
Bank & Trust Co. v. McColgan, 84 Cal. App. 2d 208, 190 P.2d 42 (1948) ; Robison
v. Elston Bank & Trust Co., 113 Ind. App. 633, 48 N.E.2d 181 (1943) ; In re Mar-
ble, 136 Me. 52, 1 A.2d 355 (1938) ; McDaniel v. Hughes, 206 Md. 206, 111 A.2d
204 (1955); Hughes v. McDaniel, 202 Md. 626, 98 A.2d 1 (1953) ; Sword v.
Marquette Nat'l Bank, 252 Minn. 544, 91 N.W.2d 75 (1958) ; St. Louis Union Trust
Co. v. Ghio, 240 Mo. App. 1033, 222 S.W.2d 556 (1949) ; In re Cook's Will, 136
N.J. Eq. 123, 40 A.2d 805 (1945); In re Buckelew's Estate, 128 N.J. Eq. 81, 13
A.2d 855 (1940).
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It may be argued that if the trust provision is made discre-
tionary as opposed to mandatory 4 the trustee is not under a duty
to exercise this discretion. Rather, if such an exercise of discretion
would be contrary to the rule of undivided loyalty, he is under a
duty not to exercise that discretion.
The statements of the rule, however, are not so limited." For
example, if the trustee is given discretion to sell trust property as
in the Rippey case, he must exercise that discretion in the manner
prescribed by the terms of the trust in order to completely manifest
the intention and purposes of the settlor."6 He must act in that state
of mind in which the settlor contemplated he would act.
3 7
Thus, the trustee has two primary duties: (1) the duty to carry
out the terms of the trust and (2) the duty of loyalty. The trustee
is in effect a middleman. He represents both the settlor and the
beneficiary.38 Because the nature and extent of the trustee's powers
34 See 3 G. BOGERT, supra note 17, at § 552. In stating the rule that the trustee must
carry out the directions of the settlor exactly, in order to manifest his intent and
purpose, at least one court qualified the rule by saying in effect, in the absence of
discretion the trustee must comply strictly with the trust terms. Bryson v. Bryson,
62 Cal. App. 170, 216 P. 391 (1923).
35 Carter v. Rolland, 11 Humph. 333, 338 (Tenn. 1850), stated, "The powers, duties
and responsibilities of trustees necessarily vary with the directions, limitations and
restrictions contained in the instrument under which they assume to act; their general
duty is, to do whatever may be necessary and proper, to give effect to the purposes
contemplated by the trust; the intention of the instrument is to guide their action
and to protect them in the performance of their duty." It is stated in 4 J. POMEROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1062 (5th ed. 1941): "The trust itself, whatever it be,
constitutes the charter of the trustee's powers and duties; from it he derives the
rule of his conduct; it prescribes the extent and limits of his authority; it furnishes
the measure of his obligations. If the trust is express, created by deed or by will,
then the provisions of the instrument must be followed and obeyed." (Footnote
omitted.]
3
6Nashville Trust Co. v. Lebeck, 197 Tenn. 164, 270 S.W.2d 470, 475 (1954) (where
the settlor of a trust directs the trustee to dispose of property by sale in a certain
prescribed manner and that direction violates no positive rule of law, the trustee
must carry out the settlor's intention) ; accord, Crutcher v. Joyce, 134 F.2d 809, 816
(10th Cir. 1943), stating, "The provisions of a trust fixing the mode, the time, and
the conditions for the execution of the powers are exclusive of others, if not forbidden
by law or public policy." [Emphasis added.] In Welch v. Mann's Ex'r, 261 Ky. 470,
88 S.W.2d 1, 3 (1935), the court stated: "When the mode of executing a power is
definitely prescribed by the creator, the trustee or donee is without authority to
employ a different method, and any attempt to do so is void." See Loftin v. Kenan,
155 Misc. 552, 280 N.Y.S. 28 (Sup. Ct. 1935) (trust for 21 years for the purpose
of "keeping together" a railroad was given effect) ; Berry v. McCourt, 1 Ohio App.
2d 172, 204 N.E.2d 235 (1965) (settlor's intention to keep a business in the family
and under family control for as long as possible must be effectuated). But see In re
Pulitzer's Estate, 139 Misc. 575, 249 N.Y.S. 87 (Sur. Ct. 1931), wherein a trust
term stating settlor's intention to preserve a newspaper, forbidding a sale thereof,
was subordinated to the presumed intention to benefit the cestuis que trustent.
Extreme circumstances were deemed to necessitate this intervention of equitable
judicial power. Note, however, the caveat to the exercise of this equitable power in
Russell v. Russell, 109 Conn. 187, 145 A. 648, 652 (1929), where the court stated:
"(lit should be most carefully and sparingly used, and it is to be borne in mind that
it is the necessity of the situation which brings it into operation, not the mere fact
that thereby the estate may be administered in a way which will be more advantageous
to its beneficiaries." [Emphasis added.)
3
7In re Ferrall's Estate, 41 Cal. 2d 166, 258 P.2d 1009 (1953); Read v. Ringsby, 156
Neb. 33, 54 N.W.2d 318 (1952) ; 2 A. SCOTT, supra note 15, § 187.
381, re Hughes Will, 241 Wis. 257, 5 N.W.2d 791 (1942).
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and duties are defined by the trust terms, because by these terms the
settlor can modify the trustee's duty of loyalty, and because the
trustee is under a duty to carry out the terms of the trust in the pre-
scribed manner, it is this writer's conclusion that the settlor may by
a trust term validly empower the trustee to consider the interests of
third persons. The duty of undivided loyalty, which the trustee
otherwise owes to the beneficiary, can therefore be modified. Any
reasonable 9 action taken by the trustee whereby the interests of
third persons are considered in dealing with trust property should
not be deemed a breach of trust.
The foregoing principles are squarely set out in the case of
Wolfer v. National City Bank.40  This case is one of the few to
clearly and logically consider the issue; consequently, it is quoted
at length in the body of this text. The court stated:
The standard of loyalty for fiduciary relations does not permit
a trustee to create or to occupy a position in which he has interests
to serve other than the interest of the trust estate. Undivided loyalty
is the supreme test. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164
N.E. 545, 546, 62 A.L.R. 1. Plaintiffs urge that the defendant by
permitting its securities affiliate, the Company, to participate in the
selection of securities to be included in the trust, placed itself in a
position of divided loyalty as a matter of law....
It is well settled in this state, however, that a settlor of a trust
has the right to select the agencies by which his bounty is to be
distributed and to impose the terms and conditions under which it
is done. Denike v. Harris, 84 N.Y. 89, 94; Crabb v. Young, 92
N.Y. 56, 65; Matter of Balfe, 245 App. Div. 22, 280 N.Y.S. 128,
130, 131. In the Balfe case, the Court, holding that there was no
basis for the surcharge of the corporate trustee, said, "the descedent
was willing that the trustee should act under conditions of divided
loyalty. He had the power and right to so provide. That which he
knowingly did with his own property did not impinge public
policy or involve the doing of anything malum in se or malum
prohibitum."
To the same effect are the rules of law expounded in the
Restatement of the Law of Trusts. Thus, Section 170, subdivision s:
"Terms of the Trust. By the terms of the trust the trustee
may be permitted to sell trust property to himself individually, or
as trustee to purchase property from himself individually, or to lend
to himself money held by him in trust, or otherwise to deal with
the trust property on his own account. The trustee violates his
duty to the beneficiary, however, if he acts in bad faith no matter
39 Braman v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 138 N.J. Eq. 165, 47 A.2d 10, 24
(1946), states that the trustee has a duty of loyalty to his beneficiary, "but that duty
does not justify him in acting against his own judgment, for the responsibility is
the trustee's and not the beneficiary's. 2 Scott on Trusts 856, sec. 170. 'As long as
he (a trustee) is not acting in his own interest the standard fixed for his behavior
is only that of a reasonable degree of care and skill and caution.' 2 Scott on Trusts,
909, sec. 170.25."
40 189 Misc. 711, 68 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
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how broad may be the provisions of the terms of the trust in con-
ferring power upon him to deal with the trust property on his own
account."
Though "uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of
courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of un-
divided loyalty" (Meinhard v. Salmon, supra) . . . this Court is
powerless to act where the trust agreement itself permits the "dis-
integrating erosion" of particular exceptions.
41
Finally, if the duty of loyalty can be modified, other duties of
the trustee owed to the beneficiary might be consequentially modi-




The basic policy question of the propriety of trust terms pro-
viding for the consideration of the interests of third persons in the
administration of a trust has seldom received comment. At this
point, it might be well to consider what are those policies as viewed
from the perspective of the settlor, the trustee, the beneficiary, the
third person, the courts, and the legislature.
First, consider the point of view of the beneficiary. Because of
the nature of the trust relationship, he is dependent upon the trustee
to administer the trust for his benefit. Naturally, he wants the
maximum benefit possible. Because of the nature of his relation-
ship to the trustee, he is often in need of court imposition of strict
rules of fiduciary law. Further, because of his position of disad-
vantage, the courts have been most strict with trustees to insure pro-
tection of the beneficiary's interest. But the beneficiary must re-
member that he owes his position of gain to the settlor's dispositive
motive.
Consider the settlor's point of view. He is making a disposi-
tion. By trust law, he has the right to control the entire disposition
of the property and its subsequent administration His intent and
purpose is paramount - thus, the trust agreement.
Now consider the trustee. By accepting the trust he undertakes
the duty of manifesting the purpose and intent of the settlor. He is
also under a duty to administer the trust in the best interest of his
beneficiary; but, the extent of this duty is dependent upon the trust
terms, and this duty of loyalty may be modified by the settlor's
4168 N.Y.S.2d at 215-16.
42 For an excellent discussion of this duty, albeit with reference to English law, see
Bodkin, Duty of Trustees for Sale to Obtain the Best Price, 14 CONVEYANCER AND
PROPERTY LAWYER 228 (1950).
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express provisions in the trust. The beneficiary can only expect the
trustee to follow the terms of the trust and manifest the settlor's
intent and purpose. If as a result of so doing, a third party's inter-
est is considered, the beneficiary should not be heard to complain,
and the trustee should be protected by the trust terms.43
What of the third party? He is not a trust beneficiary and thus
cannot invoke the aid of a court if the trustee disregards the instruc-
tions of the settlor by failing to consider his interests. While it is
outside the scope of this Note to do more than raise the issue, he
may have some possibility for relief under third-party-beneficiary-
contract theory.
Much has been said already of the "unbending and inveterate"
tradition of "uncompromising rigidity" of the courts.4 4 Some courts
might insist that the trustee, who discovers that the settlor has placed
him in a position of conflict of interest, petition for instruction.
The trustee will protect himself by such a petition,45 but an instruc-
tion which takes the position of the Rippey court would result only
in a frustration of the settlor's intent.46 A court cannot allow devia-
tion from the settlor's expressed intent absent emergency circum-
stances.47  Nor should such action on the part of the trustee be
necessary where the trust provision is clear.48
Heretofore, the draftsman of a trust instrument has faced in-
creasing challenge in his attempt to transfer extremely broad powers
to the trustee. The outer limits of permissible grants of power have
been defined by public policy considerations and by rules of com-
mon law, both of which have previously been discussed. In addition,
those limits are defined by statute. 9 Certainly, statutes also reflect
public policy. What then is the point of view of the legislature?
The Colorado legislature, by enacting the Colorado Fiduciaries'
Powers Act,50 has taken a step in the right direction. The adoption
43Dabney v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 196 F.2d 668, 675 (2d Cir. 1952), states, "The law
ought not make trusteeship so hazardous that responsible individuals and corporations
will shy away from it." See Niles, supra note 13. Mr. Niles pleads for a more
realistic judicial view of the trustee's plight. He feels that the overly inflexible rule
of undivided loyalty has in the long run worked to the detriment of the beneficiary
and that legislative reform is needed. Cf. Carter v. Rolland, 11 Humph. 333, 338
(Tenn. 1850).
44 See text accompanying notes 20, 21 supra.
45 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 201 (1959).
" Not only is the settlor's intention thwarted where the law states that it need not be,
but bad precedent is or may be established.
47 In re Pulitzer's Estate, 139 Misc. 575, 249 N.Y.S. 87 (Sur. Ct. 1931).
48 Fratcher, Trustees' Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 627 (1962).
49 See Report of Subcommittee, supra note 23; Niles, supra note 13. Both sources are
in agreement that a skilled and clever draftsman can provide for modified duty of
loyalty and consideration of third party interests.
50 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-8-1 to -8-8 (Supp. 1967).
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of the Act reflects a realistic, contemporary approach."' An under-
lying purpose of the Act is to alleviate the problem of undue com-
mon law restrictions on the trustee's actions. The Act confers many
specific powers upon the trustee, including powers which have been
interpreted to be self-dealing under the common law." It broadly
empowers the fiduciary to do every act reasonably necessary to
administer the trust without the necessity of court administration
or the need for such authorization in the trust instrument.53  Unless
the trust terms restrict these grants of power,54 they exist by virtue
of the statute in every Colorado trust. At the same time, the statute
imposes upon the fiduciary the duty to act reasonably and equitably
with due regard for his obligation and responsibility toward the
interest of the beneficiaries, the estate or trust, and its purposes.5
Thus, the Act provides for increased flexibility, ease of trust ad-
ministration, and trustee self-regulation.
Prior to the passage of this Act, the trustee's discretionary de-
cisions concerning the administration of the trust were made at his
peril. The Colorado statute should relieve the trustee from these
sometimes ancient and now outdated restrictions of the common law.
It is not suggested, however, that, had the Act been appli-
cable to the Rippey case, a different decision would have been
reached. It is suggested that, had the court applied the principles
51 24 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 191 (1965),
states:
Increased flexibility in the exercise of investment powers attendant
upon the enactment of "prudent man" rule investment statutes has sug-
gested the advisability of extending the same principle to the field of
trustees' powers generally. Greater reliance is thereby placed upon trustee
self-regulation rather than upon trustor restriction to protect the fulfillment
of trust puposes without depriving a trustor of power to impose trust
power restrictions if he wishes so to do.
The proposed Uniform Trustees' Powers Act accepts the premise that in
the trusts to which the act applies (§§ 1, 8) the trustees' powers should be
commensurate with the duties of the trustee acting as a prudent man (§
1 (3)) to perform the purposes of the trust in the absence of trust restrictions
on such powers (§§ 1, 2). Accordingly: first, "the trustee has the power to
perform, without court authority, every act which a prudent man would
perform for the purposes of the trust including but not limited to powers
specified in" Section 3 (c) ; and whether or not otherwise existing restric-
tions on the scope of powers conferred would exist but for the act; second,
the trustee is not absolved from "his obligation as a fiduciary" except in
the case of certain so-called self-dealing powers (§ 3 (c) (1), (4), (6),
(18), (25), § 3 (b)) the exercise of which nevertheless continues subject
to prudent man requirements; and third, with respect to the exercise of
trust powers, third persons dealing with the trustee are protected (§ 7).
Other provisions are included relating to trustees' powers.
For a basic review of the underlying theory of the Uniform Trustees'
Powers Act as drafted, see Professor William F. Fratcher's article entitled
"Trustees' Powers Legislation" published in New York University Law
Review, June, 1962, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 625[sic)-664.
52
Coto. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-8-4 (1), (2), (n), (q), (r) (Supp. 1967).
53 Id. § 57-8-4 (1)
54 Id. § 57-8-3.
55 Id. § 57-8-4 (1).
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behind the Act and had the court viewed the common law rules as
analyzed in this article, effect would have been given to the trust
provision allowing the trustee to consider the interest of a third party.
Finally, although the Colorado Fiduciaries' Powers Act in-
creases the efficiency of trust administration by relieving the trustee
of many restrictions, further legislation may be desirable. England
has gone further in one respect. Should a breach of trust be found,
the English Act may be applicable to relieve the trustee of liability
if he has acted in good faith and ought fairly to be excused.56 This
presents an advanced policy position from the one taken by Ameri-
can courts which refuse to hear any excuses or defenses when they
determine that the trustee is in an unauthorized position of conflict
of interest.
57
The English Act and its function within the context of trustee
sales has been analyzed by Mr. E. H. Bodkin, an English barrister,
who stated:
The court has always recognized the difficulties in which
trustees may be placed in the conduct of the negotiations [for sale]
through no fault of their own. The ommission of the trustees to
obtain the directions of the Court was always a material con-
sideration . . . .But it may be impossible to obtain such directions
where there are rival offers. The modern practice of signing an
agreement subject to contract may also be thought to have further
loaded the scales against trustees, as it has increased the period
during which they may consider themselves morally bound to a
purchaser. Trustees may now be relieved under section 61 of the
Trustee Act, 1925, if they have acted honestly and reasonably and
ought fairly to be excused for the breach of trust and for omitting
to obtain the directions of the Court. . . .Further it appears to
follow . . . that the fact that the trustees acted contrary to the
express wishes of a beneficiary would not prevent the Court from
considering that they ought "fairly to be excused."
5 8
The specific language of section 61 of The Trustee Act, 1925, is as
follows:
61. Power to relieve trustee from personal liability. - If it appears
to the court that a trustee, whether appointed by the court or
otherwise, is or may be personally liable for any breach of trust,
whether the transaction alleged to be a breach of trust occurred
before or after the commencement of this Act, but has acted
honestly and reasonably, and ought fairly to be excused for the
breach of trust and for omitting to obtain the direction of the court
in the matter in which he committed such breach, then the court may
relieve him either wholly or partly from personal liability for the
same.
59
The preliminary note to this statute instructs that the language of
56The Trustee Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 19, § 61.
5 See text and authorities cited note 21 supra.
58 Bodkin, supra note 42, at 2 33-34.
59 The Trustee Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 19, § 61.
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section 61 is wide and that narrow constructions should be avoided.
Its purpose was to give to the court the power to relieve an honest
trustee in proper cases.6°
CONCLUSION
The present state of the common law already supports a con-
clusion that a trustee can consider the interest of a third person
without breaching his duty of loyalty to the trust beneficiary, pro-
vided that the trust authorized him to do so. However, the court
which decided the Rippey case held that such consideration was a
breach of trust. Colorado's new Fiduciaries' Powers Act expresses
a legislative intent that trustees be relieved of some of the more
conservative trust rules which have traditionally hampered sound
trust management. However, with the Rippey case now reported,
new legislation which specifically overrules the holding in Rippey -
since the Act does so only inferentially - will probably be neces-
sary to change its unwelcome force and effect. Until legislation is
enacted, trust administration in all its facets will be unsettled, and the
beneficiaries will suffer as a result. The settlor's intent and purpose
may well be thwarted, and the very purpose for the undivided
loyalty rule is wholly or partially defeated. This need not be so.
Lewis T. Babcock
60 26 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 7-8 (2d ed. 1951).
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